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ABSTRACT
THE USE OF EXEMPLA FROM CICERO TO PLINY THE YOUNGER
David C. Urban
Joseph Farrell
This dissertation  expands our  picture of Roman  exemplarity  by  focusing  on  exempla  as 
they  are used to construct arguments.  In  contrast to recent studies of the practice, 
instead of focusing on  repeatedly  cited instances in  a  series of different  texts,  my 
argument centers on repeated patterns in  which  authors deploy  exempla.  I suggest that 
Roman  exemplarity  constructs a  mode of moral and practical  reasoning  that  conditions 
its users to repeat  a  pattern  of imbuing  and responding  to meaning  in  the exempla they 
select  for  themselves.  I focus on  texts that  present themselves as dealing  directly  with 
contemporary  society: in particular  forensic  oratory,  epistolography  and satire.  Cicero 
and Pliny  the Younger  provide the central anchors for  my  discussion.  The chapters of 
this dissertation  frame and supplement the current discussion  by  exploring  several of the 
most prominent  uses of exempla. The first  chapter  builds on  Quintilian’s discussion  of 
exemplary  comparison to demonstrate the malleable nature of moral arguments based in 
comparisons between  narratives.  The second chapter  focuses on  exempla featuring 
nameless figures which  consequently  emphasize patterns of action rather  than  the 
authority  of the actor.  Such exempla display  close connections with  declamations and 
fables, creating  a  triangle of relationships through which  factual and fictional narratives 
influence one another.  In  my  third chapter,  I demonstrate  that exempla  which  claim  to 
illustrate how  things are provide a  powerful means to forestall  judgment  or obscure 
status distinctions. The final  chapter  explores the frequently  superficial deployment  of 
exempla as emblems: where anonymous exempla  emphasize actions as opposed to 
actors,  exempla  deployed as emblems foreground the status and authority  of the actor 
while downplaying the narrative details of the action.  Exemplarity  provides a  useful 
window onto the patterns of Roman moralism.
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Introduction
Most  people are other  people. Their thoughts are someone else’s opinions, their 
lives a mimicry, their passions a quotation.
       Oscar Wilde, De profundis
Most  Romans were other Romans. By  tradition  and education,  they  were acculturated to 
adapt  and adopt for  themselves the behaviors,  attitudes and opinions they  approved in 
others.  As a  central element  of this practice, Romans used exempla — examples of 
particular  acts or  attitudes they  identified as models for  emulation, illustrations, or 
symbolic emblems.  Roman  exemplarity  constitutes a form  of cultural modeling  that 
unites both  moral and practical decision-making under  the belief that  individual 
behavior should reflect and emulate that of other members of society.
To explain  the particularity  of Roman exemplarity,  we must examine how  they 
used exempla. In  this dissertation, I primarily  discuss exempla  of human  actions, 
because such  instances form  the basis for  moral reflection  and argument.  Central to the 
function of exempla is the process of analogy. Such  comparisons may  be direct, implied 
or  merely  potential. An  exemplum  may  provide an  example that  serves as a  model for 
emulation, or  as an  illustration. It  may  also serve in  a more symbolic mode as an emblem 
that  carries cultural  authority. Virtually  everyone, of course, uses examples as a  method 
of argument.  But  the Romans are exceptional  in  the degree to which  they  promoted 
examples themselves as the core of their  understanding of morality.  Contrast this focus 
on  examples as the basis for  ethics with  other  methods used elsewhere in  the ancient 
Mediterranean  such  as the proverbs of wisdom  literature or  the abstract definitions of 
philosophy.  Romans often contrasted themselves with  the Greeks,  describing  themselves 
as men of action, the Greeks as men of words. 1 They  consequently  formed their  ethics 
through  the analysis and comparison  of particular  actions,  typically  expressed in 
narrative form. The Roman  attitude toward these models of behavior  is primarily 
1
1 E.g. Vergil, Aen. 6.847-53; Hor. Ars 323-330; Quintilian, IO 12.2.27-30.
practical; categorization  or  systemization  only  occur  at  a  secondary  level,  removed from 
the day-to-day  arguments and decisions in  which  exempla  found their  primary  use.  This 
emphasis on  action  paradoxically  produces a  more malleable value system  than  the 
supposedly  slippery  emphasis on  the word.  The Roman  focus on actions — and 
consequently  on  narratives of those actions — in  effect allows storytelling  devices such  as 
framing  and editing to shape the ethical content of such  acts. Cicero’s discussion  of 
friendship in  his dialogue De amicitia  provides a  cogent demonstration  of the Roman 
tendency  to approach even  theoretical  definitions through  the medium  of exempla: the 
central  speaker  in  the dialogue, Laelius, is useful to Cicero as a  voice not  only  for  his 
philosophical reputation, but  far  more for  his well known  friendship with  Scipio 
Aemilianus that provides the spur for discussion in the dialogue.
This preference for  inculcating moral instruction  through the use of exempla 
provides a  useful point  of entry  for  thinking about the Roman  moral universe. The 
fragmentation  of moral ideas into discrete,  portable units mimics the ad hoc  character  of 
the underlying  moral system.  Exemplarity  reveals a sort  of detail-oriented or 
particularist  ethics. It  focuses attention  on  the practical  effectiveness of particular 
observed,  remembered or  proposed behaviors rather  than  on  the relationship of those 
acts to some broad abstract  system. While Roman moral discourse often  suggests that  its 
various injunctions represent elements within  a  broader, coherent  ethical  code — the 
mos  maiorum — in  actual practice  authors and speakers draw  their  responses to 
immediate issues from  a vast  smorgasbord of potential  actions and attitudes that find 
their  expression  in  the array  of moral exempla available for  use on  any  given  topic. Of 
course,  exemplarity  involves both  ethical and practical concerns.2 In  fact  the indefinite 
boundary  between practical  and moral exempla helps to maintain  the entire system  by 
grounding  the concept of imitation  in  clearly  valid practical comparisons.  Romans 
2
2 See also Roller (2009) 215.
deployed exempla to provide instruction  in  eminently  practical  matters such  as military 
command,  laying  primary  attention  on  efficacy.3 The Roman  use of exempla is at  its 
heart  the deployment of comparisons between discrete actions with  the goal  of gauging 
the relative effect  — whether  practical or  moral — of those particular  acts. Identifying 
acts as representing  particular  ethical categories,  or  collecting  groups of stories under 
particular  rubrics, are secondary  accretions on  the core functionality  of exemplary 
comparison. Roman  exemplarity  is interested far more in  practical application and 
patterns of action  than  in  abstract  definition.  The story  of Fabricius, to cite  a  famous 
exemplum, does not explain what frugality is, but rather how to perform frugality.
As the core element of a  popular,  practical ethics, this analogical  pattern of 
thought creates a  system  that  is amazingly  supple and resilient,  but at the same time 
susceptible to rhetorical manipulation  and ethical  opportunism. Nameless exempla 
could serve in  place  of the more obvious historical  names,  activating  similar  habits of 
thought while drawing  the deployment  of their  narratives closer  to fable and fiction than 
to evocations of historical  memory.  Authors and speakers could manipulate the 
boundaries between  illustrative and extraordinary  acts either  to reassure or  to castigate 
their  audience.  When  they  function  as illustrations,  exempla  may  sometimes take on  a 
role  in  encouraging moderation  or  a  relaxation  in  standards. Speakers and writers may 
in  fact  use  them  to argue against  a  too strict  application of moral standards or  judgment. 
Such illustrations may  demonstrate the advantages obtained by  maintaining a  careful 
balance between the good and the bad,  or  may  promote an  understanding of the 
common fallibility  of both  the judge of morals and the object of judgment.  At  times, 
Romans could deploy  exempla simply  as emblems of cultural authority  with  little 
concern  for  the particular  details of their  original context. Frequently  recasting  well-
known narratives risks creating  cognitive dissonance for  an audience unprepared to 
3
3 E.g. Frontinus, Strategemata. See Campbell (1987) on the use of this and other such 
military manuals in the instruction of military commanders during the Imperial period.
accept such  narrative flexibility. The assumption of ethical continuity  between  various 
retellings of any  particular  exemplum  allowed audiences subconsciously  to protect 
themselves from  an uncomfortable sense of the implicit relativism  of such  appeals to 
tradition. 4 By  rooting  their system  of ethical thought in  a practice of comparison  and 
analogy,  Romans provided themselves with  a  malleable and adaptable means of 
promoting and evaluating themselves and their actions.
The Roman practice of exemplarity  encompasses a  far  more diverse range of 
activities than  has sometimes been noted.  Much of the recent work  on exempla has 
focused on  their  role in  cultural memory  and the Roman conception of,  and relation to, 
their  own  history.  In  illuminating those subjects,  however, scholars have artificially 
separated the narratives of well-known  historical actors from  the pattern of practical 
ethical reflection  in which they  functioned.  Though  historical exempla of famous persons 
and events constitute a  salient  element of Roman exemplarity,  such  narratives do not 
exhaust  the range of material for  analogical reflection. The primary  advantage to the 
study  of well-known  historical  exempla  is simply  the ease with  which  they  can be 
recognized in  texts and monumental constructions. Restricting critical focus to such 
exempla artificially  limits and thereby  distorts our  understanding of the functioning  of 
exempla themselves. This practice also encourages circular  argument: we begin  with 
frequently  attested figures because they  offer  a  fuller  picture, then  conclude that  fame 
and repeated citation  are core elements of exemplarity  because our  examples are 
frequently  attested.  While it  often  makes use of historical  actors and events,  Roman 
exemplarity  is not  about history  per se. In fact,  as I discuss in  the following  section 
(section  0.1), Roman sources repeatedly  identify  current events and figures within  living 
memory as the primary source of exempla.
This introduction  falls into four sections. In  the first,  I demonstrate the emphasis 
4
4 For the term ‘ethical continuity,’ see Roller (2004) 34-38.
placed on  the use of contemporary  sources by  several  ancient  authors in  describing the 
educational  function  of exempla.  As these accounts reveal, personally  observed 
contemporary  references provide the essential  frameworks through  which  Romans 
approached their  social and political world. Next, I outline the history  of modern 
scholarship on  this topic  which  frequently  turns to Roman  historiography,  rather  than 
the educational texts,  to provide the core of their  theoretical explanations for 
exemplarity.  The third section  argues that immediate context or  local understandings 
provide the central force in  determining the range of exempla  available for  use in  any 
given  text.  Authors thus select their  examples with  reference not to some stable canon  of 
culturally  approved figures but rather  to the references they  expect to appear  most 
familiar  or  resonant to their  audience.  Finally,  in  closing,  I outline the structure of this 
dissertation as a whole.
0.1: The Foundation of Exemplary Knowledge: Personal Observation
This section  serves primarily  as a  reading  of representative texts designed to highlight 
the centrality  of local  exempla  collected by  personal observation. In  contrast  to most 
modern  treatments of exemplarity  which  focus on  well known  exempla  drawn  from 
history,  here I argue that  Romans regarded instances within  their  living  memory  as the 
most effective source of exempla. They  saw  examples as educational  tools, focused 
sometimes on  moral  development, sometimes on  practical skills.  Some of the most 
frequently  cited statements about  moral education  focus specifically  on  imitating models 
within  the local  community  or  whom  one has personally  observed (e.g.  Ter., Ad.  414-19; 
Hor., Ser.  1.4.105-21; Seneca,  Ep.  1.6.5).  The institutions of contubernium  or  tirocinium 
fori — educating adolescent  aristocrats by  means of apprenticeship to respected military 
or  political figures — demonstrates a  more formal aspect of this practice (e.g.  Cic.  De off. 
2.46; Pliny, Ep.  8.14.4-5; Tac., Dialog.  34.1).  Even when  this practice is directed toward 
the formation  of character, practical consequences tend to be heavily  emphasized.  In  the 
5
story  Horace tells about  receiving moral education  from  his father,  for  example,  he 
focuses primarily  on  material  or  social  consequences — poverty, gossip, etc.  — of the 
indicated vices (Serm.  1.4.105-21). Above all, these accounts of exemplary  learning 
should encourage us to focus on  the imitator  rather  than  the original  actor in 
understanding the function of exempla.
A  frequently  cited passage from  Seneca’s Epistulae Morales  emphasizes living 
persons as the primary  sources for  exempla.  Seneca  deploys the term  exemplum  to 
represent  a  mode of learning  by  personally  observing  an  authoritative model: 
“Nevertheless the living  voice and social interaction  will benefit  you  more than 
discussion; you ought  to come to the scene of action,  first  because people trust their  eyes 
more than  their  ears,  second because the journey  through  precepts is long,  but  the one 
through  exempla  is quick  and efficient”  (Plus  tamen tibi et viva vox et convictus quam 
oratio proderit; in rem  praesentem venias oportet,  primum  quia homines  amplius 
oculis  quam  auribus credunt,  deinde quia longum iter est per praecepta, breve et 
efficax per exempla, Sen., Ep.  6.5).  In  making this claim,  Seneca  clearly  defines exempla 
not as historical  instances known  through  books or  other  monuments,  but  rather  as 
living  persons with  whom  the observer  is personally  acquainted.  He describes this 
method as a  sort of apprenticeship, illustrating  his claim  with  exempla  drawn  from  the 
salutary  effect of the founders of philosophical  schools on  their  immediate disciples,  for 
example: “Cleanthes would not  have throughly  imitated Zeno,  if he had only  heard him: 
he took  part in  his life,  he examined his secrets, he observed whether  that man  lived by 
his own rule.”  (Zenonem Cleanthes  non expressisset,  si tantummodo  audisset: vitae eius 
interfuit,  secreta perspexit,  observavit illum, an ex formula sua viveret,  Ep.  6.6).5 Thus 
in  this letter  Seneca  privileges face-to-face interactions as the core of exemplary 
education.
6
5 Seneca also cites Plato and Aristotle as students of Socrates, and Metrodorus, 
Hermarchus and Polyaenus as students of Epicurus.
Although  Seneca  chooses to illustrate his argument with  examples of Greek 
philosophers,  such  master-student  relationships also constitute an  core element in 
training the Roman elite. The forms of apprenticeship that prepared aristocratic  youths 
for  their  military  and political careers — the contubernium  and tirocinium fori — 
demonstrate the importance of observing and emulating  contemporary  models. 
Instructing  his son  on  how  to be a  good Roman  aristocrat,  Cicero discusses such 
relationships as a  means for  a  young man  to shape his public  reputation  through 
aspirational modeling: “Moreover young  men  become known  most  easily  and in  the best 
way, who devote themselves to famous and wise men  who take good care for  the 
republic,  and if they  are frequently  with  them, they  convey  to the people the belief that 
they  are going  to be similar  to those men  whom  they  have assigned to themselves for 
imitation”  (Facillume autem  et in optimam  partem  cognoscuntur adulescentes, qui se 
ad claros  et sapientes viros  bene consulentes rei publicae contulerunt,  quibuscum  si 
frequentes  sunt, opinionem  populo  adferunt eorum  fore se  similes,  quos  sibi ipsi 
delegerint ad imitandum, Cic.  De off.  2.46). 6 Cicero uses such  relationships as evidence 
for  character in  some of his speeches. In  his defense of Cn. Plancius,  for instance,  he 
claims that  Plancius’s service  under  A. Torquatus in Africa  provides evidence of his good 
character  (Planc.  27).  Likewise he attempts to counter attacks on  M. Caelius’s character 
based on the younger  man’s association with  both  M. Crassus and Cicero himself (Cael. 
9). In  the same manner,  Tacitus uses his father-in-law  Agricola’s service under Suetonius 
Paulinus in Britain to demonstrate Agricola’s good character (Agr. 5).
7
6 See Cic. De am. 1, Brut. 305-306, and Quint. Inst. 12.6.7 on Cicero’s own education 
with Q. Mucius Scaevola augur and others. At Tac. Dial. 34.1, Messalla claims that the 
practice has ceased, but compare Dial. 2.1 (on Tacitus’s own education) and 20.4. Pliny, 
Ep. 2.14.10 mentions Quintilian’s attendance on Domitius Afer for this sort of training, 
and Ep. 8.14.4-5 discusses the practice as the preferred method for learning Senate 
procedure. See Campbell (1987) 20-22 on this practice, focusing primarily on military 
training, and Mayer (1990) 143-44. Van der Blom (2010) 311-315 discusses Cicero as ‘An 
exemplum and teacher to the younger generation.’
The younger  Pliny  offers an  extensive comment  on  this form  of education  by 
apprenticeship to and consultation  with  established authoritative figures.  In  an obituary 
letter  for  a  younger friend,  Pliny  complains that  young men of his day  have abandoned 
the practice of taking  their  elders as models: “This is rare among  our  young  men.  For 
how  few  yield as the lesser  either  to the age or  authority  of another? Straightaway  they 
are wise,  straightaway  they  know  everything, they  revere no one, they  imitate no one, 
and they  themselves are exempla  for  themselves”  (Rarum hoc in adulescentibus nostris. 
Nam  quotus  quisque vel aetati alterius  vel auctoritati ut minor cedit? Statim sapiunt, 
statim  sciunt omnia,  neminem verentur, neminem  imitantur,  atque  ipsi sibi exempla 
sunt, Pliny,  Ep.  8.23.3).  Notably,  these young men have not  actually  stopped using 
exempla, but  rather  have chosen  to look  only  to themselves for  models.  Pliny’s 
complaint, then,  is not  that they  have ceased to model themselves on  observed examples, 
but rather  that  they  have chosen  to ignore older  contemporaries, like Pliny  himself,  as 
sources for  those examples.  He directs his criticism  at  the young  men who refuse to learn 
from  the sources he would prefer, not  at  the elders or  the system  of education.7 Pliny’s 
young friend,  of course,  is different: “But  not Avitus,  who possessed this particular 
prudence,  that  he judged others to be wiser,  [and] this particular  learning that he wanted 
to learn”  (Sed non Avitus, cuius haec  praecipua prudentia, quod alios prudentiores 
arbitrabatur,  haec praecipua eruditio  quod discere volebat, Ep.  8.23.3).  Pliny’s account 
identifies Avitus’s guides not  as historical figures,  but as older  contemporaries. In 
addition to Pliny  himself,  these models include his superiors in  military  service and 
political office: “What obedience he offered to Servianus, a  most  precise man! [Avitus] in 
the office of tribune so understood and charmed that  commander  that not as a  fellow-
soldier  but  as a  companion  and assistant he followed him  traveling  from  Germany  to 
Pannonia. With  what diligence, what modesty  as a  quaestor  was he no less delightful  and 
8
7 Contrast Riggsby (1995) 132 who interprets this comment as a reference to historical 
exempla.
welcome to his consuls (and he served many) than he was useful!”  (Quod ille obsequium 
Serviano exactissimo viro  praestitit! quem legatum tribunus ita et intellexit et cepit,  ut 
ex Germania in Pannoniam transeuntem non ut commilito sed ut comes  adsectatorque 
sequeretur. Qua industria qua modestia quaestor,  consulibus  suis  (et plures  habuit) non 
minus  iucundus et gratus  quam utilis  fuit!, Ep. 8.23.5).  Pliny  combines two ideas in 
praising  Avitus: imitating  his superiors makes him  a  better  person, and also makes him 
better liked by those he thus flatters.
While  Pliny  describes a relatively  elevated stratum  of Roman  society, Horace’s 
well-known lines on  his father  teaching him  how  to behave demonstrate the same 
analogical process of exemplarity  occurring  in  less exalted circumstances (Serm. 
1.4.105-121).8 Horace, like Seneca  and Pliny, asserts the primacy  of personal observation, 
not reading,  for  collecting examples of behavior. In  this passage, Horace’s father 
indicates several  negative examples by  name, but  these names—the son  of Albius (Albi… 
filius, 109), Baius (110),  Scaetanus (112) and Trebonius (114)—do not  belong  to known 
individuals.9 Indeed Horace appends brief comments to each  name to indicate the exact 
nature of that  man  and the lesson  to be drawn  from  his actions, for  example: “So that I 
would not  pursue adulteresses,  when  I could engage in  permitted sex,  he used to say, ‘the 
rumor about Trebonius,  who was caught  in  the act, is not good’”  (ne sequerer moechas, 
concessa cum venere uti | possem,  ‘deprensi non bella est fama Treboni,’ | aiebat,  Serm. 
1.4.113-15).10  Such  names allow  Horace to present  the process of drawing  ethical 
judgments from  analogies between  oneself and other  social actors without actually 
attacking identifiable persons. His description  of his father’s lesson  itself functions as an 
exemplum  for  the identification  and interpretation  of exempla,  as well  as a model  for 
9
8 This passage has sometimes been cited in discussions of exemplarity, cf. Skidmore 
(1996) 19, Chaplin (2000) 11-12.
9 See Rudd (1966) 132-59 on names in Horace, esp. 137 on the names in these lines.
10 Cf. Val. Max. 7.3.10: an anonymous father dissuades his son from a dangerous love 
affair by encouraging him to visit prostitutes.
training children  through  the use of exempla. Consequently  the form  of this lesson is at 
least  as important  as its specific content,  particularly  for  readers to whom  the specific 
examples – the son  of Albius, Baius, Scaetanus, and Trebonius – are no more than 
anonymous names attached to a  series of moral commonplaces. 11 The very  process of 
exemplary  reflection  provides the central content  of Horace’s education from  his father. 
By  observing the behaviors of others and the social  reactions they  provoke, individuals 
can  thereby  reflect  on their  own actions and intentions through the mirror  of analogies 
drawn both from others and from their own past history.
Expanded to the level of Roman  society  as a  whole,  Tacitus’s description  of the 
atrophy  of republican  sentiment through  the principate of Augustus likewise stresses the 
importance of personal  observation  for  creating  social views. In  the opening  paragraphs 
of his Annales,  he claims that  the passage of time eliminated those who personally 
remembered the republic  and thus ruptured the tradition  of government: “The younger 
men  had been born  after  the victory  at Actium, most  old men  as well had been  born 
during  the civil  wars. How  few  were there remaining  who would had seen  the republic? 
Therefore,  since the circumstances of the state had changed, there was nothing  anywhere 
of the old, unchanged custom”  (iuniores post Actiacam  victoriam,  etiam  senes plerique 
inter bella  civium  nati. quotus  quisque reliquus qui rem publicam  vidisset? igitur verso 
civitatis  statu nihil usquam prisci et integri moris, Tac. Ann.  1.3-4).  As Richard Alston 
comments on  this passage: “Indeed,  the process only  seems complete when the politics 
of the republic had become a purely  historical  phenomenon, not  something about  which 
living  Romans had experience.” 12 Tacitus’s statement  may  appear  to suggest  a rupture 
10
11 Chaplin (2000) 11-12 cites both this passage of Horace and Terence Ad. 414-19 in order  
to demonstrate “the singular emphasis within the Roman aristocratic world on the past 
as all that was worthy of imitation and emulation, particularly in the guidance and 
training of the young” (11). Just as in the Horace passage, however, Demea in the 
Adelphoe seems to teach his son through the observation of immediate, local examples 
and to present this activity as a continuing process: denique | inspicere, tamquam in 
speculum, in vitas omnium | iubeo atque ex aliis sumere sibi (414-16).
12 Alston (2008) 151. He suggests a link between this and the transition between saecula.
between  Republican  exemplarity  and that under  the Principate,  but  such  a  rupture only 
appears if you  focus on content rather  than process: Tacitus in fact explains the rupture 
specifically  in  terms of a  continuous practice of exemplarity  that  centers on exempla 
within  living  memory. In  the opening  sentences of the Annales, the historian 
suggestively  emphasizes the  brevity  of earlier  interruptions in  the republican 
government: “Dictatorships were appointed at  times; neither  did the power of the 
decemvirs  last  longer  than  two years nor  did the consular  power  of the military  tribunes 
hold sway  for  long.  Cinna’s rule was not  long,  nor  was Sulla’s;  and Pompey’s and Caesar’s 
power  quickly  passed to Caesar,  Lepidus’s and Antony’s military  might quickly  passed to 
Augustus”  (dictaturae ad tempus sumebantur; neque decemviralis  potestas  ultra 
biennium,  neque tribunorum  militum consulare ius  diu valuit.  non Cinnae,  non Sullae 
longa dominatio; et Pompei Crassique potestas cito  in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii 
arma in Augustum  cessere,  Tac. Ann.  1.1).  In  contrast  to the extended rule of Augustus, 
the brief periods during  which  these alternate governments held power  were insufficient 
to erase the Republic  from  living memory.  Tacitus thus implicitly  builds his explanation 
for  the shift  from  Republic  to Principate on  the idea  that  personal observation  of living 
examples provides the determining lens through  which  the exemplary  view  of the world 
takes shape.
0.2: Exemplary  History  and Cultural  Memory  in  Theories of Roman 
Exemplarity.
Modern studies of exemplarity  generally  look to the programmatic  claims of Roman 
historians in  order  to ground their  explanations of the role of exempla  in  Roman society. 
These accounts of the Roman practice often focus on well-known, frequently  attested 
anecdotes and authorized interpretations of those events displayed through  monuments, 
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official decrees and public ceremonies.13 In  one common approach,  scholars focus on 
historiographical justifications for  the utility  of history. Evoking the exemplar theory  of 
history,  developed from  claims by  ancient historians that their  works provide models for 
imitation,  they  thus adopt  those arguments for  history’s relevance to explain  exemplarity 
as a  method of learning  from  history.14 Modern  scholars also frequently  cite the “custom 
of the ancestors”  (mos maiorum)  as a  concept to explain  Roman exemplarity.  In 
deploying  this idea,  they  likewise privilege historical models over  contemporary  ones by 
focusing on  the identity  of the  “ancestors” or  “elders” (maiores): Who were these 
“ancestors”? Which  people were eligible to become “ancestors”? How  did they  become 
“ancestors”? By  treating  the “ancestors”  (maiores) as if they  were a  gradually  expanding 
but essentially  fixed library  of culturally  authorized models,  scholars consequently 
assume that transmitting the mos maiorum  involves a  relatively  straightforward process 
of selecting  from  the official canon of exempla  provided by  these “ancestors,”  or  from 
some subset  of this canon  such  as the ancestors in one’s own family.  In  contrast,  by 
focusing on  the transmission  of the mos  rather  than  the identification  of the maiores, 
and by  locating  that  process within  the practice of modeling  personal behavior  on  older 
contemporary  figures discussed in  the previous section, a  more vibrantly  engaged 
pattern  emerges for  the transmission of tradition.  I argue that,  rather  than  seeing Roman 
actors as reaching  back into history  to discover  models for  their  actions, we should 
instead understand them  as looking  to their  immediate elders and superiors as 
transmitters of tradition. These figures from  living  memory  serve as the last  link in  a 
chain  of imitation  that stretches back to those famous names from  history  which  modern 
studies usually  treat  as the primary  objects of exemplarity. Those figures, which  we 
might  term  ‘ur-exempla,’ often serve as emblems for  the process of analogical  reasoning 
12
13 Cf. Litchfield (1914); Maslakov (1984); Hölkeskamp (1996); David (1998a); Lehmann 
(1998); Loutsch (1998); Chaplin (2000); Stemmler (2000); Roller (2004); Gowing 
(2005); Bartsch (2006).
14 On the exemplary theory of history, see Nadel (1964).
rather  than as models for  direct emulation. Thus historical  exempla represent more the 
idea of Roman tradition (mos maiorum) than the substance of tradition itself.
Henry  Wheatland Litchfield in  an influential early  article discussing  national 
exempla virtutis  approaches the use of historical  examples as a  sort  of moral code.  He 
transposes exemplary  history  directly  into a sort of moral philosophy  and attempts to 
describe a  systematized depiction  of virtues through  exempla.  Oddly, his naively 
Christianist  attitude toward pagan  moral thought may  have distracted attention  from  his 
identification  of the essential importance of exempla for  individual ethical reflection.  In 
cataloging these ‘examples of moral  virtues’ (exempla moralium  virtutum),  he dismisses 
contemporary  references from  primary  consideration. 15 His work  consequently  privileges 
the traditional, generally  Republican,  exempla  most  frequently  cited by  extant  Roman 
writers over  a  broad span  of time.  Litchfield thus played an  important  role in  structuring 
the modern approach  to this subject.  His criteria  for  defining what  constitutes an 
exemplum  and the conclusions he draws from  his compilation  of references seem  to have 
created some basic  — and distorting  — assumptions about  the history  of the Roman 
culture of exemplarity.  In  particular,  his identification  of an  apparent fossilization of the 
cultural  stock of exempla in  the early  Empire has been  enormously  influential on later 
critics as the frequent limitation of studies to the period of the Republic demonstrates. 
The frequent  appearances of this limited number  of Republican figures also affects the 
later  work on  exemplarity  by  Hölkeskamp, Roller  and others who focus heavily  on 
figures whose frequent appearance in  the extant  literary  and monumental record allows 
greater scope for comparison among separate instances of citation. 16
13
15 Litchfield (1914) 25, 58.
16 Hölkeskamp (1996) concentrates almost exclusively on the Early and Middle Republic.  
Roller (2004) and (2009) focuses on the late Republican and Imperial audiences for 
exempla, but the examples he discusses are drawn almost exclusively from the Republic, 
most from the early Republic.
Recent  studies also link  exemplarity  to the concept  of cultural memory. 17 These 
discussions focus primarily  on  the pre-existing  elements of the original narrative and 
privilege the force of exempla themselves in  the process of memorialization and 
imitation.  Karl-Joachim  Hölkeskamp, in  a  seminal article for  these recent  discussions, 
stresses the  sense – fostered by  the profusion  of monuments and other  sites of memory 
throughout the city  of Rome – in  which  every  Roman  citizen  lived both  with  and within 
the history  of their  city.18  Frequent  reminders of the deeds of various cultural heroes 
produce a  sense of their  continuing presence and guidance.  Hölkeskamp presents a 
vision  of Rome in  which  reminders of famous,  authoritative men  and their deeds were 
everywhere,  but were frequently  separate from  any  broader sense of their  original 
context.  He describes an  atomizing  impulse within Roman  treatments of history: “the 
actual interest  directs itself above all not  toward ‘History’ as a chronologically  structured 
connection between  events, but  toward the happenings themselves,  concrete events, 
even  individual  ‘histories’.” 19 In  this view,  as these histories of individual  events are 
transformed into exempla,  they  become disconnected from  their  particular  contexts and 
their  places within the broader  course of history,  and thus are  reduced into mere type-
figures of particular  virtues.20 This process of reduction  could likewise allow  individual 
names of particular  historical figures to function as evocative markers of one or  more 
values: “The name alone then  evokes directly,  practically  without  digression  through res 
gestae,  one certain  key  concept – or  even,  as in  the case of Curtius Dentatus, Fabricius 
and other individual  ‘household names’ – an  entire catalog  of values,  concentrated in  one 
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17 Hölkeskamp (1996); Gowing (2005) focuses primarily on memory, but includes a fair 
bit of discussion concerning exempla. On Roman memory, see also Farrell (1997).
18 Hölkeskamp (1996) 305. Cf. Roller (2004) 8-9.
19 Hölkeskamp (1996) 309. “Das eigentliche Interesse richtet sich überhaupt nicht auf 
‘die Geschichte’ als chronologisch strukturierten Geschehenszusammenhang, sondern 
auf das Geschehen selbst, konkrete Ereignisse, eben einzelne ‘Geschichten’.” Cf. Roller 
(2004) 31-32 who also compares this narrative decontextualization to that created by an 
encounter with a historical monument.
20 Hölkeskamp (1996) 314, cf. David (1998a) 10 and 12-13.
individual representative figure.” 21 As I discuss in  section 1.2  of the following  chapter, 
however, writers and speakers could use small  additions or exclusions in  the context  of 
an  anecdote to mold the exemplary  meaning of that  event in  sometimes dramatic ways. 22 
While  any  given  citation  of an exemplum  necessarily  includes only  a  limited number of 
details, the particular  details present in any  specific  version  define the meaning of the 
example in that passage.
Matthew  Roller’s 2004  article on  exemplarity  outlines a  four-part  schema  for  the 
creation,  recognition  and imitation  of socially  or  politically  important  actions in  the 
Roman  community.  His model  heavily  emphasizes the original  instance: the first  three 
elements involve the first  instance directly,  namely  the action  itself,  the audience that 
witnesses and judges that action, and the commemoration of the event  through  a 
monument  that reports both  the deed itself and the original  audience’s evaluation.  The 
final element, imitation, appears in  this account  as an attempt to replicate or  improve 
upon  the previous model.23 This model attempts to describe the process by  which  the 
Romans themselves believed they  identified and transmitted social values. Roller  states 
that,  “Romans assumed  that  actions,  audiences,  monuments,  and social  value were or 
should be linked in  these ways. They  often  acted with  a  view  toward being  observed, 
evaluated,  monumentalized,  and imitated,  and assumed that other  people did 
likewise.” 24 This model can  potentially  describe a  variety  of levels on  which  exemplary 
discourse operated, although  Roller’s 2004  article concentrates on  the most  public level 
of discourse,  focusing on  two well-known  mythistorical  figures from  the earliest  years of 
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21 Hölkeskamp (1996) 315, “Allein der Name evoziert dann direkt, practisch ohne Umweg 
über res gestae, einen bestimmten Leitbegriff – oder sogar, wie im Falle des Curtius 
Dentatus, des Fabricius und einiger anderer ‘household names’ – einen ganzen Katalog 
von Tugenden, konzentriert in einer einzigen repräsentativen Figur.”
22 Cf. Gowing (2005) 76-81, which discusses Seneca’s idiosyncratic transformation of 
Cato into a purely moral exemplum (Ep. 14) and of Scipio Africanus into a figure of 
political quietism (Ep. 86).
23 Roller (2004) 4-5 and (2009) 216-17.
24 Roller (2004) 7, emphasis in the original.
the Republic  — Horatius Cocles and Cloelia.  In  a  later  Companion  article on  the same 
topic, he examines the tradition concerning  C. Duilius in  similar  fashion.25 He devotes a 
good deal of attention to the interaction between Romans and the physical 
representations of famous men  and women that  filled the city,  as well as to the 
interaction  between  textual and physical  representations.26 In  line with  his focus on  the 
broadest, most public level of exemplary  discourse, Roller  takes the populus Romanus  as 
a  whole to be the community  that  evaluates and determines the meaning  of individual 
exempla.27  This emphasis on the people as a  unit  leads him  to concentrate more on 
contestation  directed toward producing a unified meaning  at a  specific  point in  time than 
the potential  for  multiple coexisting divergent  traditions of meaning.  The primary  engine 
for  coexisting  variations of a  single exemplum  within this model is the assignment of an 
act  to multiple  ethical categories.28 While Roller  discusses the productive potentials of 
the contestation  of exemplary  meaning,  his view  of such  contestation and change is 
almost always closely tied to the progression of time, whether explicitly or implicitly.29 
A  recent  collection  focused on  Role Models  in the Roman World attempts to 
expand the study  of exemplarity  beyond the literary  sources produced by  and focused on 
the upper  reaches of the office-holding  aristocracy.30 In his introduction  to the volume, 
Bell  suggests that  art  and archaeological  remains provide an  alternative to the literary 
focus of most  studies and may  allow  us to reconstruct  the relationship of the lower 
classes to the use of exempla.  Bell’s overview  of the volume’s purpose assumes that 
exempla enjoy  some stable existence external to their  use, and thus concentrates on 
questions about their  transmission  and selection.  For  example,  the first question  Bell 
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25 Roller (2009), especially 219-29.
26 Roller (2004) passim, esp. 5, 8-9, 10-23, 33-37, 44-50. Cf. Hölkeskamp (1996) 305-8, 
320-26.
27 Roller (2004) 6.
28 Roller (2004) 44: “Many deeds admit of evaluation in multiple ethical categories, with 
conflicting results.”
29 Roller (2004) 7.
30 Bell and Hansen (2008).
sets forth  to describe the aims of the collection  emphasizes variety  in  the means of 
transmission  as a  means to expand the field  of evidence: “What  are the different  media 
for  disseminating  exempla (e.g.,  oral, visual,  epigraphic),  and how  do their  target 
audiences vary  accordingly?” 31  The collection  thus treats these  role models as 
representations drawn  from  a  common  cultural  library  of forms. Another  path  of 
discussion emphasizes exempla as models for  particular  social roles — patterns of 
behavior  appropriate to certain social  circumstances — rather  than  for  individuals 
constructing a  cohesive individual identity. 32 One line of inquiry  pursued by  several 
contributions to the volume,  in  particular  those which  discuss visual representations, 
connects these exemplary  models to artistic archetypes or  stock  scene types. 33  This 
conception  of role modeling nicely  expresses something of the particularist  approach to 
moral  and practical reasoning  that  I identify  in  the Roman  use of exempla:  the attention 
to these examples as models for  certain discrete categories of social interaction 
highlights the typical character  of exempla  not  as type-figures for  abstract virtues,  but 
rather as pattern narratives for particular types of action.
Another  approach  to exemplarity  starts from  rhetorical theory, although  this at 
times has a tendency  to emphasize the Greek-ness of rhetorical theory, ignoring  the 
central  importance of understanding  the audience in  ancient  rhetorical training. 34 
Although  referring  to parallel elements in  Greek discourse, rhetorical approaches to 
Roman  exemplarity  are not  substantially  distorted for  that reason. Scholars such  as 
Alewell and Stemmler  begin  their  discussions by  attempting  to define the difference 
between  Greek  and Roman  rhetorical  definitions of examples (!"#$%&'()" vs. 
exemplum) and thus to discover  the particularly  Roman  character  of the exemplum.35 
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31 Bell (2008) 19.
32 See especially Bell (2008) 20-24 and Hölscher (2008) 52-54; contra Alston (2008).
33 E.g. Davies (2008), Hansen (2008), Hölscher (2008), Von Hesberg (2008). See also 
Imber (2008), who focuses on declamation.
34 E.g. Alewell (1912), Gazich (1990), Stemmler (2000).
35 Alewell (1912) and Stemmler (2000).
Both  authors build their  arguments primarily  on  the brief definitions given  in Cicero’s De 
inventione  and the Rhetorica ad Herennium,  using  Quintilian’s later, but more detailed 
and expansive discussion  only  to supply  a  few  scattered bits of additional information. 36 
Gazich, on  the other  hand,  focuses on  Quintilian’s discussion in order  to determine that 
text’s unique contribution  to the discussion.  These attempts to isolate the distinctively 
Roman  elements in  ancient  definitions of the rhetorical example, while  illuminating 
some interesting  features of the practice,  tend to limit themselves at  the same time 
through  their  focus on  the peculiarity  itself, rather  than  the integration of those 
distinctive elements into the broader argumentative use of examples.
Also useful to consider  are critical  treatments of particular  important texts for 
our  understanding of exempla. The critical  work on  Valerius Maximus done by  Maslakov 
(1984),  Bloomer  (1992), Skidmore (1996) and David et al.  (1998) provides another  point 
of access for  understanding the influence of these examinations on  our  understanding  of 
exemplarity.  In  addition,  the singularity  and importance of Valerius Maximus’s 
collection for  our understanding  of exempla may  introduce selection  criteria  more 
closely  linked to Valerius’s own project  and historical moment than to the broader 
intellectual and cultural  practice of exemplarity. 37 Even Valerius,  however, occasionally 
introduces a  more personal, contemporary  exemplum, in  particular  his references to his 
own  patron  Sextus Pompeius as a  model for  imitation  (2.6.8, 4.7.ext.2b).  Cicero likewise 
provides a  major  focus for studying the use of examples by  a  single prolific  author. In 
recent  years several  book-length  studies have appeared on  exempla in  various categories 
of Cicero’s work: Opperman has discussed the use of examples in  the letters, Bücher  in 
the speeches. 38 Van  der  Blom  has approached the use of exempla throughout  Cicero’s 
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36 Cic. De inv. 1.49 and Rhet ad Her. 4.62. See Quint. Inst. 5.11 for his discussion of 
exempla.
37 Litchfield (1914) 62-63 suggests that Valerius’s collection and other parallel works 
from the late Republic and early Principate led to a fossilization of the exemplary 
cannon.
38 Opperman (2000) and Bücher (2006).
corpus of work,  focusing  on  the orator’s use of such  references as a  novus  homo to 
construct  an  alternative to the ancestral exempla  of officeholders from  established 
aristocratic  families.39 Mayer  has written an  overview  of Seneca’s use of Roman historical 
exempla throughout his work.  Although  Mayer  directs his discussion  at historical 
examples,  he does repeatedly  note Seneca’s participation  in  a  vibrant  tradition that  uses 
contemporary  instances as well as established ones.40  Shelton and Wilcox  have both 
written  articles focused more narrowly  on  Seneca’s use of exempla in his consolationes. 41 
Shelton  discusses the use of examples as a  means of persuasion  in  the ad Marciam, 
while Wilcox examines the relationship of gender  to the understanding  of virtue (virtus) 
in  the two consolationes that  Seneca  addresses to women, the ad Marciam  and the ad 
Helviam. Some recent work has also examined the use of exempla in  Silius Italicus’s 
historical epic.42
Jane Chaplin’s work  on  the use of exempla within  Livy’s history  presents in  some 
ways an earlier  version of my  project  to shift  the focus in  studies of exemplarity  from  the 
original  instances to their  deployment by  speakers and writers in  later  circumstances. 
Her  project, however,  remains (for  obvious reasons) tethered to the concept  of exempla 
as a  form  of specifically  historical material. For the same reasons,  it  also tends to focus 
only  on  the use of exempla in  important  political and military  discussions rather  than  on 
the broader use in  day-to-day  decisions. In  her  introduction,  she suggests that in 
examining  Livy’s use of exempla we should shift  away  from  the creation of these 
instances to the manner  in  which  later  people  put them  to use: “Yet  focusing  solely  on 
characters or  events that  are identifiable as exempla within  their  immediate context 
(such  as Lucretia) does not do full justice to Livy’s statement  about the value of history 
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39 Van der Blom (2010). For earlier work on Cicero’s use of exempla, see e.g. David 
(1980) and Brinton (1988).
40 Mayer (1990) 147, 149.
41 Shelton (1995) and Wilcox (2006).
42 Spentzou (2008) and Tipping (2010).
because this approach encourages a concentration  on the first  part of his claim  — that 
history  is a  storehouse of beneficial lessons — to the detriment of the second — that 
people can tailor  their  actions according to what  they  have learned from  the past.” 43 In 
the course of her  study  she makes a particularly  important  observation  about the pattern 
in  which  speakers cite earlier  examples: the internal  speakers and audiences in  the 
history  typically  prefer  references drawn  from  their  own  living  memory.44  Chaplin’s 
discussion of several speeches in  the work explores the tension  between  Livy’s 
historiographical claims about the utility  of history  and the more contemporary  focus 
displayed by the actors within the historical narrative.
0.3: Exempla as Local Knowledge.
The emphasis on  discovering exempla by  personal observation  in  one’s local community 
(discussed above in  section  0.1) suggests that, rather  than  limiting  themselves to a  fixed 
communal  collection  of exempla,  individual  Romans would build their  own  mental 
libraries of models drawn  from  a variety  of sources:  local,  literary  and monumental. The 
prominence of historical exempla,  particularly  in  public  discourse, merely  reflects the 
need to use recognizable figures in  any  argument that hopes to evoke an emotional 
effect.  The central position  of comparison within this discourse,  however, encourages a 
continual practice of expanding and supplementing personal collections of exempla. 
Writers of the early  Imperial period,  after  the supposed fossilization  of or  revolution  in 
the exemplary  tradition,  provide a  useful corrective to that critical view. Pliny’s letters, 
for  example,  are filled with  references to his contemporaries as models for  behavior,  and 
Tacitus’s Agricola  and Historiae  both  announce themselves as accounts containing 
virtuous deeds and thereby  as sources for  imitation  (e.g.  Agric.  1; Hist. 1.3). The 
preference for  ‘local’ exempla  also helps to explain  the commonly  noted emphasis on 
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43 Chaplin (2000) 2.
44 Chaplin (2000) 108, 120-31.
using  exempla from  an  individual’s own  family  as each  person’s family  forms an  obvious 
local  grouping.  The transmission  of behaviors by  imitation from  one generation  to the 
next provides a  clear path for  the continuity  of particular  traits within  families.  The 
presence of wax images of ancestors (imagines) in  the atria of family  residences would 
reinforce this direct emulation of behaviors from generation to generation.45
Exemplary  thought functioned both on  the level of public  interventions by 
authoritative groups and on  a  more localized or  individual level, although  obviously 
there could be a great  deal of communication between  the more personal and more 
public manifestations of the practice. This communication operates in  both  directions, 
the public  discourse providing formulations to the private one and personal views 
molding  the public  statements of individual actors. Seneca’s use of exempla to structure 
moral  thought  provides one vision of the application  of this discourse on  an individual 
level. He recommends using  memories of men perceived as virtuous to guide one’s own 
actions,  and in  particular  he suggests choosing one single individual to act  as a  personal 
model and overseer.46 Seneca, of course,  takes Cato the Younger  as his personal model 
for  virtuous living.  This choice of a  well-known  Republican exemplum  may  seem  to 
confirm  the emphasis on  a  limited set  of exemplary  figures forming  the core of 
exemplary  discourse,  but  I would suggest that  this emphasis distorts our  picture of the 
typical Roman’s use of the analogical process of exemplary thought. 47 
The process of personal  reflection  through  analogy  exists at  the opposite end of a 
continuum  from  the more public  discourse centered on  monuments, oratory,  histories 
and other  vehicles of collective memory.  An  ethical  system  defined and transmitted 
through  social,  political and historical instances cannot  remain  limited to a 
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45 I discuss the emblematic function of the imagines in section 4.3.
46 E.g Ep. 11.8-10 (Seneca recommends that one choose a particular outstanding 
individual to act as a model and guardian of personal morality) and 52.7-8. Roller (2001) 
88-97 and Gowing (2005) 72-76 discuss Seneca’s attitude toward and use of exempla.
47 Seneca also made rather idiosyncratic use of both Cato and other Republican exempla, 
cf. Gowing (2005) 76-81 on his treatment of Cato and Scipio Africanus.
predetermined set of authorized examples: the underlying  logic  of evaluating  various 
acts by  comparison  with  one another encourages individuals to extend their  own mental 
collections of exempla through  personal observation  and memory. Public 
commemoration  in  fact  is more likely  to be secondary  to the individual practice than  the 
other way  around.  Such  observation,  as we have seen  with  Horace’s Satire  1.4,  forms a 
central  part  in  Roman ethical education. Quintilian in  fact  recommends that  an orator 
should not only  know  both  historical examples and those from  his daily  life,  but even 
those drawn  from  well-known poetry  as well.48 While recent  studies of exempla  have 
focused primarily  on historical  examples at  the public  level of discourse,  this wider 
discourse acts more as a  common  store of references than  as the primary  intellectual  and 
emotional force behind exemplarity  as a  practice. A  speaker  who uses exempla as 
vehicles of rhetorical persuasion  before an  audience must  evoke examples that  are 
meaningful and familiar  to that audience.  While obscure examples may  easily  describe 
technical  details of a proposal, they  cannot  carry  the emotional impact  of a  familiar 
model. Many  modern  accounts follow  the ancient  rhetorical handbooks in  describing  the 
importance for  orators of building a  large store of exempla,  but  they  do not  note as 
clearly  the necessity  for  the audience to possess similar  training.49 If orators must train 
themselves to possess an extensive store of exempla,  their  audience must  be equally 
familiar  with  the same body  of references.  The rhetorical training  shared among orators 
and their aristocratic audiences constitutes a  necessary  medium  for  communication.  An 
orator’s choice  of available exempla is conditioned by  his expectations of his audience’s 
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48 In primis vero abundare debet orator exemplorum copia cum veterum tum etiam 
novorum, adeo ut non ea modo quae scripta sunt historiis aut sermonibus velut per 
manus tradita quaeque cotidie aguntur debeat nosse, verum ne ea quidem quae sunt a 
clarioribus poetis ficta neglegere (Inst. 12.4.1).
49 Cf. Loutsch (1998) 29; Chaplin (2000) 13-15. For representative ancient descriptions 
of exempla as elements in an orator’s arsenal, see: Cic. de Or. 1.18 and 256, Orat. 120, 
Quint. Inst. 10.1.34 and 12.4.1-2.
collective store of references. Broader  audiences thus may  restrict  the variety  of 
examples available for use.
A  provocative suggestion  by  Mary  Beard that declamation  might  function  as a 
sort of Roman  mythology  provides an avenue for reading  something mythopoetic in  the 
process of abstracting, then emulating particular  observed forms of action  that 
characterizes exemplarity. 50  Margaret  Imber  has discussed declamation as training 
students to perform  an aspect  of the role modeling  behavior  that underlies the use of 
exempla, and she highlights Beard’s claim  that  declamations “offer  an  arena  for learning, 
practicing  and recollecting what  it  is to  be and think Roman.” 51 Imber  would prefer  to 
characterize this activity  as ideological rather  than  mythopoetic,  but her  redefinition 
seems to ignore Beard’s use of Barthes’s model  of mythology  as a kind of depoliticized 
speech  that  naturalizes the arbitrariness of ideological claims.52  Expanding  Beard’s 
suggested link between  mythological discourse and declamation  to encompass the 
practice of exemplarity  as a  whole,  we might  even  characterize the educational  practice 
of inculcating morality  through the observation of other  persons as a  method by  which 
individuals were acculturated to mythologize the actions of those around them. As 
Terence’s Demea  describes his method of teaching his son: “I bid him  to look into the 
lives of everyone as if into a  mirror  and to take from  others an  example for 
himself”  (inspicere,  tamquam  in speculum, in vitas omnium | iubeo atque ex aliis 
sumere exemplum  sibi,  Ad. 415-16).53  Unlike Barthes’s focus on  widely  shared texts 
produced as elements of mass culture,  or  Beard’s more Hellenic/Levi-Straussian 
adaption  of this to apply  to the “traditional tales”  of declamation,  by  centering  this 
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50 Beard (1993). I discuss Beard’s work on declamation further in sections 2.2 and 2.3.
51 Beard (1993) 56, emphasis in the original, quoted and discussed at Imber (2006) 166.
52 Beard (1993) 45 n. 2, 63. See Barthes (1972) 109-58, esp. 142-45 for his 
characterization of myth.
53 This passage is frequently paired with Horace, Serm. 1.4.103-126; see e.g. Mayer 
(1991) 145-46 and Chaplin (2000) 11-12. I discuss the Horace passage above in section 
0.1.
discourse on  personal  observation  of behaviors and the social  judgments about those 
behaviors within local  social  circles, I suggest, Roman exemplarity  constructs a  mode of 
moral  and practical  reasoning that  maintains its stability  not  by  the repetition  of 
“traditional stories”  or  the mass diffusion  of images through  public  speeches and 
monuments — though, of course,  both  those methods of communication  do play  a  role — 
but rather  by  conditioning its users to repeat a  consistent  pattern  of imbuing and 
responding to meaning  in  the exempla they  each  select  for  themselves.  Conforming  one’s 
own  actions to behaviors approved in  others mythologizes this method of creating  and 
acting  on  contemporary  moral judgment  as adherence to traditional patterns of 
behavior.
In  building  my  argument  I have focused on  texts and genres that present 
themselves as dealing  directly  with  contemporary  society.  Forensic oratory, 
epistolography  and satire thus play  central roles. In particular,  Cicero and Pliny  the 
younger  provide perhaps the most important anchors for my  discussion. Although earlier 
scholars have treated Cicero’s use of examples extensively,54 Pliny’s use of exempla has 
received relatively  little direct  attention  in  discussions of exemplarity. Historiography 
and historical  epic serve a more supplementary  function  in  my  argument.  I have used 
evidence from  those sources where parallels have suggested themselves,  but  overall I 
have treated those genres as secondary. In  this work I also adopt a  synchronic approach 
to presenting  the practice  of exemplary  reasoning. I believe that the basic  process of 
reasoning through  particular  observed actions remained essentially  the same throughout 
the period under discussion,  stretching  from  the time of Cicero to that of Pliny  and 
Juvenal.  While particular  applications of exempla may  appear,  develop or  disappear  over 
time, I interpret such  changes as a  consequence of the  importance of personal 
observation  in assembling  individual  libraries of examples. In  parallel  to the emphasis 
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54 See e.g. David (1980), Brinton (1988), Opperman (2000), Bücher (2006), Van der 
Blom (2010).
on  contemporary  individuals as models, the deployment of exempla  is also keyed to 
contemporary  concerns. Although the sources of exemplary  observation  shift  over  the 
time, the methods in which authors use these instances remains generally stable.
A  number of recent  scholars on exemplarity  have attempted to expand our 
understanding  of the practice beyond the most immediately  visible elite discourse,  that 
is,  the use of aristocratic  male exempla by  aristocratic authors for  an  audience of their 
peers.55 Even  within  the literary  sphere, however,  scholars have focused primarily  on  the 
highest  end of the spectrum. When they  have tried to expand the focus, they  tend to leap 
rather  vertiginously  down  the social scale, bypassing  the available exempla from 
equestrians and municipal aristocrats. My  work attempts to expand our understanding 
of the range of exemplarity  in  Roman  culture in  a  slightly  different manner.  The use of 
personal observation  in  Roman  moral education,  which  I discussed above in  section  0.1, 
presents a  clear  illustration of how  Romans of various classes could adopt  the practice of 
exemplary  reasoning by  observing  those around them  for  examples of behavior  either  to 
adopt  or  to avoid.  A  number  of passages,  particularly  in  the letters of Pliny,  demonstrate 
this practice extending  at  least to the lower  reaches of the elite — minor  equestrians and 
local  municipal elites — and consequently  focusing on  concerns in  private life — dining, 
family  life and similar  concerns. 56  Although  this approach  cannot  definitively 
demonstrate the extension  of this form  of moral observation  to the lowest  end of the 
social hierarchy, it  does offer  a  possible pattern  in  which  to understand members of the 
lower  classes as discovering exempla directly  relevant  to their  own  concerns rather  than 
focusing solely  on how  they  might  relate to the aristocratic  models displayed through  the 
speeches and monuments of the political  elite.  For  this reason  I emphasize the 
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55 See esp. Roller (2004) and the various contributors to Bell and Hansen (2008). Wilcox  
(2006)’s examination of exempla of and for women demonstrates another method of 
expansion.
56 E.g. Pliny Ep. 6.24, 7.25, 9.17.
importance of equestrians and other  more peripheral  aristocrats as a  means to expand 
the study of exemplarity beyond the pinnacle of the senatorial elite. 57
Pliny  the Younger’s treatment of his friends and other  contemporary  figures as 
models for imitation  provides an  illuminating  source for  exploring the form  and 
operation  of exemplary  thought. This author’s use of examples has been  particularly 
useful for  my  project  of expanding  the range of what  we should view  as Roman exempla. 
His focus on  contemporary  society  and use of recent figures allows us to glimpse some 
elements of exemplarity  that  have only  a  limited presence in  more historically  focused 
texts. In  particular  he  frequently  introduces instances that  do not  possess the spectacular 
character of those exempla that have typically provided the basis for earlier studies.
Throughout his collection  of letters, Pliny  describes a  range of figures as notable 
or  as models for  his own  conduct. Some letters present  obituaries for  various individuals 
or  offer  consolations that  cast  the dead persons as exemplary  citizens,  often  good (Ep. 
1.12,  2.1,  3.21,  4.21, 5.5,  5.16, 5.21, 6.16, 8.5, 8.23,  9.9),  but sometimes bad (Ep. 3.14,  4.2), 
sometimes equivocal (Ep.  3.7,  7.24,  8.18).58 A  small number of other  letters use a  friend’s 
illness as an  occasion to offer  a  similar  summary  and praise of that  person’s life (1.22, 
7.19, 9.22).  Pliny  frequently  cites a  small number  of older  senators as outstanding 
citizens and models for  his own  conduct  — Corellius Rufus (1.12,  4.17, 9.13.6),  Vestricius 
Spurinna  (1.5.8-10,  2.7, 3.1), Verginius Rufus (2.1,  6.10, 9.19),  Julius Frontinus (4.8, 
9.19), and Pliny’s own  consular  colleague Cornutus Tertullus (4.17.9,  5.14) — as well as a 
group of figures banished or  executed under  Domitian — among them  Herennius 
Senecio (1.5.3,  3.11.3, 4.7.5,  7.19.5,  7.33), Arulenus Rusticus (1.5, 1.14,  3.11.3), and Fannia 
(3.11,  7.19,  9.13).59 Occasionally  Pliny  introduces a  negative figure, most prominently  the 
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57 See especially sections 2.1 and 3.3.
58 Rather than focusing solely on formal obituaries, I have selected all those letters that 
report or mention a death and comment on the character and/or actions of the dead 
person, so there are also a few more casual reports of deaths (e.g. 4.2) and a few 
consolationes (e.g. 9.9).
59 The fullest individual list of the anti-Domitianic group appears at Ep. 3.11.3.
former  delator60  Regulus who serves as one of the primary  targets for  his attacks on 
supporters of the Domitianic regime (1.5, 1.20.14-15, 2.11.22, 2.20,  4.2, 4.7,  6.2).  Some 
individuals serve as examples for  non-political activities, often intellectual, for  example, 
Titinius Capito as a  model for  historical  scholarship (1.17,  8.12)61 and Passennus Paulus 
as a  model poet  (6.15,  9.22). In  some cases Pliny  links his descriptions with  the official 
discourse described by  Roller’s quadripartite  model  (e.g.  his report in  Ep. 2.7  of statues 
decreed by  the Senate  for  Spurinna and his dead son  Cottius62  or  his criticisms of the 
official honors for  Pallas in Ep. 7.29  and 8.6 63),  but often he focuses on  less official,  more 
private qualities and activities (e.g.  his description  of the daily  activities of Spurinna  in 
Ep.  3.1, those of his uncle  in  3.5,  and his own daily  life  in  9.36  and 9.40). 64 Pliny  not 
infrequently  presents his own  conduct, both  private and public,  as a  model for  his reader 
(e.g. Ep. 1.18, 1.23, 2.6, 3.18.1-3, 6.27, 7.1, 7.33).
The majority  of exemplary  figures in Pliny’s letters are not the Republican heroes 
who have formed the focus of much  recent work on  exemplarity, but  are instead near 
contemporary  figures who allow  Pliny  to reflect  upon  modes of living and acting  in  the 
current social and political  circumstances. Pliny’s use of contemporary  figures, along 
with  similar  practices in  other  writers stretching  back  to Cicero and including Seneca, 
Horace, Ovid (especially  in  the exilic  poetry), and Martial,  demonstrates a  vibrant use of 
contemporary exempla operating in addition to the traditional set.
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60 Cf. Goldberg (1999) 227-28 on Regulus’s career and the tendentious nature of Pliny’s 
attacks on his character and oratory.
61 Cf. also Ep. 5.8, addressed to Capito himself. Pliny’s letters on Capito are discussed in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2.
62 This example is complicated somewhat by the youth of Cottius, whose statue is more 
an honor and consolation for his father than a monument to the young man himself. 
Pliny’s language suggests that Cottius’s honor is more a reflection of the forestalled 
potential of his life than a commemoration of anything he actually accomplished in his 
short life. Pliny’s praise for the young man both here and at Ep. 3.10 provides an 
interesting contrast with his mockery of Regulus’s effusive attempts to commemorate his 
own dead son at Ep. 4.7.
63 For discussions of Pliny’s criticism of Pallas’s honors see Bartsch (1994) 174-75 and 
Roller (2001) 270-71.
64 See also Henderson (2002) 58-66 on Ep. 3.1 and 69-102 on Ep. 3.5.
By  basing  moral  judgment on  particular  instances that refer  not so much  to 
reified abstract  concepts as simply  to other  particular  actions,  Roman  exemplarity 
creates a  moralist  discourse that  can  readily  adapt itself to any  particular  set  of 
circumstances while nevertheless maintaining  a sense of coherence with  a  stable 
tradition.  The ability  to tailor  evidence for  particularist  arguments while avoiding 
cognitive dissonance constitutes a central strength  of the exemplary  mode of argument. 
Essentially,  by  emphasizing individual cases over  idealist  definitions,  the use of exempla 
enables social  actors to utilize confirmation  bias as a  means to project  an advantageous 
interpretation  of both tradition  and the current  circumstances without  risking 
contradiction  when  judged against a stable rule.  This pragmatic approach to 
understanding  human actions is almost  custom  tailored to allow  those who use it  not 
only  to find evidence to confirm  their  own  points of view, but also to assemble such 
evidence to appeal  to others.  Consequently  such a deployment  of examples defines a 
mode of moral  and practical  argument  that  presents situational adaptability  within  a 
discourse of traditional  stability. It  is,  in fact, the process of reasoning through  exempla 
rather  than  the specific  content,  identity  or  meaning  of those exempla that  remains 
constant  over  time. Roman  traditionalism  thus is here expressed through a  traditional 
method of interpretation  rather  than  through  an  authoritative canon of traditional 
judgments.
0.4: Outline of Chapters.
This dissertation  expands our  picture of Roman  exemplarity  by  focusing  on  exempla  as 
they  are used at particular  moments to construct  arguments, not as cultural artifacts 
with  a  stable history  beyond the moment  of citation.  The following  chapters do not offer 
an  exhaustive outline of the practice of exemplarity, but rather  seek  to frame, 
supplement  and complicate the current  scholarly  discourse by  exploring  several  of the 
most prominent — and sometimes rather  unexpected — uses of exempla.  Individual 
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chapters respond to various assumptions that  underlie the models proposed by 
Hölkeskamp, Roller  and others. For  example, I demonstrate that  spectacular  actions do 
not constitute a  necessary  element  of exemplarity  in  a  couple ways:  in chapter  2, I 
examine the seemingly  paradoxical idea  of nameless or  anonymous exempla  which 
emphasize the action  itself in  place of the actor, and,  in  chapter  3,  I discuss how  authors 
use examples of everyday  activities to illustrate ideas of general fallibility  or  shared 
humanity.  Instead of focusing on  the manipulation of repeatedly  cited instances in  a 
series of different texts, I construct  my  argument  around patterns in  which  authors 
deploy  exempla. Each  of the following  chapters centers on  an  idea  or tactic  for  using 
examples that  reveals an  facet of the practice that  has received little attention  in  the 
earlier, content-focused studies of Roman exemplarity.
The first  chapter,  “Exempla as Arguments from  Comparison,”  lays the 
groundwork  for  my  study. I begin from  Quintilian’s discussion  of exempla as a  method of 
argument. This is the most  extensive individual  treatment of examples from  a  Roman 
writer  on rhetoric. He provides a  broad and flexible definition  of term  as the citation  of a 
narrative to support an argument  (Inst.  5.11.6).  Quintilian  links the exemplum  to many 
other forms of comparison.  Building  on  this discussion, I illustrate how  the narrative 
flexibility  of the exemplum  allows authors an  equivalent flexibility  in  constructing  ethical 
arguments.  This quality  of the narrative form  ensures social actors the opportunity  to 
mold ‘tradition‘ to conform  with  their  current  needs.  Through  this device, authors are 
enabled to represent  interpretations based in  their  local  time and circumstances as 
continuations of a stable tradition.
In  the second chapter,  “Anonymous Exempla,”  I push back against  the previous 
scholarly  emphasis on spectacular  action  and monumental  commemoration  in theories 
of exemplarity. I focus first on  anonymous or  nameless exempla, in  particular  those in 
which  the author  neither  wants nor  needs the audience to know  the exemplary  actor’s 
name. Such examples,  although  they  lose the opportunity  to use the cultural authority  of 
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the actors,  possess other  advantages. For  instance,  by  suppressing  the name,  they  may 
make the exemplum  a  more effective illustration  of a  purportedly  universal idea or, in 
the case of negative examples,  they  may  avoid giving offense to the subject  of the 
narrative. In such  exempla, the nameless actors become almost  stock figures. This 
movement  toward abstraction  draws such  examples close to the form  of declamation 
themes and fables.  In  the later  sections of the chapter, I argue that  these three forms of 
narrative — anonymous exempla,  declamations and fables — form  a  network in which 
they  each  influence the others. Exemplary  materials provide the basis for  some 
declamations and fables. The creative arguments speakers create in  their  declamations 
may  filter  back  into their  source material.  Authors may  also use fully  fictional  stock 
figures to supply  exemplary  material,  as Cicero does when he introduces comic fathers as 
models for  behavior  in  his defense of Caelius (Cael. 37-38).  The narratives of 
declamations and fables also establish  patterns into which  observed materials may  be 
fitted to create exempla.  The interaction  between  these different forms of narrative 
demonstrates the permeable boundary  between fiction  and factual  material  that  authors 
may manipulate in constructing their arguments.
The third chapter,  “Illustrating  Moderation, Tolerance and Social Authority,” 
shifts the emphasis in  characterizing  exemplarity  away  from  the strict  idea  of moral 
judgment,  that  is, the idea  that all exempla are assigned to a  moral  category  in  which 
they  are judged either  good or  bad. I demonstrate how  authors deploy  examples to 
militate against moral judgment by  illustrating  human  fallibility  through representative 
instances. My  discussion  focuses on  rhetorical tactics used to avoid or  prevent  judgment. 
As these illustrations often  present their  actors in  a  rather  negative light, authors may 
deploy  anonymous exempla  in  constructing  such  arguments. I also demonstrate how 
such  illustrations may  argue for  similarity  across other  divisions.  For  instance,  authors 
use illustrative examples to suggest unity across class boundaries.
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In  the final chapter,  “Exempla as Emblems,”  I turn  to the use of well-known, 
authoritative figures as suggestive emblems rather  than  as fully  activated role models. 
Unlike the other  uses of exempla that  I describe,  this emblematic form  emphasizes the 
actors rather than  the actions.  I argue that  Romans made use of superficial connections 
to famous figures in  order  to claim  that those figures illustrate  something  about 
themselves.  These connections avoid detailed comparison  in  favor  of simply  asserting a 
relationship of emulation. Such  connections relied on  the assumption  that people should 
imitate behaviors that  they  approve in  order  to claim  these emblems as models for  those 
who display  them, whether or  not  any  evidence supports such  a  claim. Thus aristocrats 
could claim  that  the statues in  their  art  collections demonstrated their  own good 
character,  or  that publishing  a  laudatory  biography  provided a  means of imitating  the 
subject  of that  biography. In the later sections of this chapter, I describe how  large 
collections of exemplary  figures deployed the same occlusion  of narrative content in 
building impressionistic depictions of abstract ideas.
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Exempla as Arguments from Comparison
The Roman use of examples is notable less for  its peculiarities than  its pervasiveness and 
expansiveness. Thinking  and arguing  through  exempla  imbues a Roman’s engagement 
with  the world.  As a  consequence the impulse to reason through  particular  instances,  to 
compare the effects of various acts energizes decision-making  and analysis in  both  the 
practical and ethical spheres.  This pattern  infuses the social  and political world of Rome, 
coloring thought-patterns in  nearly  every  area  of Roman  life—both  those we would 
expect and those we might  not. The stress Romans laid on understanding the world 
through  exempla creates an  inexorable seepage into any  and all  forms of discussion.  The 
centrality  of exemplarity  to the Roman  worldview  cannot  permit  this manner  of 
intellectual engagement  to remain  neatly  confined to some separate reservoir  of cultural 
knowledge; analogical  reflection  through  examples leaks into and saturates every  stream 
and current of thought.
The diffusion  of this form  of reasoning  does of course produce some concepts 
recognizable as distinctively  Roman. Most prominent  is the idolization  and emulation  of 
historical culture  heroes,  perceived as representing  a  tradition  collectively  identified as 
the mos maiorum.  But  singling out this one specific peculiarity  of Roman  exemplarity 
for  study  risks obscuring its wider  engagement  in  the thought world of Rome.  At  its 
source  exemplary  thought  functions by  the process of comparison. Building  on 
observations and memories, exemplary  patterns of thought configure contexts and 
perceptions of tradition through  the juxtaposition of particularities.  Any  available 
material  might  become grist  for  the mill of analogical reasoning.  The acts of political, 
military  and moral  heroes are merely  the most  obvious and identifiable objects of this 
process of reasoning. Understanding the process of comparison  then  is the most 
fundamental element for understanding the Roman use of exempla.
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Ethical arguments built  on  structural  analogies between  particular  actions allow  a 
great  deal of flexibility  in  their  application.  In  this chapter  I focus on  the rhetorical 
understanding and use of exempla  that  allowed Roman  speakers and authors 
consciously  to manipulate such  material in opportunistic  ways while nonetheless 
presenting their arguments as gestures toward a  stable  tradition.  This discussion  focuses 
on  the core processes and tendencies that characterize exemplary  thought. In  the first 
section  of this chapter, I examine the rhetorical discussions on  the use of exempla  to lay 
the groundwork for the remainder  of my  discussion. In  particular,  Quintilian’s chapter 
on  exempla (5.11) provides us with  a  flexible and broadly  applicable means of treating 
exemplarity  as a  species of comparison.  The second section  describes how  the emphasis 
on  particular  instances enables speakers and writers to manipulate the terms and 
context  of comparison by  recasting  the narrative framework  to their  best  advantage. 
Finally,  I argue that  the plasticity  of memories allows social or  political actors to present 
a  version  of tradition which  accords with  their  immediate rhetorical  purpose or 
ideological desiderata. By  seeing  comparison  as the motive force of exemplarity  we may 
better  comprehend the diffusion  of this habit of thought throughout  the Roman  mental 
world.
1.1: Comparison as a Source of Flexibility in Arguments from Exempla.
Quintilian  gives a  broad and flexible definition  of the exemplum  that  provides a  useful 
starting  point  for this discussion: “exemplum,  that  is the citation  of an  event that has 
happened, or  one treated as if it has happened,  that is useful for  making  what you are 
arguing  convincing”  (exemplum,  id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum 
id quod intenderis commemoratio, 5.11.6).  This definition  identifies several  essential 
features of an  exemplum: it consists of a  (1)  narrative,  whether  alluded to or  directly 
reported,  (2) of some action  or  event  (3)  used to supplement the discourse within  which 
it  is embedded.  The definition  has received relatively  little  critical treatment.  Skidmore’s 
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brief discussion  of Quintilian’s approach  is fairly  typical of the general trend, focusing 
almost  entirely  on  the brief impressionistic comments from  books one and twelve about 
the use of exempla  in  education  but  ignoring the detailed technical discussion  of their 
actual use in book  five.65 Among discussions of rhetorical definitions,  only  Gazich, who is 
particularly  interested in  Quintilian’s contribution  to rhetorical theory  in  this area, 
engages in an extensive study of this material.66
The term  exemplum  of course can refer  to a  number  of different  social, 
intellectual and linguistic  phenomena, including  artistic models,  legal  precedents, 
models of behavior,  and acts of historical figures.67 Critics have often reacted to this term 
by  narrowing  the definition  of what  really  counts as an exemplum  or  sectioning  off a 
selection of historical exempla  that adhere to certain  criteria. Typically  they  select their 
evidence by  concentrating  on the content  of exempla. By  carving out a  particular  type or 
types critics enable themselves to create a  more focused picture  of a  particular  social or 
intellectual phenomenon,  but at  the same time they  introduce a certain degree of 
circularity to their arguments, in that their chosen definitions guide the conclusions. 
Earlier  examinations of Roman  exempla  have focused on  the actors or  events 
used as examples as if they  could effectively  function  as independent units of thought.  It 
is important to note here that  modern  scholars have typically  assumed or  created 
definitions of exemplum  that insist on  precise distinctions between parts of the ancient 
usage.  Litchfield,  for  example, in  his seminal article  explicitly  announces that he has 
created a category  of exempla virtutum moralium  (“examples of moral virtues”)  that 
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65 Skidmore (1996) 22-25. Only Skidmore (1996) 87 cites anything from book 5, and 
there it is only to a comment about the utility of “argument from unlike” for exhortation 
(Quint. Inst. 5.11.10).
66 Gazich (1990) 97-141. Cf. Alewell (1914) 24-26. Stemmler (2000), who is primarily 
interested in Republican understandings of the device, makes brief references to 
Quintilian only when necessary to supplement the material in Cicero and the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium.
67 OLD s.v. supplies nine separate definitions. TLL s.v. divides its definitions into four 
major categories, most having multiple sub-types. See also Chaplin (2000) 138, n. 4 on 
the range of meaning covered by exemplum.
cannot be identified within  our ancient  sources as a  distinctive class.68  Karl-Joachim 
Hölkeskamp, despite the prominence of exempla in  the title of his 1996  article “Exempla 
und mos maiorum,”  does not  actually  introduce exempla as a  category  of interest  until 
nearly  halfway  through  his discussion.69 Instead he progresses from  the modern  concept 
of “collective memory”  through  the profusion  of monuments within  the city  of Rome to 
the individual deeds and actors that  those monuments commemorated.  Only  then  does 
he introduce exemplum  as a  theoretical term,  using  it  to describe particular well-known 
acts or  actors and linking them  explicitly  to the social establishment  of moral 
principles.70 Michael Stemmler  attempts to discover  some quality  that  would define a 
specifically  Roman  type of exemplum. To this end,  he seizes on brief references to 
auctoritas  in two extant  definitions of the term.71  The close attention  that  Stemmler 
gives to the element of auctoritas  in  these passages,  however, mistakes a potential 
advantage of a  subtype for a  theoretically  significant  distinction  between divergent  types. 
Contrasting  this emphasis with  Aristotelian  treatments of this form  of argument, he 
argues for  two separate understandings of exempla: a  Greek conception  that saw 
instances as building blocks for  logical argument and a  Roman  version  that emphasized 
the authority and normative power of historical examples.72 
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68 Litchfield (1914) 8. See p. 25 for a more detailed discussion of his chosen criteria for 
filtering what is or is not an exemplum. 
69 Hölkeskamp (1996) 312 presents the first use of the term exempla as an important 
element in his discussion. Previous to this, the word only appears in the title and once as 
an unremarked part of a list of various historical materials quoted from various passages 
of Cicero, p. 309. And even this quotation does not appear until nearly a third of the way 
through his argument.
70 Hölkeskamp (1996) 312.
71 Stemmler (2000), esp. 151-67. He relies particularly on two brief statements about 
exempla, one from Cicero that includes auctoritas as on possible basis for an exemplum 
(Exemplum est quod rem auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat 
aut infirmat, De Inv. 49), the other from the Auctor ad Herennium that instead stresses 
the author (auctor) of the source (Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum 
certi auctoris nomine propositio, ad Herr. 4.62).
72 Stemmler (2000) 157-58. See section 1.3 below for more extensive discussion of the 
relationship between exempla and the power of tradition and the mos maiorum.
Many  scholars have adduced Valerius Maximus’s collection  of famous words and 
deeds (facta ac dicta) as a  model  for  descriptions of how  Romans regarded exempla. 
Alewell devotes a  full  chapter  to Valerius and other  compilers of exempla.73 David places 
the genre to which Valerius’s work belonged as a  feature central  to the basic 
understanding  of Roman  exemplarity.74  Maslakov  treats the collection as fully 
representative of the rhetorical understanding  of exempla and emblematic of the 
tenuous and imprecise grasp average Romans had of their  collective past.75 While the 
compilation  is certainly  different from  many  other  genres focused on historical  content, 
Valerius himself presents his work not  so much  as an  intellectual  or moral touchstone, 
but more as a  convenient reference guide: “The deeds and words worthy  of memory  of 
the city  of Rome and of foreign  peoples,  which  in  other  authors are too widely  scattered 
to be learned quickly,  I have decided to select  from  famous authors and to set  in  order  so 
that  the trouble of a  long search  would be forestalled for  those wishing  to gather 
instances” (Urbis  Romae exterarumque gentium  facta simul ac  dicta memoratu digna, 
quae apud alios latius diffusa sunt quam ut breviter cognosci possunt, ab  illustribus 
electa auctoribus  digerere constitui,  ut documenta sumere volentibus  longae 
inquisitionis labor absit, 1.praef.1).
My  approach  to Roman  exempla represents a  reversal  of the typical patterns 
followed by  scholars of Roman  exemplarity. My  use of the term  exemplum  resists two 
common tendencies of modern  scholarship on  the subject: (1) the insistence on  an 
excessively  hermetic separation between the exemplum  and other  forms of comparison, 
and (2) a  conception of a  fixed canon  of historical  exempla as a  reified thing  with  a 
continuous existence outside the social  and literary  contexts within  which  examples are 
cited.  I focus less on  the possible content of exempla and more on  the process of 
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73 Alewell (1914) 36-53.
74 David (1980) 67.
75 Maslakov (1984) 445, 454-55
comparison  in  which  they  are used. I assume that,  outside of a  few  technical contexts, 
Romans did not insist on  precise,  inflexible definitions but  instead made use of various 
understandings of what exempla  were and how  they  could function. The precise 
character  of an exemplary  citation  depends far  more on  internal factors within  a 
particular  text—its context  and the purposes to which  it was deployed—than  on  any  pre-
existing external criteria.
Ancient  rhetorical treatments of exempla typically  link  them  with  other  forms of 
comparison  and often discuss the effects produced by  the similarity  between  a  particular 
case and a  well-known  event.76  The process of comparison  between two narrative 
instances constitutes the primary  engine of exemplarity  in  Roman  legal and social 
discourse. In  order  to understand the function of exempla  in Roman  culture, I start 
foremost  from  the actual use of exempla  in  their  contexts rather  than focusing on  the 
content  of the particular  excerpted narratives.  I shift the focus away  from  attempting to 
explain  exempla  as independent  phenomena  towards understanding  them  within  their 
typical contexts.  I therefore treat the difference between  exemplum and similitudo  or 
other types of comparison  as primarily  involving  a movement  along a  qualitative scale, 
rather  than  as a  concrete distinction  between  objectively  measurable types. 77 Exempla 
were embedded within  broader contexts,  exerting  their intellectual or persuasive force 
on, and deriving  their  meaning from, the actions—actual  or  proposed—with  which  they 
were compared. 
Quintilian’s attitude toward such  proofs seems eminently  practical  rather  than 
dogmatic. What  emerges from  his discussion  is less an  affirmation  of the stable moral 
37
76 For Republican examples, cf. Cic. De Inv. 1.49; Top. 41-45; Ad Herennium 4.62.
77 Gazich (1990) 112 notes that Quintilian’s treatment of the subject has a tendency to 
swing back and forth between specific and broad definitions of exemplum, between a 
comprehensive understanding of comparisons and distinctions between sub-types; 
112-120 discusses the overlap and distinction between the terms “exemplum” and 
“similitudo.” Cf. Chaplin (2000) 138, n. 5 discussing the mutability of the term 
exemplum and the inconsistent usage made of it by both Cicero and Quintilian.
force of previous models than  an encouragement  to careful parsing  of the details and 
suitability  of particular  precedents.  Quintilian’s chapter  on  exempla (5.11)  — as well  as 
the surrounding  chapters that  discuss other  technical proofs and their  refutation  — 
emphasizes the malleable force of arguments built upon  similarities or  dissimilarities. As 
I discussed at  the opening  of this section,  his definition  of exemplum  resists an  overly 
detailed and schematized subdivision of types. While he recognizes that  various attempts 
to define particular  types of comparison describe recognizable types,  he nevertheless 
insists on the overall unity  of proofs utilizing  similarities. The opening of the chapter 
recognizes two definitions of comparison  that overlap in  nomenclature, one broad, 
another specific: 
The Greeks call  the third sort, out  of those things that  are introduced into a  case 
from  outside, !"#$%&'()". They  use this name both  generally  for every 
comparison  of similar  things and particularly  for  those things that rely  on  the 
authority  of res  gestae.  Our  authors typically  prefer  to name the former  type, 
which  is labeled parabole by  the Greeks,  similitudo,  the latter  exemplum, 
although  the latter  also is a simile,  the former  an exemplum.  So that  we may 
more easily  explain  the subject, let  us understand that  each  type is a  !"#$%&'()" 
and let us use the term exemplum.
Tertium genus,  ex iis  quae extrinsecus adducuntur in causam, Graeci vocant 
!"#$%&'()",  quo  nomine et generaliter usi sunt in omni similium adpositione et 
specialiter in iis quae rerum  gestarum  auctoritate nituntur.  Nostri fere 
similitudinem  vocare maluerunt quod ab illis  parabole dicitur, hoc alterum 
exemplum, quamquam et hoc simile est, illud exemplum.  Nos,  quo facilius 
propositum  explicemus,  utrumque !"#$%&'()" esse credamus  et ipsi appellemus 
exemplum.
       (5.11.1-2)
Thus, while Quintilian recognizes that  comparisons may  be classified into those that 
draw  on  history  and those that don’t, he treats that distinction  as more nominal than 
functional. 78 In  particular,  the concession that similitudo  and exemplum  possess much 
the same character  as one another  highlights the centrality  of comparison  to this 
conception  of exempla.  As Gazich  notes, “Quintilian is thoroughly  conscious of speaking 
about  an  exemplum  not  simply  as the citation  of an ancient event, but  as an 
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78 Gazich (1990) 106-108 discusses this passage.
argumentative proof that  exactly  compares,  on  the basis of a  simile (similium 
adpositione),  two events,  the particular one under  examination  and the exemplary 
one.” 79
Quintilian  repeats similar  preferences for  broader  definitions several times in  this 
and the following chapter,  insisting on  the general  unity  of these types against  attempts 
at  minute classification  into sub-types (e.g.  5.11.30-31, 34; 5.12.1,  15-17).  He views the 
division  into different types as reflecting qualitative rather  than  functional differences: 
all  types perform  the same functions, but each  may  have particular  advantages or 
disadvantages.  For  example,  he identifies the citation  of res  gestae as the “most 
powerful”  (potentissimum) of the types belonging  to the broader category  of similarity 
(5.11.6).  Less particularized comparisons are nearly  as effective: “similarity  has nearly 
the force of an  exemplum,  especially  one which  is drawn  without any  coloring  of 
metaphor  from  things that are almost  equal”  (Proximas  exempli vires  habet similitudo, 
praecipueque illa quae ducitur citra ullam  tralationum mixturam  ex rebus  paene 
paribus,  5.11.22).  Fables like those of Aesop,  however, “are accustomed to draw  the 
minds particularly  of rustics and the ignorant  who both  listen  to things that  have been 
made up more simply  and,  having been captured by  pleasure,  consent  easily  to the things 
they  enjoy”  (ducere animos solent praecipue rusticorum  et imperitorum,  qui et 
simplicius  quae ficta sunt audiunt,  et capti voluptate facile iis  quibus  delectantur 
consentiunt, 5.11.19).80
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79 Gazich (1990) 107 “Quintiliano è ben consapevole di parlare di exemplum non 
semplicemente come della citazione di un fatto antico, ma della prova argumentative che 
appunto confronta, in base ad una somiglianza (similium adpositione), due fatti, quello 
particolare in esame e quello esemplare.”
80 Cicero gives a ranked list of types of comparison at Part. or. 40: Maximam autem 
fidem facit ad similitudinem veri primum exemplum, deinde introducta rei similitudo; 
fabula etiam non numquam, etsi sit incredibilis, tamen homines commovet. Gazich 
(1990) 82-83 discusses this passage and others indicating similarities between 
exemplum and similitudo in various technical works of Cicero. I discuss the relationship 
between exempla and fables in section 2.3 of the following chapter.
Quintilian’s definition  of exemplum  defines both content  and purpose in  broad 
terms: “an exemplum,  that is the citation of an event that  has happened or one treated as 
if it  has happened useful for  making  what  you  are arguing  convincing”  (exemplum, id est 
rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis  ad persuadendum  id quod intenderis  commemoratio, 
5.11.6).  He allows a  broad understanding of what  might  count as an  exemplary  event: he 
only  describes it  as “an  event  that has happened”  (rei gestae)  or  even an  event  that is 
merely  “treated as if it  has happened” (ut gestae). The second term  in  particular  implies 
that  non-historical  deeds might be included in  this category.81  Quintilian  does not 
identify  any  more specific quality  such  as authority, antiquity  or  familiarity  as necessary 
to defining  an  instance as an  exemplum. Such  qualities may  certainly  increase the impact 
of an exemplum, but  Quintilian  at  least does not  view  such  qualities as core elements of 
the rhetorical figure. This lack of specificity  allows the boundary  between  historical 
exempla and fables to become blurred. 82 (I discuss this phenomenon further  in  chapter 
2.)
Users of exempla mold their  arguments not  only  through  the selection of 
particular  instances,  but  also through  the selection of the point  of comparison.  For 
example,  Chaplin  notes an  interesting  feature of exempla that  serve as precedents in 
passages of both  Livy  and Tacitus: constitutional  or  legal innovations can provide 
exempla for  further  innovations. 83 The similarity  between  the exempla and the proposed 
changes in  these cases is not always the content of the changes themselves,  but  may 
simply  consist of the simple fact  of change itself.  Canuleius,  arguing  for  opening  the 
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81 Cf. Gazich (1990) 112, 115 discusses historical examples as the primary type, rather 
than the only type. At 115 he discusses the shift from the definition offered at ad 
Herennium 4.62 in particular. In contrast Alewell (1914) 26 treats historical exempla as 
the only possible type.
82 Gazich (1990) 115 suggests that the list of various exemplary materials that Quintilian 
advises the orator to be familiar with at 12.4, including both old and new exempla, daily 
events and poetic fictions, provides a good idea of what the phrase rei gestae aut ut 
gestae would encompass.
83 Chaplin (2000) 159-60.
consulship to plebeians and allowing intermarriage between  patricians and plebeians, 
adduces Rome’s foreign-born  kings and several religious and constitutional innovations 
in  support of his two proposals (Livy  4.3.1-5.6).  Likewise Tacitus’s version  of Claudius’s 
speech  urging  the addition  of Gauls to the  Senate make the same argument: “All things, 
conscript fathers, which  now  are believed to be extremely  ancient,  were once new: 
plebeian  magistracies followed patrician  ones,  Latin magistracies followed plebeian ones, 
those of all  the  other  peoples of Italy  followed the Latin  ones. This too shall  become 
ancient,  and what today  we consider  using exempla,  one day  will  be among the 
exempla”  (Omnia, patres  conscripti,  quae nunc vetutissima creduntur,  nova fuere: 
plebeii magistratus post patricios, Latini post plebeios, ceterarum Italiae gentium post 
Latinos. inveterascet hoc  quoque, et quod hodie exemplis  tuemur,  inter exempla erit, 
Ann. 11.24). 84
The logic  of comparison  may  even allow  specific instances when  an  event  did not 
occur  to function as counterfactual exempla.85 Roman  speakers and writers often refocus 
the meaning  of exemplary  events through  the analogies drawn between  the earlier  and 
later  events. 86  Sometimes they  even  introduce “exempla”  that  have no independent 
existence prior  to the moment  of their  citation.  These examples may  be ad hoc creations 
derived from  an  analogy  with  a  topic  currently  under  discussion. Such exempla may  be 
tangentially  connected to a  well-known event, but  have not previously  been a  focus of 
interest. For example,  in his defense of T.  Annius Milo, Cicero uses the absence of violent 
popular  reactions to the actual,  alleged or  attempted assassinations of several men—M. 
Drusus,  Scipio Aemilianus,  M.  Papirius,  Pompey  and himself—to ridicule the popular 
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84 Chaplin (2000) 159, n. 59 discusses this passage. The original speech using similar 
reasoning is preserved (CIL 13.1668).
85 See also Van der Blom (2010) 135 on references to non-existence of exempla; she 
emphasizes the use of such examples in prosecution and invective speeches.
86 Cf. Roller (2004) 34-35 on a speech in Dio Cassius (31.1) comparing Marc Antony to 
Horatius Cocles and Cloelia solely on the basis of their clothing (or lack thereof), rather 
than any resemblance between their actions. Roller (2004) 35 labels this type of linkage 
the “principle of performative analogy.”
reaction to the death  of Clodius (Mil. 16-20). Although  these deaths and assaults were 
widely  known,  Cicero focuses instead on the public reaction.  His central point  in  this 
comparison  is the lack  of an  exemplum  for  the special  tribunal  occasioned by  Clodius’s 
death: recounting  the public grief at  the death  of Scipio,  he asks, “Was any  inquiry  about 
the death  of Africanus decreed for  this reason? Certainly  not.”  (num igitur ulla quaestio 
de Africani morte lata est? certe nulla, Mil.  16)  In  this passage,  a group of events that 
didn’t  happen  serve as counterfactual exempla.  These non-events only  take recognizable 
form  through  analogy  with  the special court  established to try  Milo for  Clodius’s murder. 
The identities of the victims used here also play  a  role in  the broader argument. Three of 
the five men—Papirius,  Pompey  and Cicero—were victims, whether  actual  or  intended,  of 
Clodius himself.  Through  his choice of counterfactual  instances,  Cicero reinforces his 
attack  Clodius as a  thug who receives special  consideration never  granted to his victims 
and whose murder, consequently, is beneficial for the Republic.
Let  us return again  to Quintilian’s capsule definition  of exemplum  for a  moment: 
“exemplum,  that  is the citation  of an  event that has happened or  one treated as if it  has 
happened useful for making  what you  are arguing  convincing”  (exemplum,  id est rei 
gestae aut ut gestae utilis  ad persuadendum  id quod intenderis commemoratio, 5.11.6). 
The final point to notice is the attention  Quintilian gives to the purpose of the citation: it 
must  be “useful for  making  what you  are proposing convincing”  (utilis  ad persuadendum 
quod intenderis).  This requirement firmly  anchors the identity  of an  instance as an 
exemplum  to some immediate persuasive purpose. 87 The definition Cicero offers in  De 
Inventione  likewise emphasizes the importance of persuasion  to the deployment  of 
exempla: “An  exemplum  is a  thing  that strengthens or  weakens the subject by  means of 
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87 Cf. Gazich (1990) 131.
the authority  or  happenstance of some person or  event”  (Exemplum  est quod rem 
auctoritate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negoti confirmat aut infirmat, 1.49). 88
Quintilian  emphasizes the careful parsing of details against definite moral 
content  in  his discussion of exempla.  His initial introduction  of comparisons indicates 
that  the points of comparison must  be carefully  chosen: “Therefore we must consider 
whether it  is similar  completely  or  in  part,  so that  from  it  we may  mention either 
everything  or  just  what will be useful”  (Intuendum igitur est totum  simile sit an ex parte, 
ut aut omnia ex eo sumamus  aut quae utilia erunt,  5.11.6).  Several times Quintilian 
cautions his reader  to be careful in  the choice and deployment  of exempla in  order  to 
insure that  the terms of comparison  are valid and the logical progression  does not lead 
somewhere unintended.  “The appearances of similarities, however, are apt  to be 
deceptive,  and therefore judgment must be applied in  these matters. For though  a  new 
ship is more useful  than an  old one, the same is not  true of friendship. Though  a  woman 
who is generous with her  money  should be praised,  the same is not  true of a woman  who 
is generous with  her  body. In  these examples the words ‘old’ and ‘generous’ are similar, 
the meanings far  different”  (Solent tamen fallere  similitudinum  species, ideoque 
adhibendum  est eis iudicium. Neque enim ut navis  utilior nova quam vetus,  sic 
amicitia,  vel ut laudanda quae pecuniam suam pluribus largitur, ita quae formam. 
Verba sunt in his  similia vetustatis  et largitionis,  vis quidem longe diversa,  5.11.26). 89 
Quintilian  suggests that  arguments from  dissimilarity  or  contraries are often  effective at 
disproving such comparisons (5.11.35).
Quintilian’s advice on  refuting exempla  cited by  an  opponent provides a  clear 
picture of how  the value of a  particular  instance can  be contested: “Exempla of events 
must  be treated in  various ways,  if they  are damaging: if they  are very  old,  one may  call 
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88 See David (1980) 68-69, Gazich (1990) 82, and Stemmler (2000) 151-52 for discussion  
of this passage.
89 Cf. Gazich (1990) 124.
them  mythical,  if they  are  undoubted, one may  emphasize the  dissimilarities; for  it 
cannot happen that  everything  will be  the same”  (Exempla rerum varie  tractanda sunt, 
si nocebunt: quae si vetera erunt,  fabulosa dicere  licebit,  si indubia, maxime quidem 
dissimilia; neque enim  fieri potest ut paria sint omnia,  5.13.24). To illustrate  potential 
arguments against a damaging  exemplum, Quintilian  details a  set  of objections that 
could be mounted against a  hypothetical  speech  using the example of Servilius Ahala to 
defend Scipio Nasica: “if after  Tiberius Gracchus was killed [P. Scipio] Nasica  were 
defended by  the exemplum  of [Servilius] Ahala  by  whom  [Spurius]  Maelius was killed,  it 
would be stated that  Maelius had been  striving  for  kingship,  but Gracchus only  passed 
popular  laws,  that  Ahala  had been  magister equitum,  but Nasica  was a  private 
citizen”  (si Nasica post occisum  Ti.  Gracchum defendatur exemplo Ahalae  a quo 
Maelius est interfectus, Maelium regni adfectatorem  fuisse, a Graccho  leges modo latas 
esse popularis,  Ahalam  magistrum equitum fuisse,  Nasicam privatum esse  dicatur, 
5.13.24).90  This careful parsing  of legal status and exact  characterization of action 
demonstrates the tendentious nature of the similarities or  dissimilarities highlighted by 
the hypothetical speaker. The contrasting  characterization  of Maelius and Gracchus is 
perhaps most revealing, given  that the traditional  story  of Maelius identified the 
distribution of grain to the plebs as the primary  evidence for  his regal ambitions. The 
hypothetical argument suggested by  Quintilian  thus suppresses the details of the Ahala 
exemplum  while concurrently  insisting  on only  the most limited and straightforward 
account possible of Gracchus’s political activities.
Juxtaposing  multiple analogical  relationships may  allow  a  speaker  to manipulate 
a  comparison between  two persons even  beyond what  a  direct  analogy  would allow.  This 
tactic relies on  carefully  shifting  the terms of comparison  between  the constituent pairs 
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90 Interestingly within his list of examples of the major types of comparison Quintilian 
5.11.12 quotes the opening of the prosopopeia at Cic. Pro Mil. 72 which uses the same 
two killings as exempla to defend the murder of Clodius.
within  the multi-step analogy. The speaker  may  alternate between  structural  and 
categorical analogies in  order  to mold the cumulative effect.  In the post-exilic speeches 
pro Sestio and de Haruspicum Responsis, Cicero uses a  historical comparison  within  his 
discussion of the conflict  between the populares  and the boni in  order  to widen  the 
apparent  moral divide between the two groups. By  juggling  several comparisons — 
current populares  versus current  boni, current  populares  versus earlier  populares, 
previous populares  versus previous boni — he attempts to create the impression  of an 
ever  expanding divide between the two groups. These comparisons hinge on  a  few 
different features: the political positions and activities of the various groups,  the popular 
reaction to each  group, and the moral  character  of the various men,  seen  largely  through 
the contrast between  masculinity  and effeminacy. Cicero disapprovingly  contrasts the 
popular  politicians of his own  day  with  their  predecessors.  He subdivides the populares 
into two distinct groups: the earlier  politicians who were merely  bad for  the Republic, 
and the current  ones who are not  only  bad citizens, but  also bad men. In  these speeches, 
he describes the Gracchi  and others as public  minded,  differing  from  the senatorial party 
of their  own  time,  but  receiving  genuine support  from  the people. 91 These men  work 
through  the voting  assemblies,  not through  mobs of hired supporters (Sest.  105).  Cicero 
generally  approves the elements of their  public  persona,  including  both  their  speech  and 
their  bodily  habitus  that  was the focus of oratorical training. In contrast  to how  he treats 
current populares  such  as Clodius,  Cicero praises the oratorical  abilities of the Gracchi 
and their  immediate successors: his comments lament  the  misapplication of their  talents 
rather  than  disparaging their  skill. 92 While the relationship between  the early  populares 
and the people focuses on  their self-presentation  – “men loved their  name,  their  speech, 
their  face, their  walk”  (horum homines nomen, orationem, vultum,  incessum  amabant, 
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91 Cf. the harsher presentation of C. Gracchus and Saturninus at e.g. Rab. Perd. 12-24.
92 E.g Secutus est C. Gracchus, quo ingenio, qua eloquentia, quanta vi, quanta gravitate 
dicendi! ut dolerent boni non illa tanta ornamenta ad meliorem mentem 
voluntatemque esse conversa (Har. Resp. 41); cf. Brut. 103-4, 125-26.
Sest.  105) – the earlier  boni in contrast  “were not  pleasant to the multitude”  (multitudini 
iucundi non erant, Sest. 105).  The influence of these “serious and great  men” (graves  et 
magni homines) relies on  the more intangible  notion  of auctoritas.  Cicero’s description 
of these two types of relationship with the people suggests that  popular  support  derives 
from  an  affective basis. He thus defines the opposition  between  the two groups as a 
conflict between physical  style and philosophical substance.  He does not  explicitly 
describe the appearance of the Gracchi and their  successors,  but  the contrast  he 
establishes between  them  and the graves et magni homines  suggests that  their  habitus 
presented a  more amiable effect  than the severity  of the supporters of the senate.  This 
contrast  suggests that those who adopt  an  amiable persona  do so as a  conscious tactic to 
court  popular  support  while those who present themselves as severe and restrained are 
merely  enacting the innate character  of a  Roman  senator. Such  a  division is,  of course, a 
false distinction: the severity  of the optimates  is as much  as stylistic  choice as the 
geniality of the populares.93
Cicero uses public  applause in  the theater  as another  metric to reinforce the 
distinction  in his comparison  between the two types. While  he describes applause for  the 
populares  with  a  simple statement of fact  — “There was applause for  them  in the 
theater”  (his  in theatro plaudebatur,  Sest.  105)  — he highlights the negative 
connotations of such  applause through  the suspicions of the senatorial  party: “indeed 
even  if one of them  received applause at  some time,  he was very  afraid he had done 
something  wrong”  (plausum vero etiam si quis  eorum aliquando acceperat,  ne quid 
peccasset pertimescebat,  Sest. 105). This account demonstrates a  deep anxiety 
concerning the collective decisions of the general populace. 94 As a venue for  evaluation of 
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93 See Gunderson (2000) and Connolly (2007) 132-36 on the carefully trained and 
disciplined nature of the orator’s public persona.
94 Connolly (2007) 234-36 discusses the problematic balance created by the orator’s use 
of emotion to persuade the populace at large. On the negative side, the interaction 
between the orator and his audience creates a “terrifying spectacle of the republican 
citizenry as a collective of unreason.”
political figures,  the theater  firmly  links popular  political activity  with  performance. The 
juxtaposition  of comparisons between  the senatorial party,  the early  populares  and the 
Clodiani thus creates a  threefold division  based on  the combination  of masculinity  and 
political orthodoxy.  While he assigns the optimates  of both  the Gracchan era  and his own 
time to the single category  of right-thinking  masculine men,  he divides the politically 
objectionable populares  between  the Gracchi – personally  upright,  though  politically 
suspect – and the Clodiani whom  he represents as effeminate monsters.95  The 
distinction  between the political and the gendered components of these identities, 
however, is not so secure as this schematic  outline suggests.  As we have seen,  in  Cicero’s 
representation  the political conflict between  the senatorial party  and the early  populares 
already  shades into a  conflict between  style and substance,  suggesting that the 
masculine-effeminate opposition characteristic of the conflict with  Clodius in  Cicero’s 
rhetoric  already  underlies the battles between  the Gracchi and their  opponents.  By 
shifting between  the various comparisons that  compose this discussion  – optimates  vs. 
Gracchi and Gracchi vs.  Clodiani – Cicero reinforces the abuse of Clodius and his allies. 
The relatively  composed and masculine demeanor of the Gracchi, Saturninus and the 
others allows Cicero to shift  his portrayal of Clodius,  Piso,  Gabinius and his other 
opponents even  further  down the represented scale of gender conformity  than a simple 
opposition between  his own party  and the Clodiani would. In  his attacks on his political 
opponents, Cicero shifts repeatedly  back  and forth  between scales of “proper”  political 
position  and gender performance. The combination  of multiple analogies in  the pro 
Sestio  and other  such  speeches aims less at creating a coherent evaluative framework 
than  at  manipulating  a  series of relative evaluations, linked by  juxtaposition  rather  than 
logical coherence. Slipping between  subtly  different presentations of a  common  point of 
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95 Unacknowledged within these comparisons is a potential fourth category: the 
effeminate conservative. The alleged character of the current populares is depicted 
perhaps most vividly in the capsule biography and description of Clodius at de 
Haruspicum Responsis 41-44.
comparison allows the orator  to build a more damning  contrast between  the 
contemporary  senatorial party  and their  popular  opponents than  a  direct comparison 
would.
1.2: The Standard of Credibility Enables the Manipulation of Narrative. 
In  addition  to the choice of objects and terms for  comparison,  speakers and writers are 
also able to manipulate the material that  comprises each  of those terms. In this section  I 
argue that the character  of exempla as narratives plays a  vital role in  the methods 
authors use to build arguments with  them. The form  in  which  an exemplary  citation 
appears has important implications. Quintilian’s identification  of the content  of an 
exemplum  as “the citation of an  event  that has happened or  one treated as if it  has 
happened”  (rei gestae aut ut gestae… commemoratio,  5.11.6) implies that  exempla  are 
built  upon  narrative content.96 Sometimes a  speaker should narrate the full content of an 
exemplum; sometimes he should simply  allude to it  (5.11.15-16).  Quintilian  indicates that 
the choice between  these alternatives depends on  three elements: familiarity, utility  and 
taste. “These things will  be reported according  to how  well  they  are known, or how  their 
usefulness for  the case or suitability  demands”  (Haec ita dicentur prout nota erunt vel 
utilitas  causae aut decor postulabit, 5.11.16). Gazich  notes the close similarity  between 
the definition  that  Quintilian provides for  narratio and the one, cited above,  for 
exemplum: “narration is the exposition of an event that  has happened or  one treated as if 
it  has happened that  is useful for  persuasion” (narratio  est rei factae aut ut factae utilis 
ad persuadendum  expositio, 4.2.31). 97 Perhaps the most  salient difference is the shift 
between  the central  terms used to describe the two elements: “exhibition”  (expositio) 
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96 Cf. Quint. Inst. 4.2.17 where he includes among the types of narrative revelant to but 
not intrinsic to the case itself those related exempli gratia.
97 Gazich (1990) 131-32. Cf. “exemplum, that is the citation of an event that has happened 
or one treated as if it has happened useful for making what you are arguing 
convincing” (exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod 
intenderis commemoratio, 5.11.6).
and “citation”  (commemoratio). While a  narratio  must  in  general relate the narrative of 
the event in  question,  the citation (commemoratio)  may  simply  allude to the exemplary 
narrative, provided that is well known.
Various techniques allow  speakers and writers to manipulate the effect  of the 
anecdotes that  they  deploy  as exempla.  It  is important  to recognize that credibility  rather 
than  veracity  serves as the standard for  the judgment of narratives—and consequently 
for  the judgment  of exempla. 98 An audience’s acceptance of both  the details of events 
and moral or  pragmatic  judgments about those events depends upon  the credibility  of 
the narrative. The rhetorical device of distinctio  – drawing  tendentious distinctions 
between  near  synonyms with  divergent  ethical connotations – provides a  useful point  of 
entry  to thinking  about the credibility  of moral judgments. The difference between 
virtuous frugality  and vicious miserliness, for  example,  is often little more than  a  matter 
of narrative framing.99 The selection,  arrangement or  even invention  of tangential details 
may color the effect of a particular event.100
Anecdotes that  may  be deployed as exempla sometimes display  dramatic shifts in 
meaning  from  one telling  to another.  The distinction  between  different interpretations is 
often  a  matter of focus and framing. For example,  Cicero and Suetonius report  the action 
of the Vestal Virgin  Claudia,  who rides in  her  father’s chariot  during  his triumph  and 
prevents a tribune from  interfering  with  it, in  order  to illustrate very  different qualities. 
For  Cicero, speaking  in  the voice of Appius Claudius Caecus,  she serves as a  model of 
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98 Quint. Inst. 4.2.52-60 discusses credibility as one of the three essential virtues of 
narrative. Cf. Cic. De Inv. 1.28-29.
99 Cf., for example, Quintilian’s remarks on the substitution of positive and pejorative 
adjectives at 3.7.25 and 5.13.26.
100 E.g. the coloring lent by the location of Tiberius’s death in Lucullus’s villa, or 
Augustus’s death in his father’s bed, cf. Gowing (2005) 65.
filial  piety  to contrast  with  the target  of his speech,  Clodia  Metelli (Cael.  34).101 Suetonius 
on  the other  hand uses Claudia  to illustrate the arrogance of the gens  Claudia and their 
contempt  for  the Roman  plebs  (Tib. 2). 102 Cicero focuses on  the relationship between 
father  and daughter.  Claudia  embraces her  father  — patrem complexa  (Cael.  34) — 
narrowing  the picture to the father-daughter  pair riding  in  the chariot. The tribune 
appears solely  as an  external  threat; the orator  does not  describe his motives,  only  his 
physical  aggression  — “she did not  allow  her  father  to be dragged for  his chariot  by  the 
hostile tribune of the people”  (patrem… ab inimico  tribuno plebei de  curru detrahi 
passa non est, Cael.  34).  Claudia’s reason for  riding  in  the chariot is not  revealed, only 
her  defense of her  father.  With  one additional  detail Suetonius expands the frame to 
reveal the external political situation. Claudia’s act in  fact  helps her  father  (or  brother) 
celebrate a  triumph  forbidden  by  the people — iniussu populi (Tib. 2) — and her 
presence provides religious sanction  to prevent the tribunes from  enforcing  the will of 
the people — “so that  it would not  be possible for  any  of the tribunes to forbid or 
interfere”  (ne vetare aut intercedere fas  cuiquam tribunorum  esset, Tib.  2). Where 
Cicero prioritizes the relationship between  father  and daughter,  Suetonius highlights the 
conflict between  the Claudian family  and the people. Both  of these interpretations may 
exist  simultaneously: Cicero reproduces the attitude of the gens  Claudia  and those 
sympathetic to them,  Suetonius that of the  common people. Neither  version  then 
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101 Nonne te, si nostrae imagines viriles non commovebant, ne progenies quidem mea, 
Q. illa Claudia, aemulam domesticae laudis in gloria muliebri esse admonebat, non 
virgo illa Vestalis Claudia, quae patrem complexa triumphantem ab inimico tribuno 
plebei de curru detrahi passa non est (Cicero, pro Caelio 34). Cicero’s account of this 
anecdote appears within the prosopopoeia of Appius Claudius Caecus, using a series of 
exempla from the gens Claudia to castigate Appius’ descendant Clodia. Cf. Val. Max. 
5.4.6, who gives a slightly different version of this story.
102 Etiam uirgo Vestalis fratrem iniussu populi triumphantem ascenso simul curru 
usque in Capitolium prosecuta est, ne uetare aut intercedere fas cuiquam tribunorum 
esset (Suetonius, Tiberius 2). Suetonius identifies the Vestal Claudia’s relative as her 
brother rather than her father as in the accounts of Cicero and Valerius.
produces an  “official”  authorized meaning,  and likewise neither  can  be fully 
discounted.103
The careful selection  of vocabulary  and narrative detail allows speakers to present 
persons and events in  whatever  way  they  feel will prove most  effective for  their 
arguments.  They  must conceal,  however, the  inherent  flexibility  of the narrative 
apparatus.  Quintilian,  for  example, cautions that speakers must be careful to conceal 
their  art  in  order  to avoid arousing  the judges’ suspicions (e.g.  4.2.58-59,  125-27). 
Speakers constantly  mold their  descriptions and arguments to reflect  the assumptions of 
their  audience,  all the while acting as if they  were presenting a  stable face.104 Citing  “a 
certain closeness between  virtues and vices”  (quaedam virtutibus ac vitiis vicinitas,  Inst. 
3.7.25),  Quintilian  suggests that positive and pejorative synonyms can  be substituted for 
one another  as the speaker’s purpose dictates.105 He takes care, however,  to set  what  may 
initially  appear  to be strict  limits on  his ideal  orator’s use of this practice: “And indeed 
the orator, that  is the good man, will never  do this,  unless by  chance he is led on  by  the 
general  good”  (Quod quidem orator, id est vir bonus, numquam  faciet,  nisi forte 
communi utilitate  ducetur, 3.7.25). The qualification  that Quintilian  appends to his 
strong denial appears limiting,  but  by  identifying the “general  good”  or  “common  utility” 
as the prerequisite for  allowing  this practice he leaves open a  very  wide field for  the use 
for  this sort  of linguistic flexibility.  His apparent  injunction  may  even  be read as little 
more than a  pro forma  protest  that  fails to disavow  such  opportunistic uses of language 
and ultimately  has little other  purpose than  to insist that  the moral authority  of the 
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103 Cf. Loutsch (1998) 33-35 who discusses variant traditions concerning Regulus’s 
capture by the Carthaginians.
104 E.g. Corbeill (2004) 111-12 discusses Cicero’s varying use of the popularis label both 
against his opponents while speaking to the Senate and for himself while speaking to the 
people—popularis consul (Leg. Agr. 2.6-7, 9, 15, 102). Also cf. Santoro L’Hoir (1992) 28 
on both the inconsistent application of popularis and similar context-driven shifts 
between the terms vir and homo in Cicero’s speeches.
105 This thought appears multiple times in the Institutio, e.g. est praeterea quaedam 
virtutum vitiorumque vicinia (2.12.4) in a discussion of popular preferences for faulty 
oratory. On this practice, labeled distinctio, cf. Brink (1989) 480.
orator  authorizes his use of such potentially  deceptive devices.  The orator’s use of speech 
effects that  threaten  the reception  of his speech  as authoritative find defense in  the moral 
character  ascribed to the orator  himself. Quintilian  here calls upon the moral authority 
suggested by  the definition  of the orator  as a  “good man”  (vir bonus)  in  order  to 
ameliorate the ethical instability  suggested by  this discussion  of linguistic flexibility.  This 
quaedam  virtutibus  ac  vitiis  vicinitas presents a  potential ethical crisis for  Quintilian’s 
vir bonus.  Rather  than  resolving  this crisis, however, he baldly  asserts the ethical 
goodness of the ideal orator  and thus justifies the speaker’s manipulation  of ethical 
boundaries through  confidence in  that  goodness.  A  tendentious translation  of 
Quintilian’s caution  might render  his claim  simply  as “the orator  will never  do this, 
unless it is useful.”  The argument  here assumes that,  as a good man, the orator  must 
have a  good end in view  and consequently  that those ends justify  his use of ethically 
dubious means.106 
On a  more technical level, Quintilian  applies this same attention  to the language 
used in  describing  events to the refutation of opposing  arguments.  An  orator  should 
consider  the effect  of an opponent’s words when quoting or  paraphrasing them.  “The 
manner  in which  an  accuser has stated each thing  is important to consider  for  this 
reason  that,  if he has spoken  less effectively, his very  words should be quoted; but  if he 
has given  a sharp and forceful speech,  we should report the same matter  with  milder 
language”  (referre quo quidque accusator modo dixerit, huc pertinet ut, si est minus 
efficaciter elocutus,  ipsa eius  verba ponantur: si acri et vehementi fuerit usus oratione, 
eandem rem nostris verbis  mitioribus proferamus, 5.13.25).  Here Quintilian  again 
suggests the substitution  of positive for  pejorative near-synonyms in order  to alter  the 
characterization  of the defendant: “If we must  speak  on  behalf of a  voluptuary: ‘his 
lifestyle has been  called a  little too generous.’ In  the same way  it  will  also be permitted to 
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106 Gunderson (2000) 8 discusses the circularity of such formulations of oratory as the 
practice of good men.
call  a  man  ‘thrifty’ instead of ‘mean,’  or  ‘free-spoken’ instead of ‘abusive’”  (si pro 
luxurioso dicendum sit: ‘obiecta est paulo  liberalior vita.’  Sic et pro sordido parcum, 
pro maledico liberum dicere licebit,  5.13.26). 107 An  orator  must  always be aware of what 
an  opponent has said or  might  say.  Quintilian  even  suggests that students should be 
rewarded as much  for  thinking  up ideas damaging to their  own  cases as for  discovering 
advantageous ones (5.13.44). The flexibility  of language allows speakers and writers to 
manipulate the details and characterization  of actors to confirm  the picture they  want to 
create.
In  Satire  1.3  Horace discusses the use of such  distinctions either  to alienate or  to 
conciliate friends and relatives.  He compares the relationship between  friends to that 
between  a  father  and son. In  the satirist’s example,  the father  gives nicknames that 
indicate various physical  shortcomings less harshly  than  the specific name: “A  father 
calls a  squinter  ‘blink-eyed’ (paetus)  and,  if anyone has a  too small son, he calls him 
‘chick’ (pullus)”  (strabonem  | appellat paetum pater,  et pullum,  male parvus | si cui 
filius  est, S.  1.3.44-46). Different  problems with  the legs receive the names “knock-
kneed” (varum,  47) and “twisty-legged”  (scaurus,  48).  All  four of these euphemisms — 
Paetus, Pullus,  Varus and Scaurus — were also used as cognomina in famous families. 
The choice of these specific  names may  imply  that  such  instances of Roman  naming 
practices could function  as exempla for  this type of euphemism.108 Horace suggests that 
one should label the character faults of one’s friends in the same fashion:
This man lives very  parsimoniously: let him  be called ‘thrifty’ (frugi). This man  is 
tasteless and a little too boastful: he wants to appear  agreeable to his friends.  But 
he is very  harsh  and free-spoken  beyond reason: let him  be considered direct 
(simplex) and brave. He is very fierce: let him be counted among the spirited.
parcius hic vivit: frugi dicatur. ineptus
et iactantior hic paulo est: concinnus amicis
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107 Cf. also 4.2.77 on the use of such vocabulary substitutions in the narrative of a defense 
speech.
108 See Corbeill (1996) 57-98 on Roman cognomina. Corbeill focuses on abusive names 
or names used or adapted for abuse.
postulat ut videatur. at est truculentior atque
plus aequo liber: simplex fortisque habeatur.
caldior est: acris inter numeretur.
    (1.3.49-53)109
As with  the names for  children,  the first  euphemism  offered here, Frugi,  was also the 
cognomen of an important family. 110
Horace first introduces this idea through  the commonplace of the lover’s 
blindness to the faults of the love object. 111 He wishes that this beneficial mistake could 
extend to other  areas of life: “I might  wish  that  we made this mistake in  friendship, and 
that  virtue had given  an  honorable name to this mistake”  (vellem in amicitia  sic 
erraremus,  et isti | errori nomen virtus  posuisset honestum,  1.3.41-42).  The younger 
Pliny, accused of exaggerating  his friends’ virtues, assigns this “most happy 
mistake”  (felicissimo errore, Ep. 7.28.2) just such  a  name: “You  say  that  certain  people 
in  your  hearing have found fault,  as if I praise my  friends beyond their  due on  every 
occasion.  I knowledge the charge; I even  embrace it. For  what is more honorable  than 
the crime of affability?”  (Ais quosdam  apud te  reprehendisse,  tamquam amicos  meos  ex 
omni occasione ultra modum laudem. Agnosco  crimen, amplector etiam. Quid enim 
honestius  culpa benignitatis? 7.28.1-2).   In  Pliny’s eyes,  such self-deception  provides a 
great  benefit.  Those who would see their  friends as they  actually  are apply  accuracy  to 
the detriment of amicable  relations: “For  though they  may  not  be the sort of men as they 
are proclaimed by  me,  nevertheless I am  blessed because they  seem  so to me. Therefore 
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109 Cf. Ovid Ars 2.657-662:
Nominibus mollire licet mala: fuca vocetur,
 nigrior Illyrica cui pice sanguis erit;
si straba, sit Veneri similis; si rava, Mivervae;
 sit gracilis, macie quae male viva sua est;
dic habilem, quaecumque brevis, quae turgida, plenam,
 et lateat vitium proximitate boni.
See Lucretius 4.1149-70 for a negative variation on this trope.
110 Simplex is also attested as a cognomen during the first century CE, but that is too late 
to be known by Horace.
111 Illuc praevertamur, amatorem quod amicae
turpia decipiunt caecum vitia, aut etiam ipsa haec
delectant, veluti Balbinum polypus Hagnae. (S. 1.3.38-40)
let them  bring  this perverse attentiveness to others; if there are not very  many  who call 
slandering  your  friends ‘judgment’”  (Ut enim non sint tales  quales a me praedicantur, 
ego tamen beatus quod mihi videntur. Igitur ad alios hanc sinistram diligentiam 
conferant; nec sunt parum multi, qui carpere amicos  iudicium  vocant,  7.28.2-3). 
Accurate  observation  thus paradoxically  produces a  false sort of judgment: for Pliny 
optimistic  hypocrisy  greases the wheels of social intercourse. Misrepresentation  provides 
the basis for aristocratic gentility.
Events may  acquire meaning  simply  from  circumstantial details that  narrators 
emphasize, a  practice that  could be described as creative contextualization.  Accounts of 
the death  of Tiberius,  for  example,  use the location of the event in  a villa  at Misenum  that 
once belonged to the Republican  voluptuary  Lucullus to suggest something  about the 
character  of the emperor  (Tac.  Ann. 6.50; Suet. Tib.  73).  As Gowing  notes, “Despite the 
fact  that Lucullus was neither  the first  owner of the villa  nor  perhaps even  the most 
famous,  it is nonetheless the association  with  Lucullus  that  the sources wish to stress in 
narrating  the emperor’s death.” 112 The linkage created between  Tiberius and Lucullus 
does not  function directly  as an  exemplum,  but  the implicit  association  between  the two 
figures functions in  what  might be termed as a  “para-exemplary”  mode.  Although  neither 
Tacitus nor Suetonius draws a  specific  analogy  between  the two men,  the connection 
implies such  a  comparison,  most immediately  between Lucullus’s luxurious life in 
retirement and Tiberius’s on  Capri. This connection between  Tiberius and Lucullus, 
however, may  not rest  as much  on  their  actual activities as on  the sort  of activities that  a 
Roman  audience was disposed to imagine that  public figures who withdrew  from  public 
life engaged in.  As Shadi Bartsch  comments concerning  the stories of Tiberius’ life of 
sexual depravity,  “What the rumors definitely  reveal is not so much  whether  Tiberius 
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112 Gowing (2005) 65, emphasis in the original. Cf. Bodel (1997) 13-14 on Lucullus as 
potentially the first “‘eponymous’ villa owner.” D’Arms (1970) 113, 184-86, 113 reviews 
the evidence on Lucullus’s Campanian estates.
had a  kinky  side, but  that  removing oneself from  public view  itself may  produce such 
allegations!” 113 While residence in  a  popular  resort  region  would not  create quite the 
same level  of isolation  as the princeps’ retreat  on  Capri,  Lucullus’ retirement  from  Rome 
nevertheless removed him  from  frequent  public observation. 114  The implied analogy 
between  the retired general and Tiberius thus may  find its suggestive force through  the 
shrouded private space in  which  would-be observers could imagine various scandalous 
acts.
At times speakers may  present radically  disparate pictures of events.  The most 
common version  of Tiberius Gracchus’s death in  the extant sources describes Scipio 
Nasica, the leader  of the mob that  killed the tribune, as a  valiant  defender  of the Roman 
state. Valerius Maximus, for  instance,  labels Nasica as an  example of “bravery  in  a 
toga”  (togae… fortitudo,  3.2.17). 115 In  this account,  Gracchus appears solely  as an  enemy 
of the Senate and the Republic,  bribing the people to abolish  the Senate and take control 
of everything  (3.2.17).  The resistance of the consul Mucius Scaevola  to taking violent 
action against  Gracchus and his followers is nearly  as important  to the anecdote as the 
attack  on  the tribune himself.  Valerius characterizes Nasica  almost entirely  through 
direct speech, implicitly  endorsing  his claim  to defend the Republic: “Then Scipio Nasica 
said,  ‘because the consul,  while  he follows the letter  of the law, brings it  about  that 
Roman  power  will collapse along with  all  the laws, I myself,  a  private citizen,  offer  myself 
as a  leader for  your  will. … Let those who wish  the Republic to be safe follow  me”  (tum 
Scipio Nasica, ‘quoniam,’ inquit,  ‘consul, dum iuris ordinem  sequitur,  id agit ut cum 
omnibus  legibus Romanum  imperium  corruat, egomet me privatus voluntati vestrae 
ducem  offero,’ … ‘qui rem  publicam salvam esse volunt me sequantur’, 3.2.17).  In 
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113 Bartsch (2006) 135-36.
114 D’Arms (1970) 47-48 discusses privacy among the qualities of such seaside villas.
115 Plutarch TG 16-19 and Appian 1.14-16 provide the two most complete extant accounts 
of the events leading up to the fatal assembly. The sources discussed here—Val. Max. 
3.2.17, Velleius 2.2-3 and Rhet. ad Herr. 4.68—focus almost exclusively on the assembly 
itself.
Valerius’s version of the event, a  rhetorical  act  of self-presentation  defines the 
protagonist’s act as a valiant and public-spirited defense of the state.
Velleius Paterculus presents nearly  the same outline of events, but focuses 
instead on  ancestry  and public  recognition  to affirm  Nasica’s good character: “Although 
he was a  cousin  of Ti. Gracchus, he preferred his fatherland to kinship and judged 
whatever  was not  beneficial  for  the state to be foreign  to his own  interest  (because of 
these virtues he was the first  man of all  elected pontifex maximus  when  he was not 
present)”  (cum esset consobrinus  Ti.  Gracchi, patriam  cognationi praeferens  et 
quidquid publice salutare non esset, privatim alienum existimans (ob eas virtutes 
primus  omnium  absens  pontifex maximus factus est),  2.3). Velleius grounds Nasica’s 
moral  worth  in  the official recognition  provided by  his selection  to priestly  office. The 
historian ignores the conflict  with  the consul  concerning the use of violence against 
Gracchus, paraphrasing only  Nasica’s exhortation that “those who wish  the Republic  to 
be safe should follow  him”  (qui salvam  vellent rem publicam, se sequerentur,  2.3.1).  In 
his version  of events, Velleius contrasts Gracchus’s “selfish”  sense of offense at  the 
rejection of a  treaty  he had negotiated — “bearing harshly  that anything  settled by  him 
was invalidated” (graviter ferens  aliquid a se  pactum infirmari,  2.2.1) — with  Nasica’s 
“selfless” choice to murder his cousin.
The Rhetorica ad Herennium, however, dramatically  reverses the  descriptions of 
the two men within an illustration of the rhetorical technique of vivid description 
(demonstratio).  The Auctor  depicts Scipio Nasica  as a  rabid beast while presenting 
Gracchus as a  model of the dignified Roman politician. Nasica, here left  unnamed, 116 
receives an extensive,  colorful description: “overflowing with  crime and evil thoughts… 
sweating,  his eyes burning,  his hair  on  end, his toga  twisted about… that  man,  slavering 
villainy  from  his mouth,  panting  out cruelty  from  the depths of his chest”  (scelere et 
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116 Sordi (1978) 318 suggests that the absence of the name serves as a sort of damnatio 
memoriae.
malis cogitationibus  redundans… sudans, oculis  ardentibus, erecto  capillo,  contorta 
toga… iste, spumans  ex ore  scelus, anhelans ex infimo  pectore crudelitatem,  4.68). 
Gracchus, in  contrast,  appears at the moment  of his death  as the consummate dignified 
Roman  politician: “that  man,  not  marring  his innate courage with  any  word, fell 
silently”  (ille, nulla voce delibans insitam  virtutem, concidit tacitus,  4.68).  The Auctor 
closes with  a  picture of Nasica  rejoicing  over  the murder. He characterizes Nasica’s self-
presentation  as a  savior  of the Republic,  which we saw  most  prominently  in  Valerius’s 
account, as a  terrible delusion: “that  man,  splattered with  the piteous blood of the most 
courageous man, looking  about as if he had done the most  noble deed, and cheerfully 
extending  his criminal  hand to his flatterers,  went  into the temple of Jupiter”  (iste  viri 
fortissimi miserando sanguine aspersus,  quasi facinus praeclarissimum  fecisset circum 
inspectans, et hilare sceleratum gratulantibus  manum porrigens,  in templum  Iovis 
contulit sese, 4.68). These pro- and anti-Gracchan  accounts present  the same figures and 
the same basic  events in  dramatically  different  lights. The meaning  of the killing and the 
political view  espoused follow  from  the prevailing  view  of Nasica’s intentions and 
emotional state.  Whether he is a  valiant,  club-wielding  defender of the Republic  or  a 
rabid, club-wielding murderer  depends on  the particular  narrator’s political 
sympathies.117
1.3: Manipulating Tradition to Fit Current Arguments.
As the previous section has demonstrated,  the framing  of an  exemplary  narrative, the 
additions and omissions,  serve an important  function in  structuring the effect of that 
narrative. This capacity  for  recasting the material  of comparison  enables authors to 
recreate the conception  of Roman  tradition  to meet the needs of their  current 
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117 For a parallel instance in which the view of an actor’s private intentions colors the 
understanding of an event, compare the pro-Caesarian view of Caesar’s sorrowful 
reaction to the death of Pompey at e.g. Val. Max. 5.1.10, with the anti-Caesarian view of 
Caesar’s feigned sorrow given at Lucan 9.1010-1108.
circumstances. In this section, I demonstrate how  the standard of credibility  used to 
judge the  effectiveness of exempla  permits the recasting of memory  through  the lens of 
current interests.
As the discourse around a given  event  develops,  writers and speakers may  draw 
on  circumstantial elements to present  a various interpretations.  Complete historical 
veracity  is not  necessary  in  many  circumstances: credibility  becomes the central concern 
in  the availability  of circumstantial elements with  which  to mold the meaning  of an 
exemplum.  Sometimes details would be omitted to alter  the meaning of a  narrative,  as 
we saw  with  the different versions of the Vestal  Claudia’s defense of her  father.118 
Likewise details could be added to a  narrative to color  the effect  of the anecdote. 
Quintilian,  for  example,  advises prospective orators that  even fictional  elements have a 
place in  forensic  speeches, provided that  such  details appear  reasonable: “We will make 
things apparent if they  are like  the truth,  and it  is even  permitted to invent  falsely 
whatever  usually  happens”  (Consequemur autem ut manifesta sint si fuerint veri 
similia,  et licebit etiam falso adfingere quidquid fieri solet,  Inst.  8.3.70).119 Following the 
standard of credibility, conventional tropes may  easily  become entwined in  narratives as 
various speakers and writers shape and reshape them.120  The misidentifications and 
composite figures that  appear  in  Valerius Maximus’s collection  of exempla  demonstrate 
one form  of mutation  that a narrative of an  event  may  undergo.121 Such  changes may  be 
the result of either  careless mistakes or  deliberate manipulation  on the part of a  writer  or 
speaker  seeking  to mold the narrative to further  a  particular  purpose.  Over  time, various 
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118 Cf. Gowing (2005) 76-81 discussing Seneca’s transformation of the figures of Cato and 
Scipio Africanus in Epp. 14 and 86 respectively.
119 Cf. Inst. 4.2.88-100 on the use of false narratives, or false elements within narratives, 
for forensic speeches.
120 Cf. Quintilian 4.2.57-58 on Cicero’s introduction of a domestic scene to the narrative 
of his speech for Milo (Mil. 28).
121 E.g. Maslakov (1984) 444 with n. 15 and Bloomer (1992) 2, 19, 39, 67, 120, 135-36 – 
the latter mostly dealing with individual historical errors – discuss misidentifications 
and composite figures in Valerius’s collection.
accretions or associations may  become integral or  optional  parts of some “standard” 
version  of an  event, and may  consequently  influence the range of associations available 
to later  speakers and writers. 122 Cultural shifts may  create a  similar  effect,  where  shifts 
between  different  times, places,  languages and social groups change the audience’s 
interpretive framework.
Writers and speakers must perform  a  delicate balancing act  between  invoking 
tradition and manipulating exemplary  materials. Despite the flexibility  with  which  they 
could treat  exempla, to some extent  these authors and their  audiences must believe that 
these narratives represent gestures toward some stable body  of tradition.  A  central 
motivation  for  encouraging  such  a balance is the need to avoid any  sense of cognitive 
dissonance with  common  beliefs about the figures discussed. Such  avoidance, however, 
does not imply  that the possibility  for mistakes or  shifts in  knowledge went 
unrecognized. The interest  in  antiquarian  research  that  flowered at  various times, 
notably  in  the late Republic and later  in  the second century  CE,  demonstrates an 
awareness at  some level  that  current  understandings about  the past  might not  be 
accurate representations.123 As Wallace-Hadrill  notes in connection  with  the activities of 
scholars such  as Varro during  the later  part of the first  century  BCE, “Antiquarianism 
presented a frontal challenge to the authority  on which  the nobility  based their claim  to 
power. It  was now  the antiquarian, by  his laborious study  of obscurely  worded 
documents,  and displaying  the credentials of Greek academic  learning, who ‘knew’ what 
the ‘real’ Roman tradition  was.” 124 This conflict  over  who possessed more “accurate” 
knowledge of customs and traditions provides a  productive opening  for  speakers and 
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122 Cf. Roller (1997) discussing the influence of declamation on the historiographical 
tradition surrounding Cicero’s death (I discuss the relationship between exemplary 
thought and declamation in section 2.2).
123 Rawson (1985) 233-49 discusses antiquarianism in the late Republic, focusing 
primarily on the work of Varro.
124 Wallace-Hadrill (1997) 14.
writers to proclaim  their  own  interpretations as traditional and thus to bolster  their  own 
authority as reporters of culture.
Roller  identifies an  important  tendency  of exemplary  thought  that he labels the 
“principle of ethical  continuity.”  This phrase describes an  underlying assumption  that 
judgments about the value of exempla,  even  when  later  evaluations vary  from  the 
original,  are made on  the basis of persistent  ethical  standards shared between  the 
evaluating  audiences at  all points in  time.125 Roller  limits his treatment  of this concept  to 
shifts along the temporal axis, but the assumption  of a  single consistent ethical system 
operating  throughout the various sub-groups of the Roman populace—or even simply 
throughout the aristocracy  taken  as a  unit—is equally  as fictional as the assumption  that 
a  late Republican or  an Imperial  audience would recognize the same moral standards as 
one in  the early  Republic. The image of a  consistent,  shared system  of ethical standards 
provides a  comforting sense of legitimacy  and group or  cultural solidarity  that  allows 
individual actors to employ  exemplarity  to create powerful rhetorical effects in  their 
immediate circumstances.  This principle of ethical  continuity  may  operate across a  wide 
variety  of axes: temporal, social,  political, economic,  regional  and so on. Even  within 
moments of direct  conflict it  is advantageous for  each  of the competing  actors to depict 
his/her  own  evaluative framework as consistent  with  that  assumed to exist throughout 
the populus  Romanus  at  all times and in  all  places. Exempla  as atomized, 
decontextualized tokens of cultural and ethical  authority  provide flexible tools for 
advancing  almost  any  goal  while nevertheless appearing  to adhere to a  persistent, shared 
moral tradition.
Of course the moralizing stance taken  by  many  extant texts complicates the 
understanding  of continuity  between  various times or  groups.  Romans often assumed 
61
125 Roller (2004) 34, cf. Roller (2001) 21 where he describes traditional Roman ethical 
discourse as “traditional” because aristocrats regarded it as passed down from their 
maiores.
that  their  contemporary  society  had declined from  an  earlier,  more virtuous time. 126 
Since, as we have seen  in  the previous section, ethical meaning depends on  the narrative 
setting of the exempla or  other media  used to express it, a  moral stance espoused as 
traditional could shift  from  one situation to another  depending on  the views of the 
involved parties and audience. As a  consequence speakers and writers could treat 
ideological desiderata  as “traditional”  whether  or  not such  beliefs had actually  existed in 
earlier  times.  Thus the concept  of “ethical continuity”  may  authorize writers and 
speakers to represent their  own ideological  preferences as “tradition.”  In  other  words, a 
practice that was neither  adhered to by  contemporaries nor  authentically  archaic  could 
be treated as “traditional”  without  any  sense of dissonance. The familiarity  of an  idea 
could reinforce its credibility  as a “traditional”  understanding.  A  concept or  opinion  that 
seemed familiar  would more readily  attain acceptance from  an  audience not intent  on 
historical accuracy.127
Cicero’s dialogue Brutus  depicts an  interesting  interchange between  Cicero 
himself and his friend Atticus concerning  the factual  content  of a  pair  of anecdotes. 
Comparing  the death  of the Roman  general  Coriolanus to that  of Themistocles — he 
claims that both men  committed suicide rather  than  carry  through on  plans to attack 
their  own city  — Cicero admits that his representation  of events differs from  that  set  out 
by  his friend’s work on Roman  antiquity.  Atticus laughs and excuses the lapse,  claiming 
that:  “it  is allowed for  orators to make false claims in historical narratives so that they 
may  state something  more clearly”  (concessum est rhetoribus  ementiri in historiis,  ut 
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126 E.g. Sallust, Cat. 6-13, Iug. 4; Livy, praef. 11-12; Seneca, Contr. 1.praef.6-10. On 
Roman moralism see Edwards (1993), esp. 1-5 on the persistence of the trope of moral 
decline.
127 See Quintilian IO 4.2.52-60 on the importance of familiarity and audience expectation  
in fostering the credibility of a narrative.
aliquid dicere possint argutius,  Brutus  42). 128 He remarks that  some historians treated 
the death  of Themistocles in  very  similar  fashion, providing  an  elaborate narrative in 
which  the Athenian general  sacrificed a  bull and drank a  bowl of its blood.  Atticus claims 
that  these historians preferred this fantastical story  for  the opportunity  it allowed to 
engage in  rhetorical  display: “Indeed they  were able to adorn  this death in  rhetorical  and 
tragic  fashion, but that  common sort  of death  offered no material  for  elaboration,”  (Hanc 
etiam  mortem rhetorice  et tragice ornare potuerunt,  illa  mors  vulgaris  nullam 
praebebat materiem ad ornatum, 43). Atticus here identifies sensationalism  as the 
driving force  behind such  revisions of history,  but  the choice to use more exciting 
narratives may  also have an  ethical  intent.  The interest  in  sensationalism  described by 
Atticus contrasts with  Cicero’s more ethically  driven interest  in  recasting  Coriolanus’s 
death. The antiquarian focus on accuracy  not  only  reduces the rhetorical interest  of the 
anecdote,  but  also diminishes its utility  as a  moral  exemplum.  Cicero in fact  had asked 
his friend to excuse his deformation  of death  of Coriolanus on precisely  such  an  ethical 
basis: “For  even  if the story  about  Coriolanus is told differently  in  your  book,  Atticus, 
nevertheless allow  me to approve rather  this sort  of death”  (Nam  etsi aliter apud te est, 
Attice, de Coriolano, concede tamen ut huic  generi mortis  potius  assentiar,  42).  The 
antiquarian concern  for  accuracy  thus impinges on  the orator’s ability  to build an  ethical 
argument: lies here may provide the motive force for moral edification. 129
Given  the example of this parallel, the antiquarian  lightheartedly  offers to allow 
his friend to add the bowl  to Coriolanus’s death  and even  offers to supply  a  sacrifice to 
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128 Stemmler (2000) 174-75 briefly introduces this episode solely to illustrate the point 
that: ‘Die Kategorie der historia und der historischen Wahrheit wird somit den 
Maßstäben der Wahrscheinlichkeit und Glaubwürdigkeit untergeordnet, die Fakten 
werden dem Vorverständnis des Zuhörers angepaßt und, bezogen wiederum auf die 
exempla, die Geschichten gegebenenfalls nach Maßgabe des jeweiligen gesellschaftlichen  
Bildes vom mos maiorum korrigiert – allerdings mit der Einschränkung, daß keine 
schriftlichen Zeugnisse oder eine firma auctoritas der Wahrheitskorrektur in Weg 
stehen dürfen.
129 In contrast, however, Rawson (1985) 243 identifies moralism as a much more central 
concern for Roman antiquarianism in contrast to Greek antiquarian scholarship.
further  the similarity  between the two men. 130 A fictional embellishment of the death  of 
Themistocles thus becomes an  exemplum  excusing  Cicero’s rewriting  of a historical 
event. By  limiting the purpose of rhetorical  embellishment to mere “ornament”  (ornatus, 
43), however,  Atticus gently  corrects Cicero’s desire to revise history  to adhere to his 
preferred moral  view. He shifts the basis of comparison  from  the actors of the two 
anecdotes (Themistocles and Coriolanus)  to the narrators of the anecdotes (Clitarchus 
and Stratocles concerning Themistocles, and Cicero concerning Coriolanus).  As Atticus 
frames the event,  by  creating  a  parallel  between  the Athenian  and Roman  generals, 
Cicero creates a  parallel between  himself and the two Greek historians. This 
identification  at  least partially  vitiates the moral message that  the orator  preferred in  his 
version.  In  response Cicero promises to be more cautious about his use of Roman 
history,  at  least  when  Atticus is there to correct  him: “I will mention  history  more 
carefully  after  this when  you  are listening, whom  I can  praise as the most  careful teacher 
of Roman  affairs” (ego cautius posthac historiam  attingam te audiente,  quem  rerum 
Romanarum  auctorem laudare possum  religiosissimum,  44).131  The problem  Cicero 
seeks to avoid in  the future, then,  is not  so much  fabricating  historical falsehood as it  is 
the possibility  of being  caught  while doing  so.  Antiquarian  knowledge such  as that 
possessed by  Atticus presents an  obstacle to the orator’s deployment  of historical 
materials. 132 The flexibility  of an  anecdote is more important for  the orator than accuracy 
of detail.
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130 “Therefore because it suits you to make all things alike in this way for Themistocles 
and Coriolanus, you may also take the bowl from me; I will provide a sacrificial victim as 
well, so that Coriolanus may clearly be a second Themistocles” (Qua re quoniam tibi ita 
quadrat omnia fuisse Themistocli paria et Coriolano, pateram quoque a me sumas licet,  
praebebo etiam hostiam, ut Coriolanus sit plane alter Themistocles, 43).
131 On Atticus’s antiquarian work see also Cic. Orat. 120 and Nepos, Att. 18.
132 Cf. Wallace-Hadrill (1997) 14 (cited above) on the challenge presented by academic 
antiquarianism to the Roman nobiles’ claim to cultural authority. His article as a whole 
makes a case for the shift from traditional knowledge to technical skill during the late 
first century BCE as a form of cultural revolution.
The manipulation  of tradition  in  spoken  and written  discourse relies on  an 
inherent  plasticity  of memory. As anecdotes are adapted to fit  new  contexts,  they  must 
nevertheless maintain  some resemblance to previous versions.  Joseph  Farrell, 
commenting  on  Cicero’s use of an  anecdote concerning the discovery  of memory 
techniques by  Simonides of Ceos (De orat.  2.351-53),  identifies a  concerted effort  to 
downplay  the poet’s professionalism  and well-known  desire for money.133  After 
Simonides performed a  poem  comparing his host  Scopas with  the Dioscuri,  the host  paid 
only  half the agreed fee, instructing  the poet  to obtain  the rest  from  the gods.  Simonides 
is called out  of the house, and the house collapses,  killing all inside. The poet discovers 
the importance of place for  memory  through his ability  to identify  the bodies from  the 
places they  had been  sitting.  Antonius, the narrator  of this anecdote,  structures his 
account to postpone the revelation  of the poet’s role  as a hired entertainer  for  as long  as 
possible.  In  fact it is only  when  Scopas refuses to honor  his contract  with  Simonides that 
the economic basis of the transaction is revealed.  Farrell interprets this effort  as an 
attempt to accommodate the example more clearly  to the situation  of the Roman 
patronus  for  whom  explicit material  remuneration  was both  legally  forbidden  and 
socially  distasteful. 134  He introduces the concept of performing  rather  than  simply 
recalling a  memory  in  order  to describe the manner in  which  Cicero adapts this anecdote 
for  the requirements of his dialogue: Cicero’s narrator  Antonius depicts Simonides as 
“the ideological ancestor  of the Roman  orator.  … Antonius’  commemoration  of 
Simonides’ discovery  is thus given  a  form  specific to the cultural  pressures that  limit  and 
define the professionalism  of the orator  as a  craftsman  who is compensated for  his 
work.”135
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133 Farrell (1997)
134 Farrell (1997) 377-83.
135 Farrell (1997) 382-83.
This evocation  of a  remembered anecdote demonstrates the same sort  of 
manipulation  that speakers would apply  to exempla, adapting the details of the narrative 
to accommodate the argumentative purpose. The connection  created between  two events 
or  acts that  are defined as repetitions of a  pattern  can  exert  a  defining  force on  the 
interpretation  of both  events. This analogical  practice may  sometimes serve less a 
conservative or  iterative function  than  a  creative one. Exempla acquire meaning  within 
the context when they  are cited,  not  at  the moment of their  origin  or  their  first  textual, 
oral or  monumental  iteration.  Farrell’s closing  comments offer  a  useful  observation  on 
the primacy  of the skeletal outline of a  narrative over accuracy  of detail or  the 
preservation  of meaning: “Handing  on an accurate memory  of whatever  ‘originary  event’ 
inspired this tale  clearly  takes second place to the story’s plasticity, its capacity  for 
adaptation  to needs that  change over  time and across cultures. … memories are not 
simply  retrieved but are actually  produced in  unprecedented versions that  bear  a  family 
resemblance to earlier  performances without conforming  to a  single unvarying  type or, 
indeed, bearing  the same meaning,  produced as they  are in  ever  differing  social 
contexts.” 136  Successive  references to the same anecdote may  build on  earlier 
interpretations or  may  introduce entirely  new  material to shape the effect  of the story  as 
an  exemplum.  The family  resemblance between variations maintains the identity  of the 
anecdote,  but  does not limit  its plasticity. The process we have seen  with  Cicero’s 
sarcastic use of the lack  of previous exempla  for  the extraordinary  reaction  to Clodius’s 
death  (section 1.1) presents a  related facet of the potential for  exemplary  thought  to 
generate analogical patterns. When  Cicero sets the creation  of the new  court to try  Milo 
in  contrast  to the absence of such  activity  following the deaths of Scipio and other  earlier 
figures, he not  only  creates a  negative analogy  with  a  set  of earlier non-events, but in  so 
doing  he also grants exemplary  status to that series of previously  unremarkable non-
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136 Farrell (1997) 383.
events. In  contrast  to the reproduction of culturally  and politically  authorized models 
highlighted by  previous critics (and often by  the Romans themselves), the actual act  of 
“imitation” could define (or  redefine) the meaning  of the exemplum  it  purported to 
emulate.  Exempla  act as fluid carriers of cultural authority  rather than  as unchanging 
ideological messages.  Through a range of processes that we might describe collectively  as 
“creative contextualization,” individual Romans could harness culturally  resonant 
instances to legitimate novel, unusual,  sometimes outright  illegal  actions or  to urge 
others to pursue such  courses. Such  appeals use the rhetoric  of continuity  and 
reproduction  enabled by  the citation  of previous models to disguise the creativity  of new 
proposals within  a social and political environment that  valorized tradition  and stability. 
The family  resemblance between  references to the same event provided a  sense of 
familiarity,  even  when  the ethical meaning  created by  the details and context shifted 
radically from one citation to the next.
A  passage in  Tacitus’s Dialogus  demonstrates how  the process of creative 
contextualization  may  graft  anachronistic material  into a discussion  of the past.  Within 
the dialogue’s comparison  between oratory  at  the time of Cicero and during the reign  of 
Vespasian, the educational views attributed to the earlier  time are inflected by 
contemporary  theoretical developments. Vipstanus Messalla, the speaker  who most  fully 
represents the view  that oratory  had declined from  greatness into decadence,  describes 
the form  of rhetorical  education that  existed under  the Republic in  order  to argue that a 
shift  in  training and social expectations underlies the change in  oratory. C.  O.  Brink 
argues that  Messalla’s depiction of education  during the late Republic  does not in  fact 
reflect  the actual practice of the earlier  time, but instead substitutes Quintilian’s 
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moralistic  neo-Ciceronian educational  program.137 Like Quintilian,  Messalla  emphasizes 
the necessity  for  a  true orator’s good moral character  far  more strongly  than  Cicero did. 
Quintilian  himself claims that his moral  purpose is one area  in  which  he goes beyond 
Cicero.138 Messalla’s first  speech  on  the causes opens with  a  lengthy  moralizing  account 
of changes in  child-rearing and household life (28.1-30.2).  As Brink  notes,  these 
concerns with  the character  of the mother  and that  of the slaves assigned to care for  the 
child, and with  the ignorance of the grammatici hired to teach  him  are most  closely 
paralleled in Quintilian’s discussion  of the same issues,  even  employing  some of the 
same exempla. 139 Only  when he has established this moralistic framework does Messalla 
introduce Cicero himself as an exemplum  of proper  education,  explicitly  citing  the 
orator’s account of his own  education  included toward the end of the Brutus. 140 In  this 
way  Tacitus’s Messalla  imports more recent educational  concerns into a  framework he 
connects with  Cicero and his contemporaries. The attribution  of Cicero’s own 
educational history  and Ciceronian  views to the general  practice  of the late Republic, 
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137 Brink (1989) 486-90, following and developing arguments in Barwick (1929) and 
(1954). Brink sets out several points of close contact between the two views of proper 
oratorical training: the importance of traditional nurture at home, the centrality of the 
grammaticus to establishing the necessary universality of knowledge, the objection to 
the unreality of current training through declamation. See also Luce (1993) 20-21 and 
Dominik (1997) 61 on the connection between Messalla and Quintilian. Fairweather 
(1982) 546-47 describes a similar confusion in the accounts of the development of 
declamation where the logically prior abstract theses are therefore erroneously assumed 
to have been historically prior.
138 Cf. Winterbottom (1964) 90. See Quintilian IO 12.praef.4: Unum modo in illa 
immensa vastitate cernere videmur M. Tullium, qui tamen ipse, quamvis tanta atque 
ita instructa nave hoc mare ingressus, contrahit vela inhibetque remos et de ipso 
demum genere dicendi quo sit usurus perfectus orator satis habet dicere. At nostra 
temeritas etiam mores ei conabitur dare et adsignabit officia. Ita nec antecedentem 
consequi possumus et longius eundum est ut res feret.
139 Brink (1989) 486-87. Quintilian discusses character of a student’s parents at 1.1.6-7 
and 1.2.4-8, that of the nurses, paedagogi and other slaves at 1.1.4-5 and 1.1.8-11, and the 
choice of grammatici at 1.4-10. The most prominent shared exemplum is Cornelia, the 
mother of the Gracchi, although she is of course a very conventional model of the ideal 
Roman mother. The Graecula aliquis ancilla, used to depict the dangers of the 
household at 29.1, might be seen as an exemplum of an anonymous figure of the type I 
discuss in chapter 2.
140 Tac. Dial. 30.3-30.5, referring to Cic. Brut. 301-325.
however, does not even  accurately  reflect the views of the time. Cicero’s own  training and 
his support  for  extensive education  in  numerous subjects was in  fact  exceptional as even 
Cicero himself noted in  his dialogues.141 In  fact  the educational views expressed by  M. 
Aper, the champion  of contemporary  oratory  in  the Dialogus,  in  some fashion echo the 
same sort  of conventional  views that some of Cicero’s dialogues put  in the mouths of 
important  orators from  the generation  before his own: M. Antonius and Q. 
Hortensius.142 The Ciceronian  model for  Aper’s role in  the Dialogus  may  thus align his 
position  with  current conventional beliefs. Consequently  Messalla’s traditionalism 
becomes unlinked from common practice despite widespread reverence for the past.
The use of Quintilian’s neo-Ciceronianism  to represent  Republican  views has a 
further  effect: by  assigning this educational paradigm  to an  earlier  era,  Messalla  may  cast 
doubt  on  the potential efficacy  of Quintilian’s educational reforms. As Brink argues,  “by 
an  adroit  use of Quintilian’s educational  theories,  Tacitus’ Messala rejects by  implication 
the basic teaching  of the same contemporary  master.  … On the surface he expresses 
approval  of (neo-)Ciceronianism.  Below  the surface, subtly  and indirectly, its rejection  is 
being prepared.” 143 This importation of anachronistic material  would thus become a 
means of invalidating  that  theory  within  its original temporal setting.  The sense of 
ethical continuity  between  these two eras allows neo-Ciceronian  educational theory  to 
appear  at  home in  a  late Republican  setting, but is then  disregarded in  the removal of 
Quintilian’s reform  program  from  the view  of contemporary  education. Messalla’s use of 
Quintilian’s program  to represent  the general practice of the late Republic  thus would 
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141 See, e.g., Luce (1993) 20-21 and Goldberg (1999) 233-34 on the exceptionality of the 
view expressed by Crassus in the de Oratore that the orator should have extensive 
knowledge of the law (De orat. 1.57-59, 165-200).
142 Goldberg (1999) 233-35 discusses parallel between Aper’s second speech and 
Antonius’s speech arguing against too much emphasis on technical knowledge at De 
orat. 1.213-262. Mayer (2001) 45 notes Aper’s similarity to both Antonius in the de 
Oratore and Hortensius in Cicero’s Hortensius as “robustly practical men, who despised 
formal doctrine.”
143 Brink (1989) 491. See also Dominik (1997) 60-61. In contrast, Luce (1993) 
have the double effect  of making the oratory  of Cicero’s time both  that  much  more 
remote from  that of contemporary  Flavian  speakers and consequently  of raising  the 
barrier  to any  possible recovery  yet  further. Messalla’s performs the memory  of late 
Republican  education  as refracted through  the lens of Quintilian  and uses the temporal 
dislocation  of the later  rhetorical  theory  to cement his depiction  of the change in taste 
and practice as an  irreversible moral  decline.  The treatment  of educational  theories in 
the Dialogus,  while not  specifically  deployed as an exemplum,  demonstrates the 
profound effects that the manipulation of content and ideas could produce.
Various authors under  the Principate adapted the memories of stridently 
Republican  figures such  as the younger  Cato to the new  political environment by 
focusing on  the more immediate or  personal aspects of their  aspects. Alain  Gowing 
identifies instances of this pattern  in the treatment of the younger  Cato in  both  Valerius 
Maximus and the younger Seneca.144 Valerius presents an  anecdote describing  Cato as an 
exemplum  of free expression  (libertas),  but  provides no context, no details of the 
external  political  situation.  In  this brief account, while serving  as a  judge, Cato dismisses 
from  court  documents showing  Pompey’s support for  the defendant  (Val.  Max.  6.2.5). 
Other  sources (Plutarch, Cato  40, Pomp.  55; Dio 40.52.2,  55.2) provide a date for  this 
event  — 52  BCE while  Pompey  was consul — and present the event as a  calculated move 
to damage Pompey’s power. Valerius’s Cato, however,  demonstrates only  Cato’s free 
expression  with  a  good deal of verbal  embellishment: “What am  I doing? Is there 
freedom  without  Cato? No more than  than  there would be Cato without freedom”  (Quid 
ego? libertas sine Catone? non magis quam Cato sine libertate, 6.2.5). 145
Seneca presents another  version  of a  depoliticized Cato, remembered as a  model 
of fortitude in  the face of adversity  rather than  as an  opponent of authoritarianism. 
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144 See also Bloomer (1992) 188-91 on the depoliticized and abstracted Cato as he 
appears in Valerius.
145 Gowing (2005) 60-61.
Discussing  the incompatibility  between  the wise man  (sapiens)  and the life of politics, 
Seneca addresses the position  of Cato during the civil  war.  He rejects any  useful role for  a 
Cato in  a  contest  for authoritarian power, addressing Cato directly: “It is being 
determined whether  Caesar  or  Pompey  should possess the republic: what  business do 
you  have with  this dispute? No side is yours. A  master  is being chosen.”  (quaeritur 
utrum  Caesar an Pompeius possideat rem publicam: quid tibi cum  ista contentione? 
nullae partes  tuae sunt.  dominus  eligitur, Ep.  14.13).  Noting  confusion  over  who is 
speaking  in  this passage,  Gowing  argues that: “the editorial  confusion  underscores how 
seamlessly  Seneca  can move from  a  past event  to the present. Moreover,  regardless of 
who utters these words,  they  seem  readily  applicable to Seneca’s own situation.  … The 
literal  blurring  of time in this section  forces us to confront the dilemma as though  it 
demands a  resolution now, in  the present  rather than  in  the past.” 146 Just as Cicero’s 
Antonius reconfigures Simonides to meet his current interests,  and Tacitus’s Messalla 
reconfigures Cicero, Seneca  adapts his favorite exemplum  to render  him  a  more useful 
tool  for  exploring  his current concerns, in  this case the place of a  Stoic wise man  in 
politics.
A  depoliticized Cato is of course not  the only  version  available to writers under 
the Principate. Cato,  along  with  the Brutus and Cassius, becomes at  times an emblem  for 
resistance to various emperors.  The Stoic  opposition to the Flavians, and to Domitian  in 
particular,  used these figures as emblems.147  The adoption  of these figures by  these 
factions, however,  seems to center  solely  on  the particular  detail of Cato’s opposition to 
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146 Gowing (2005) 78.
147 Freudenberg (2001) 219-21 on several figures in the first century CE – most 
prominently Cremutius Cordus and Thrasea Paetus – who were condemned from 
publishing works on Cato, Brutus and Cassius, or other later Stoic martyrs. In Tac. Dial., 
it is the performance of a tragedy Cato that motivates Aper to visit his friend Maternus 
out of concern: postero die quam Curiatius Maternus Catonem recitaverat, cum 
offendisse potentium animos diceretur, tamquam in eo tragoediae argumento sui 
oblitus tantum Catonem cogitasset, eaque de re per urbem frequens sermo haberetur, 
Dial. 2. I discuss this method of using historical figures as personal emblems in section 
4.2.
Caesar  as an  individual,  not  on Cato’s broader  political philosophy. The force of Cato and 
other related Republican  icons is directed more at  individual  emperors, foremost  among 
them Nero and Domitian, than at the institutional position of emperor.
Under some emperors,  toleration  of devotion  to Cato and other Republican 
heroes could also serve as a mark of the princeps’s magnanimity: Pliny’s letters include 
references to almost cult-like private veneration  of Cato to depict the emergence of a  new 
era  of freedom  under  Trajan.148 Martial,  in  an  epigram  describing  the reverence that  a 
series of major historical figures would feel for  the new  emperor  Nerva,  even  claims that: 
“if Cato returns, he will be a Caesarian”  (si Cato  reddatur,  Caesarianus  erit, 11.5.14). 
This comment  caps a  list  of historical  icons – Numa,  Camillus, Fabricius,  Brutus, Sulla, 
Caesar,  Pompey  and Crassus – who, if they  should return  from  the dead, would happily 
welcome the new  princeps. The epigram  clearly  engages in  flattering  hyperbole; as 
Gowing  notes, “Martial  does have a sense of the absurd, here playing  on  the familiar 
trope of the emperor  who surpasses even  the greatest of his Republican  forebears.” 149 
Cato and the other  Republican figures here become more historical props than vibrant 
ideological beacons. 150  Cato and other  historical figures played an important part  in 
discourse under  the Principate,  but the meaning  of such figures shifted and contracted to 
meet the needs of the context into which they were introduced.
1.4: Conclusion.
Ethical arguments built  on structural  analogies between particular  actions allow  a  great 
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148 E.g. Ep. 1.17 concerning Titinius Capito’s collection of images of Cato, Brutus and 
Cassius. I discuss this letter at length in chapter 4. See Tac., Agr. 1-3 on the revived 
ability to speak and write what you feel under Nerva and Trajan.
149 Gowing (2005) 105.
150 Gowing (2005) 105-6 sees this as a common tendency in Flavian and later writers, 
displayed by examples like this poem of Martial and Statius Silvae 1.1 of the equestrian 
statue of Domitian where “the references to Republican topography and history are little 
more than props; he summons neither Republican places nor events with which he 
wishes to connect the emperor in any meaningful way.”
deal of flexibility  in  their  application.  Quintilian  provides us with  a  flexible and broadly 
applicable means of treating  exemplarity  as a  species of comparison. The emphasis on 
particular  instances enables speakers and writers to manipulate the terms and context  of 
comparison  by  recasting the narrative framework to their  best  advantage.  The plasticity 
of memories allows social  or  political  actors to present a version of tradition  which 
accords with  their  immediate rhetorical  purpose or  ideological desiderata. At its source 
exemplary  thought  functions through  the process of comparison. Building  on 
observations and memories, exemplary  patterns of thought configure contexts and 
perceptions of tradition through  the juxtaposition of particularities.  Any  available 
material  might become grist  for  the mill  of analogical  reasoning. By  seeing comparison 
as the motive force of exemplarity  we may  better  comprehend the diffusion  of this habit 
of thought throughout  the Roman  mental  world. The next chapter  will expand this 
picture and explore the extension  of this pattern of thought  away  from  specific historical 
instances into the realm  of anonymous or  even fictional actors.  The logic of analogy 
provides a  productive and opportunistic  basis for  transferring  and co-opting  any  variety 
of material into an ethical dialogue.
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Anonymous Exempla
The third doctrine is that  Life imitates Art  far  more than  Art  imitates Life. This 
results not  merely  from  Life’s imitative instinct,  but from  the fact that  the self-
conscious aim  of Life is to find expression,  and that  Art  offers it  certain  beautiful 
forms through  which  it  may  realize that  energy. It  is a theory  that  has never  been 
put  forward before,  but  it  is extremely  fruitful,  and throws an entirely  new  light 
upon the history of Art.
      Oscar Wilde, The Decay of Lying
Historically  specific exempla are only  one potential  instantiation  of the exemplary  mode 
of thought.  The less historical  particularity  an  exemplum  exhibits,  the more that  instance 
resembles evidently  fictive forms of narrative such  as those enacted in  declamatory  cases 
and Aesopic fables. Moralizing  narratives of these types rehearse mental structures 
within  which Romans learned to shape and interpret  exemplary  narratives. These 
educational fictions enact  forms through  which  exemplary  events may  realize an  ethical 
meaning. The influence of declamation  and fable on the patterns of exemplary  thought 
demonstrates how  fictional narratives create patterns into which  observers may 
subsequently  fit  events they  have observed in  their  own  lives. This is one sense in  which 
Wilde suggests that  Life (and even  Nature)  imitates Art. Such  less prestigious forms of 
Art  display  particularly  close relationships with  exempla, revealing  the borders between 
them  as porous and indistinct.  We may  understand these abstracted fictions as 
mythologized analogues of the exemplary  mode of observation  and evaluation. This 
chapter  will chart  the vague borders between  exemplarity  and mythologized fictions, 
where the importance of particular  persons, times and places dissolves,  and attention 
shifts toward underlying moral attitudes and motivations.
This chapter  works against the artificial limitation  on exemplarity  that would 
focus solely  on  named figures as exempla. The seemingly  paradoxical notion  of 
anonymous exempla offers a path  to expand our  map of the field of exemplarity. I 
explore the possibilities enabled by  anecdotes that disregard or  downplay  the individual 
identities of the actors. Some exempla  conceal the individual identity  of the actor(s) and 
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consequently  focus more closely  on  the act itself.  While the lack of personal identifiers 
prevents these examples from  drawing on the cultural authority  that  actors from 
important families would bring,  the anonymity  of the actors presents different 
advantages. The absence of particular  names may  avoid causing  offense or forestall 
debate about a  particular  instance in  order  to focus on  the broader  issue. Such 
anonymity  may  at  times simply  reflect  the lack of wide recognition  for the names of 
lower  class or  non-local  figures.  The omission  of such  a name may  occur even  in  cases 
when  the act itself is fairly  well  known: for  example,  the story  of a  Roman  soldier  at 
Cannae who bites off the nose of his Carthaginian  killer  appears several times in  extant 
literature, but only in one, fairly late instance does the soldier receive a name.151
The first  section of this chapter  focuses specifically  on  the citation of the  actions 
of nameless figures as exempla. Such  unnamed figures display  varying degrees of 
anonymity,  ranging  from  persons who are nameless but nevertheless clearly  recognizable 
to those who are truly  unidentifiable and thus completely  anonymous. By  discouraging 
focus on  the particular  character  of the actor, such anecdotes offer  several potential 
advantages to speakers or  writers who use them. In  the following  section,  I discuss the 
dialogue and exchange between exemplarity  and the practice of declamation.  At times 
declamations on  historical  themes seem  to influence and even  supplement  or  alter  the 
historical tradition  on  those events.  Performing  suasoriae or  controversiae  may  also 
allow  speakers to create fictional  exempla for  themselves or  their  audience.  In  addition, 
declamations acculturate their  participants to a  variety  of social expectations and beliefs, 
producing  a  range of narratives and character  types to become familiar parts of the 
mental furniture of the Roman  mind. On  a more fundamental level,  the practice of 
declamation  may  function as a  sort  of mythology  within  which  Romans learned to think 
with  and negotiate their  social rules.  The third and final section approaches Aesopic 
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151 Livy 22.51.9; Val. Max. 3.2.11; Sil. Ital. 6.41-53. Only in Silius Italicus does the soldier 
receive a name.
fables, particularly  those of Phaedrus, as occupying an  analogous position to declamation 
in  both rhetorical education and the formation  of the Roman  thought  world. Phaedrus 
explicitly  labels his fables as educational  exempla,  aimed at  improving the character  of 
their  readers.  Like declamation, fables provide abstract, mythologized enactments of 
social conflicts.  Even  anecdotes from  lived experience may  take a  place in  a  collection  of 
literary  fables (e.g.  Phaedrus 2.5; 3.10; 5.7; App.  10).  The three sections of this chapter as 
a  whole map out  a  triangle  of interactions and relationships between  the discourses of 
exemplarity,  declamation  and fable.  Exemplary  narratives that  purport  to represent the 
Life of Roman reality  display  the marks of influence from  these fictional  analogues and 
thus in some sense should be seen as imitating Art.
2.1: The Indefinite Actor, or Someone Did Something.
Speakers and writers sometimes adduce narratives of anonymous individuals as 
exempla. Such  anonymity  contrasts with  the memorializing concerns commonly 
identified by  scholars as the motive force behind the preservation  and imitation of 
exemplary  models. 152 The absence of named actors centers attention more closely  on  the 
narrative itself,  freed from  the external concerns or  preconceptions that attach 
themselves to well-known  figures.  Nameless exempla  thus may  trade the greater  notice 
drawn by  a  famous name for  a  model  less encumbered by  referential debris. Narratives 
involving unnamed actors appear  even  further  divorced from  their original contexts than 
the average exemplum, but  thereby  offer  writers and speakers a  different  form  of utility. 
Sometimes writers or  speakers may  use anonymous exempla to avoid giving  direct 
offense to another  whose negative act or  quality  they  cite.  Other  times anonymous 
models gesture toward a  more universalizing understanding of the act  or  characteristic 
portrayed,  particularly  in  the introduction  of lower  class exemplars.  Such  anecdotes, 
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152 E.g. Hölkeskamp (1996) and Roller (2004).
however, also draw  closer  to the use of stock figures of the sort that  appear in  Roman 
comedy  and reoccur in  satire and other  genres.  These stories at  times blur the line 
between  factual and fictional narratives. Various sources could provide exemplary 
material  usable in  different contexts.  Cicero’s use of comic  models of fatherhood in his 
speech  pro  Caelio, for  example,  suggests the potential  for  speakers to use analogies with 
fictional  characters to shape their  appeals to an audience (Cael.  37-38). 153 To an  extent, 
when  used as an  element  in  a  larger  work,  any  exemplum  may  function  as a sort of type 
figure.  Historical authority  is merely  one among  a  variety  of potential  secondary 
characteristics that  influence the impact of an  exemplum.  Narratives of well-known 
historical figures are easily  identifiable  as exempla, but  they  do not constitute the sole 
potential content  of that  rhetorical figure.  Stories of nameless persons do not announce 
themselves in  the same way  as those bearing a name like Cato, Brutus or  Fabricius, but 
such anonymous exempla extend the potential field of exemplarity.
Unfortunately  there exists no simple or  consistent identifier  to find exemplary 
anecdotes that feature anonymous figures.  Pliny  the Younger offers a  good source to see 
a  number  of anonymous exempla  in action. Valerius Maximus also includes a limited 
number  of nameless examples that  may  give us some idea of the range of possible uses 
and types of such  nameless figures. Authors may  identify  the actors in  nameless exempla 
in  various ways.  Pliny  sometimes uses indefinite  pronouns such  as quidam  or  quaedam 
to introduce such  anecdotes (e.g.  2.6,  7.26,  8.22,  9.12,  9.27). Valerius Maximus 
occasionally  uses quidam  as well (e.g. 7.3.10,  7.6.3,  7.7.1), but more often  uses a  simple 
noun  or  brief phrase to indicate the social status or  role of the central character(s)  in  the 
exemplum. 154 The use of indefinite pronouns and social  types to identify  the nameless 
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153 Compare Val. Max. 5.8.praef. who also uses a theatrical metaphor to contrast the 
characters of different fathers: Comicae lenitatis hi patres, tragicae asperitatis illi.
154 E.g. pater (5.9.4, 7.7.1); filius (5.9.4, 7.3.10); miles (3.2.10-11, 5.5.4); frater (5.5.4); 
sanguinis ingenui mulier and filia (5.4.7).
figures grants these anecdotes an innately  wider  range of applicability  than  their  more 
individually fixed counterparts. 
Similar  identifiers appear  frequently  in  the declamatory  themes that  provide the 
narrative skeletons around which  declaimers mold the details of their  arguments. The 
invention  of circumstantial details and the use of colores  to shape the emotional impact 
of these exercises model the manipulation  of exemplary  material within  a larger  work. 
Rhetorical theory  at times encouraged speakers to invent  plausible details in  this fashion 
to build their  arguments, even in actual trial speeches.  Quintilian, for  example,  suggests 
an  orator  may  even use fictional  material to enhance the vividness of images: “We will 
make things apparent if they  are like the truth, and it is even  permitted to invent  falsely 
whatever  usually  happens”  (Consequemur autem ut manifesta sint si fuerint veri 
similia,  et licebit etiam  falso adfingere quidquid fieri solet, 8.3.70).155 The development 
of declamatory  themes into full speeches thus trains speakers to mold exemplary 
material  into effective forms.  In  a 1997  article,  Matthew  Roller  explores the possible 
effect  of declamatory  exercises on  the historical tradition surrounding  Cicero’s death.  He 
suggests that  references to Cicero’s previous defense of his murderer  Popillius on  a 
charge of parricide may  originate in  declamatory  fictions concerning  the death  of 
Cicero.156  Given  the possibility  that declamatory  exercises might have shaped the 
historical tradition  surrounding  a major figure such  as Cicero, it may  not  be 
unreasonable to suggest that  such  exercises could influence – or  even  become a  potential 
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155 Cf. 4.2.53 where Quintilian compares a credible forensic narratio to comedies and 
mimes. At 4.2.57 he cites the domestic scene with which Cicero opens the narratio of the 
pro Milone (28) to demonstrate the introduction of apparently casual details in order to 
shape audience expectations. Skidmore (1996) 93-99 discusses the importance of 
credibility for Valerius Maximus’s selection of exempla.
156 Roller (1997) passim. At 124-25 Roller discusses Seneca’s claim that declaimers 
invented the earlier charge of parricide: Popillium pauci ex historicis tradiderunt 
interfectorem Ciceronis et hi quoque non parricidi reum a Cicerone defensum, sed in 
privato iudicio: declamatoribus placuit parricidi reum fuisse (Contr. 7.2.8). 
source for  – moralizing  exempla featuring stock figure types.157 (I discuss this possibility 
further  in  section  2.2.) While such  stories would carry  less cultural authority  than  those 
linked to famous names,  narratives of nameless figures prove useful in  a  number  of 
contexts.
There are a  number  of factors to consider  when  examining an  anonymous 
exemplum.  Are the actors’ names deliberately  suppressed? Or are they  simply  unknown 
or  felt  to be unimportant?  Does the author expect  the audience to recognize the identity 
of the unnamed figures? Does the speaker  or  writer  call attention  to the absence of 
names or  not? Do the anonymous figures function primarily  as distinct individuals or 
general  social  types?  Such  considerations enable the reader  to gauge the purpose served 
by  the absence of the name and, in  addition, help to map out  a  range of potential degrees 
of anonymity, ranging  from  unnamed yet  clearly  identifiable individuals who are 
essentially  the same as named actors to purely  anonymous type figures equivalent  to the 
characters of many declamation themes or even fables.
Valerius Maximus caps his chapter  on  villainous words and criminal  deeds (Dicta 
improba aut facta scelerata,  9.11) with  an  example of the first  type, a  parricide whose 
crime,  he claims,  surpasses all other  crimes.158  Valerius leaves this villain unnamed, 
although  it  is clear  that  he is the emperor  Tiberius’s regent and would-be usurper 
Sejanus.  The suppression  of his name might seem  to offer  an outstanding model  for  an 
anonymous exemplum,  but this passage is in  many  ways closer  to a conventional 
evocation  of a  named figure than it is to one in  which  the actors appear  as more general 
types.  This passage departs little from  the character  it  would have as a  named exemplum. 
The absence of Sejanus’s name in  no way  conceals his identity  or  reduces the specificity 
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157 Cf. Val. Max. 7.7.1: An anonymous soldier, disinherited by his father due a false report 
of his death, recovers his inheritance in court. This exemplum echoes declamation’s 
frequent interest in disputes concerning inheritance and the rewards of military service.
158 Sed quid ego ista consector aut quid his immoror, cum unius parricidii cogitatione 
cuncta scelera superata cernam? 9.11.ext.4.
of the event. Valerius denounces his target in  rhetorically  elaborate fashion. 159  The 
omission  of the name appears to function  as a  sort of damnatio memoriae, although  the 
author  says nothing explicit to highlight  the omission. Direct address is the primary 
device Valerius uses to avoid naming Sejanus. The author couches the bulk of his abuse 
in  the form  of direct invective: “Would you, more ferocious than the monstrousness of 
savage barbarity,  have been  able to seize the reins of Roman  power  which  our  prince and 
father  holds fast  in  his salutary  hand? Or,  when  you  obtained your  mad desire, would the 
world have remained in  its place?”  (tu videlicet efferatae barbariae immanitate 
truculentior habenas  Romani imperii, quas princeps  parensque noster salutari dextera 
continet,  capere potuisti? aut te compote furoris mundus in suo statu mansisset? 
9.11.ext.4). By  elaborating  the abuse of Sejanus,  Valerius attempts to reinforce the 
enormity  of the averted disaster. He here omits the name not to disguise his subject’s 
identity  or  offer  a  more universal model,  but to strengthen  his invective against a  clearly 
recognizable target. Sejanus in  this exemplum  is merely  unnamed rather  than 
anonymous. 
More truly  anonymous exempla allow  writers and speakers to avoid giving  direct 
offense to contemporary  individuals whom  they  cite as negative examples.  In  a  few  cases, 
by  suppressing  names a speaker or  writer  may  avoid repeating  a  libelous claim, as in  an 
anecdote in  which  a  physical resemblance between two unrelated men leads them  to 
trade jokes impugning the chastity  of each  other’s mother. 160  Discussing  the topic  of 
expected youthful  transgressions, writers and speakers also use anonymity  both  to 
present  such  acts as commonplace occurrences and to avoid singling  out any  member  of 
their  audience for  a  shared fault. In  his defense of Caelius, Cicero draws on  the 
permissive attitudes of Roman  comedy  to approach  the topic of his client’s youth.161 In 
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159 Bloomer (1992) 228-29 discusses this passage as a fusion between the denunciation of 
Sejanus and imperial panegyric.
160 Val. Max. 9.14.ext.3. Cf. Macrobius 2.4.20 and Pliny NH 7.55
161 For further discussion of this passage see section 3.1.
order  to prove the unexceptional character  of youthful indiscretions, he claims to be able 
to cite many  exempla  of men  who became respectable citizens following  a  dissolute 
youth,  but he refrains from  naming  names, explaining: “I do not want to link even  the 
smallest error  with  the highest  praise of any  brave and well-known gentleman”  (Nolo 
enim  cuiusquam  fortis  atque inlustris  viri ne minimum quidem erratum cum  maxima 
laude coniungere, Cael.  43). Cicero indicates the presence of supporting  exempla  among 
the members of his audience, but  leaves it  to them  to find specific  instances either  in 
themselves or their fellow jurors. 162
Anonymity  could also offer  protection to authors of the more aggressive genres. 
Roman  satirists, for  example,  often  expressed concerns about retaliation  from  the targets 
of their  poetic attacks.  Horace and Juvenal each  discuss using  stock figures or  deceased 
individuals in  place of contemporary  targets in order  to prevent social or legal 
reprisals.163 In  the closing  section  of his programmatic first  satire,  Juvenal  determines to 
take the safer  path  by  attacking dead persons instead of live ones (1.151-71).164 Horace 
presents himself debating similar  risks with  Trebatius,  who acts as a  legal advisor,  in  the 
first  satire of his second book.165 At one point his interlocutor  suggests that  even when 
the poet  uses pseudonyms for  his targets,  his listeners may  still  apply  the attacks to their 
own  conduct  and thus take offense: “How  much  better  is this [to praise Caesar  in  verse], 
than  to wound Pantolabus the parasite and Nomentanus the profligate with  severe verse, 
when  each  person fears for  himself, though  he is untouched, and resents it”  (Quanto 
rectius  hoc, quam  tristi laedere versu | Pantolabum  scurram  Nomentanumque 
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162 Cicero uses the same tactic in the opening of the second Phillipic, omitting the names 
of his previous opponents: nec vero necesse est quemquam a me nominari; vobiscum 
ipsi recordamini, Phil. 2.1. This later omission, however, is more likely made for the sake 
of brevity and pacing than politeness.
163 Pliny uses deceased men as examples in one letter for the opposite reason, namely to 
avoid the appearance of fawning: neminem viventium, ne quam in speciem adulationis 
incidam, nominabo (Ep. 5.3.5).
164 See Bartsch (1994) 90-92 and Freudenberg (2001) 234-36, 242-44.
165 See Freudenberg (2001) 73-82 and Oliensis (1998) 42-46.
nepotem,  | cum  sibi quisque timet,  quamquam est intactus, et odit,  Serm.  2.1.21-23). 
Whether  or  not these poets intentionally  use their  stock figures and deceased punching 
bags as stand-ins for  specific contemporary  figures,  their  rhetoric adopts the pose that 
their  readers will  seek to build parallels between  themselves and the targets of the satire. 
The poets claim  to present these characters as representatives of common, widespread 
faults,  but they  depict  their  audience as seeking  correlations with  identifiable 
individuals.
The visible absence of some portion  of a  narrative can  also excite curiosity  about 
the information  that  has been  withheld. Pliny  comments on this sort  of public  refusal to 
criticize an  individual  in  letter  9.27.  He describes a  public recitation  of a  history  that  the 
author  cut short  on  the request  of the friends of a  certain  individual whose disreputable 
actions appeared in  the passage not  read.166 Pliny  censures the willingness to perform 
acts that  one will  later be ashamed to hear  narrated. In  addition  he argues that  the 
interruption of the reading  will ultimately  make people  more eager  to read the written 
account and thereby  discover  the story  that had been  withheld (9.27.2).  By  postponing 
the end of this “most  truthful  book”  (verissimum  librum),  the writer  clearly  defines his 
performance within  the space of the recitation  as incomplete. The availability  of a  written 
version  of this history  here allows this break in  the reading  to emphasize the missing 
passage: “nevertheless the book like the deed itself remains, will  remain and will  be read 
always,  the more so because it  was not read right then”  (liber tamen ut factum  ipsum 
manet manebit legeturque semper, tanto  magis quia non statim,  9.27.2).  The elder 
Seneca recalls a  similar event during  a  recitation  given by  the notoriously  outspoken 
historian T.  Labienus: “I remember  that once,  when he was reciting his history, he rolled 
up a  large portion  of the book and said: ‘The things that  I pass over  will  be read after my 
death.’ How  great  was the outspokenness in  them  that even Labienus was 
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166 On the potential dangers of writing or reciting histories under the Principate, see 
Bartsch (1994) 80-88; Freudenberg (2001) 219-25; Gowing (2005) 26-27, 51.
afraid!”  (memini aliquando,  cum recitaret historiam,  magnam partem illum libri 
convolvisse et dixisse: haec  quae transeo  post mortem  meam legentur. Quanta in illis 
libertas  fuit quam  etiam Labienus  extimuit! Contr.  10.praef.8).167  Seneca  here 
emphasizes the danger  of outspoken  criticism  for  the speaker  rather  than  the disgrace for 
the persons described.  Emphasizing  the potential dangers incurred by  reciting or 
publishing,  in  this account  Labienus’s confidence in  the posthumous appeal of his 
history  appears ironic given  the fate  of his own works: this anecdote immediately  follows 
a  discussion  of the burning  of his histories – the first such  book-burning  according  to 
Seneca – and the historian’s suicide in  response (Contr.  10.praef.5-7).168 This pair  of un-
recited passages demonstrates the reciprocal  dangers that  published narratives could 
present  for  both  narrator  and narrated.  Though  not usual in  history,  anonymity  offers a 
means for authors in other genres to mitigate the potential for offense or reprisal.
By  depicting  types rather  than individuals, anonymous exempla may 
communicate general lessons more efficiently  than  those featuring high-status named 
figures. In  such  cases the generalizing  impulse behind the citation  of the model  may 
outweigh  the memorializing  tendency  in  the more institutional forms of the practice.  In 
letter  7.26, Pliny  mentions a  “certain  friend”  (cuiusdam  amici) whose recent  illness 
sparks the oxymoronic  observation  that “we are best  while we are ill”  (optimos  esse nos 
dum  infirmi sumus,  7.26.1). 169 Pliny  skips directly  from  the mention  of this friend to 
general  reflections on  the attitudes and activities of sick  persons without  providing  the 
specific details or  narrative that  led to his observations.  In  effect,  he has replaced the 
typical narrative content  of an  exemplum  with  ethical  prescriptions urging  emulation  of 
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167 On Labienus’s outspokenness, see Sen. Contr. 10.praef.5: Libertas tanta ut libertatis 
nomen excederet, et quia passim ordines hominesque laniabat Rabienus vocaretur.
168 Cf. Tac. Agr. 1-3 on the dangers of writing history.
169 The unnamed friend of 7.26 is sometimes identified with Rosianus Geminus, to whom  
Pliny sends advice on dealing with a persistent illness in letter 7.1.
the elided model. 170 In  another  letter  defending the lofty  tone of some passages in  a 
speech  he has been  revising,  Pliny  cites “a  certain  orator  of our  time” (quodam  oratore 
saeculi nostri,  9.26.1)  to demonstrate  the problems of the opposite fault, an  overly 
cautious rhetorical  style.  He describes this unnamed speaker  in  broad terms — “correct 
and sensible, but  insufficiently  grand and ornate” (recto  quidem  et sano, sed parum 
grandi et ornato) — and then  quotes his own  judgment  of the man’s abilities: “He does 
nothing wrong except  that  he does nothing  wrong”  (Nihil peccat, nisi quod nihil peccat, 
9.26.1). Given  that  both  this letter  and the earlier  2.5  also addressed to Lupercus concern 
oratory,  it is possible that  this judgment  would be sufficient to identify  the orator  in 
question  to the recipient. 171 His identity,  however,  is not integral  to the content  of the 
letter.  This figure serves simply  as an  occasion  for  reflection  on  rhetorical style rather 
than  as an object  of evaluation  in  his own  right. As a  named figure, this orator  might 
encourage argument  concerning Pliny’s personal evaluation,  but as an anonymous type-
figure,  he is simply  a  device to contrast  restrained simplicity  with  a  more varied style. 
Preserving the anonymity  of the initial model allows Pliny  to focus the reader’s attention 
on  the theoretical  discussion of style,  rather than  on  the particular  characteristics of his 
chosen exemplum. 172
Anonymous exempla can  also allow  authors and writers to imply  a broad 
continuity  of values between  various social classes or other  segments of society. By 
limiting  the available context  even  more than is already  typical in  exempla,  such  figures 
promote the use of the principle of ethical continuity  to bridge variations along  social or 
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170 Pliny adopts a similar tactic in letter 8.22 to criticize hypocritical complaints about the 
faults of others. (I discuss this letter below).
171 Within the context of the published collection of letters, however, this possibility is far 
less certain. See, however, Riggsby (1995) 126-27 who suggests that this quodam oratore  
is a rhetorical substitute allowing polite disagreement with the addressee, i.e. a ‘certain 
orator’ represents Lupercus himself.
172 Cf. Pliny’s use of Regulus to contrast his own rhetorical practice at Ep. 1.20.14-15. 
There, however, Regulus provides a far more particular and individual model than the 
broad figure of the restrained orator in 9.26.
political axes.  In one letter  Pliny  comments on  the effect  of the social importance of the 
actors on the distribution of exempla. He contrasts an unnamed local woman  with  the 
well-known figure Arria,  narrating  the former’s death  while evoking the latter’s only 
using  her  name (Ep. 6.24). He reports the story  of a  woman  from  Comum  whose actions 
establish  her  as a  model of wifely  devotion  equivalent to the elder  Arria: “And I,  a  fellow 
townsman,  did not even  hear of this deed except recently,  not  because it was less 
important than that very  famous deed of Arria,  but because the woman  herself was less 
important”  (Quod factum  ne mihi quidem,  qui municeps, nisi proxime auditum  est, non 
quia minus illo clarissimo Arriae facto,  sed quia minor ipsa, 6.24.5). Although he 
reports this woman’s assistance and companionship to her  husband in  suicide, 
nevertheless Pliny  accedes to the preference for more exalted exempla and leaves her 
unnamed. The lack  of fame connected with  her  name is more a curiosity  to be remarked 
upon  than  an omission to be corrected.173  This brief letter  highlights the connection 
between  the transmission  of exemplary  actions and the social status of their  actors: “the 
same deeds by  the fame or  anonymity  of the actors are either raised to the highest  peak 
or  pressed down into the lowest pit”  (Eadem enim facta claritate vel obscuritate 
facientium aut tolluntur altissime aut humillime deprimuntur, 6.24.1). 174  Pliny’s 
description of the event  is spare but  complete.  In  reporting this obscure exemplum,  he 
treats the narrative itself as the focus of exemplary  discourse; names function  here as 
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173 This despite the fact that his addressee may be a fellow inhabitant of the region: cf. 
per Larium nostrum (6.24.2), along with Sherwin-White (1966) ad loc. It is possible that  
Pliny had originally reported the name to his addressee but removed it when he edited 
the letter for publication. On the other hand, the description of Pliny’s inquiry about the 
event may indicate that he never even asked for or learned the woman’s name: the 
woman is described only as municeps nostra (6.24.2), and Pliny’s sole question is 
described in the short clause, Causam requisivi. (6.24.3).
174 Compare letter 3.16 where Pliny uses the acts of Arria herself to illustrate a similar 
observation about deeds rather than persons: “I seem to have observed that some deeds 
and words of men and women are more famous, others are more important” (Adnotasse 
videor facta dictaque virorum feminarumque alia clariora esse alia maiora, Ep. 3.16.1). 
Unlike his letter about the anonymous wife from Comum that fails to give her a name, 
this letter about Arria corrects the obscurity of her ‘greater’ deeds by narrating them at 
length. See also Wilcox (2006) 91-92 on Pliny, Ep. 3.16.
mere adjuncts that  either  help or  hinder  transmission  of the anecdote. Pliny’s chance 
encounter  with a  notable local  exemplum  indicates both  the wide diffusion  of exemplary 
modes of thought  and some of the circumstantial considerations that condition the 
transmission  and preservation of exempla.  Through  this pairing  he comments on the 
importance of social  position  as a  determinant for  the distribution  and preservation  of 
exemplary  narratives.  By  presenting  this local woman as an  anonymous figure, he 
implicitly  approves the tendency  to prefer  socially  or  politically  important figures as 
exemplary  models. But  at  the same time his report  of the local woman’s devotion  to her 
husband levels her with  the more famous Arria  on  the ethical  plane, suggesting  that 
social importance serves more to encourage distribution  of the anecdote than  to 
guarantee the moral worth  of the actor.  Pliny  thus uses anonymity  as a  tool to 
manipulate the supposed connection  between  virtue and social  class.  The replication of 
Roman  senatorial mores by  a  woman  of the minor municipal  aristocracy 175 implies an 
ethical continuity  between  the values of the senatorial elite and those of other  social 
classes. Pliny’s use of this anonymous local exemplum  thus justifies a  preference for 
senatorial exempla while purporting  to demonstrate the universality  of the aristocratic 
values they represent.
An exemplum  of fraternal pietas  in Valerius Maximus approaches the same sort 
of comparison from  a  slightly  different  direction.  Following  a  series of exempla  drawn 
from  famous generals that  concludes with  the future princeps  Tiberius rushing to see his 
dying brother Drusus,  Valerius introduces a final exemplum  of two nameless brothers 
with  the following  apology: “But it  will  certainly  not be unwelcome to the most  famous 
commanders in  all  memory  if the highest  piety  of a  soldier  toward his own  brother 
appears in  this section  of the book”  (Sed omnis  memoriae clarissimis imperatoribus 
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175 The reference to the lakefront villa suggests that this woman and her husband belong 
to the local nobility, while Pliny’s unfamiliarity with this couple from his own hometown 
may imply their relatively low status within that group.
profecto non erit ingratum  si militis  summa erga fratrem suum pietas huic  parti 
voluminis  adhaeserit,  5.5.4).  This concluding  example contains the most  violent  and 
dramatic  illustration  of fraternal piety  among  the four  in  the section: during the 
Sertorian  War  in  the 70s BCE, one of Pompey’s soldiers unwittingly  kills his own 
brother.  When  the man  discovers his mistake, he carries out  the funeral rites for  his 
brother  and then  commits suicide over  the pyre  (Val. Max.  5.5.4).176 This anecdote both 
provides a  vivid climax  to the examples in  Valerius’s chapter  and broadens the 
representation of this quality to include the general populace.
A  few  other anonymous exempla in  Valerius’s collection  also feature anonymous 
Roman  rank-and-file soldiers (3.2.10-11,  7.7.1).  One of these presents a  soldier 
disinherited due to a  false report  of his death. When he returns home and finds strangers 
in  possession of his father’s house, this soldier  successfully  sues to recover  his patrimony 
(7.7.1).  Unlike the exemplum  of fraternal piety, this nameless exemplum  leads off a  series 
of named ones.  The same anecdote appears in  Cicero’s de Oratore,  but  Valerius shifts the 
emphasis away  from  the technical  point  for  which  Cicero uses the story  – “in  this case 
the question  concerned civil law: whether  a  son  could be disinherited from  his paternal 
goods if his father  had recorded him  in  his will neither  as disinherited nor  as an  heir”  (in 
ea causa quaesitum est de iure civili,  possetne paternorum  bonorum exheres  esse  filius, 
quem  pater testamento neque heredem neque exheredem  scripsisset nominatim, Cic.  de 
Oratore 1.175) – towards a  declamatory  elaboration  comparing  the patriotic  soldier  to 
the self-interested false heirs – “Indeed what  is more shameless than  those men? He had 
used up the flower  of his youth  for  the state, he had endured the greatest  labors and 
many  dangers, he was displaying  scars received on the front of his body,  and they, idle 
burdens to the city  itself,  were demanding  to possess his ancestral home”  (quid enim  illis 
inverecundius? florem iuventae  pro  re publica absumpserat,  maximos  labores  ac 
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176 A more abbreviated account of the event appears at Livy Per. 79.
plurima pericula toleraverat,  adverso  corpore exceptas ostendebat cicatrices,  et 
postulabant ut avitos  eius lares  otiosa ipsi urbi onera possiderent, Val. Max.  7.7.1). 177 
For  Cicero this exemplum  demonstrates the need for  technical legal knowledge; for 
Valerius it  serves as a  stirring rhetorical introduction to the theme of inheritances 
restored by  courts. This anonymous soldier  provides a  central instance through  which  to 
explore the protection of familial inheritance by Roman legal institutions.
The younger  Pliny  uses anonymous exempla at  times to comment  on  certain 
social attitudes.  In  a  small  number  of letters that  have received little critical attention 
(2.6, 8.22,  9.12), he uses anonymous exempla  to dispense advice to some of his 
friends.178 Although  he does not  explicitly  identify  them  as such,  Sherwin-White seems to 
recognize these letters as a  connected group. Aside from  identifying the recipients of the 
letters and providing  parallels for  the advice Pliny  offers, the primary  observation  his 
commentary  makes is to cross-reference these letters with  one another  for  their 
deployment  of exempla. 179 Through  these letters Pliny  presents himself as an  arbiter  of 
manners and attempts to establish himself as an exemplum for how to give advice.
In  letter  8.22  Pliny  compares two social types – those who criticize others for  the 
same vices they  themselves engage in  and those who avoid vices themselves but  tolerate 
them  in others.  In  the closing  lines, however, he hesitates to include the example that 
spurred his comments: “Recently  a  certain  person – but it’s better  in person; rather  not 
even  then. For  I fear  that  to report the attacking  and biting  that I condemn  will conflict 
with  the lesson  I am  teaching  above all.  Let  that  man,  whoever  and whatever  sort  he is, 
remain unnamed. To point  him  out  offers no exemplum, not to point him  out expresses 
much  decency”  (Nuper quidam  – sed melius coram; quamquam  ne  tunc quidem.  Vereor 
enim  ne id quod improbo  consectari carpere  referre huic quod cum  maxime 
88
177 Cf. Sen. Contr. 1.8.
178 Ep. 7.26 (discussed above) and 7.1 (in which Pliny presents himself as an exemplum) 
also belong to this group.
179 Sherwin-White (1966) ad loc.
praecipimus  repugnet. Quisquis  ille qualiscumque sileatur, quem insignire exempli 
nihil, non insignire  humanitatis plurimum  refert. 8.22.4).  The choice to refrain 
explicitly  from  narrating  this unnamed person’s criticisms and hypocrisy  suggests that 
Pliny  intends to portray  himself as a  model of the tolerance for  faults of others, but the 
language of this passage makes his disapproval clear.  By  ostentatiously  refusing  to 
provide the name of this anonymous figure, Pliny  depicts himself as tolerant  of this 
behavior  while still registering  his criticism  of it.  He clearly  conveys the criticism  he 
pretends to disavow. Other  anonymous negative exemplars are more straightforward. In 
letter  9.12  Pliny  simply  recounts a  post factum  observation  about  the ubiquity  of faults 
that  he had made to an  unnamed individual  who had treated his son  too harshly. He 
offers this story  to his addressee as protreptic advice against  the possibility  that he might 
overreact  in response to his son’s minor faults,  although notably  Pliny  himself appears 
solely in the role of advisor in both scenarios. 180
Letter  2.6  presents its author  even  more clearly  as a positive model compared to 
the anonymous object  of his criticism.  Here Pliny, offering advice to his younger friend 
Junius Avitus, voices a  common criticism  against  the practice of highlighting  status 
distinctions at banquets by  dividing  different grades of food and wine among different 
categories of guest. 181  Within  the context of a  banquet given  by  an  unnamed 
acquaintance, he registers his disapproval  of the arrangements made by  his current host 
and defines himself in  contrast  as a  more egalitarian sort of host,  serving the same 
modest  dishes and wine to himself and all  of his guests. Pliny  assumes that  his host  sees 
himself as fair  and generous: in  his words, he dines “at the home of a  certain  man  – 
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180 I discuss both of these letters further in section 3.2. Pliny himself was childless, which  
may partially explain his purely advisory role here. This circumstance may also partly 
underlie the apparent conventionality of his advice here. Cf. Hor. Serm. 1.3.1-37. Horace 
discusses the same theme but introduces himself as a potential object of criticism at ll. 
19-20.
181 Sherwin-White (1966) 152 identifies this as a commonplace moral opinion. For 
parallels see Pliny, NH 14.91; Suet. Iul. 48, SHA, Hadr. 17.4; Juv. 5; Mart. 1.20, 3.60, 
4.68.
refined and attentive, as he seemed to himself, [but]  vicious and extravagant,  as he 
appeared to me”  (apud quendam,  ut sibi videbatur,  lautum  et diligentem,  ut mihi, 
sordidum  et sumptosum,  2.6.1). Pliny  explicitly  defines his practice as limiting  his own 
wine to that  appropriate for  his freedmen  guests: “my  freedmen do not  drink the same 
thing  I do, but  I drink the same thing  the freedmen do” (Quia scilicet liberti mei non 
idem  quod ego  bibunt,  sed idem  ego quod liberti,  2.6.4). Pliny  thus accepts the mapping 
of food quality  onto social status distinctions as partly  natural,  but  defines his choice of 
simple food as a  consequence of his personal appetite.  By  what  he presents as a 
providential coincidence,  his personal abstention  allows him  to define himself as both 
virtuously  moderate in  his culinary  desires and also graciously  egalitarian  in  his 
treatment of guests.  It  is not  that his freedmen  guests receive better  food than  elsewhere, 
but that  Pliny  does not flaunt  the gap between  what they  receive and what he could 
afford to serve to his higher  status guests. While Pliny  does suggest  that  preserving 
modest  eating  habits will ensure that Avitus will not offend his guests, his central 
warning is simply  to avoid the blatant show  of unequal treatment: “It  is appropriate for 
my  love towards you,  whenever  some such  thing  happens, to advise you  by  the 
exemplum,  what you  should avoid. Remember  that  nothing  is more to be shunned than 
the recent  combination of extravagance and meanness.  Although  these things are most 
shameful  when  distinct  and separate from  each other,  joining  them  together  is even 
more shameful”  (Convenit autem  amori in te meo, quotiens tale aliquid inciderit,  sub 
exemplo praemonere,  quid debeas  fugere.  Igitur memento nihil magis  esse  vitandum 
quam  istam  luxuriae et sordium novam  societatem; quae cum  sint turpissima discreta 
ac separata, turpius  iunguntur,  2.6.6-7). Sherwin-White suggests that  the use of an 
exemplum here “softens the edge of advice and criticism.” 182
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182 Sherwin-White (1966) 153. He gives parallels at Pliny, Ep. 7.1.7, 8.22.4, 9.12.2. For 
8.22 and 9.12, see the discussion above.
As we have seen, omitting  the name of an exemplum  can produce a number  of 
effects. A  suppressed name may  highlight  moral disapproval or  avoid giving direct 
offense.  Anonymous figures may  draw  closer  to general  types and thus focus attention 
more on the action  than  the actor. They  may  avoid arguments concerning  specific details 
to focus on  underlying issues. And as with Pliny’s letters of advice,  the deployment  of 
nameless exempla may  allow  a  writer  to shift  some of the emphasis away  from  the 
content  of the instance cited onto the act  of citation  itself,  depicting the author  as a 
model for  how  to cite  exempla  and to give  advice. As these differing  uses draw  away  from 
the more particular  focus created by  exempla  of named figures, they  move closer  to the 
stock figures defined by  familial  or  social roles who play  an  important part  in  Roman 
comedy,  as well  as declamation  and fables.  It is to the fuzzy  border  between nameless 
generalizing exempla and declamatory fictions that we turn in the next section.
2.2: Exempla, Declamation and the Mythologization of Narrative Models.
Historical episodes were one source for  the themes used in the declamation  exercises of 
rhetorical education. As Matthew  Roller  has argued using the example of Cicero’s death, 
sometimes inventions of the rhetorical  schools could become important  elements within 
supposedly  historical  narratives. 183 Likewise we should note the similarity  between  the 
features of anonymous exempla and declamatory  themes. The use of professional or 
familial roles to identify  the actors resembles the use of such  labels in  setting 
declamations.  Scholars such  as Mary  Beard and Erik Gunderson  characterize  Roman 
declamation  as a  form  of mythic discourse,  suggesting  the potential for  such  themes to 
function as elements of a  rhetorically  educated individual’s mental  universe.184 Training 
in  the use of colores  — attitudes, intentions or  even  completely  external  events 
introduced into a  declamation  to change the perception of the characters and their 
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relationships — to shape the arguments on these themes may  encourage a  creative 
approach  to the  deployment  of such  resources. Quintilian’s caution  against  the too eager 
or  thoughtless use of wholesale inventions encouraged by  school declamations 
(5.13.45-46) suggests something of the care necessary to employ such devices effectively.
Roller  demonstrates how,  in  the interest  of augmenting  the moral point of an 
event, declaimers could alter  or  even  create  “historical”  events such  as Cicero’s defense of 
Popillius on  a  charge of parricide. 185 Roller positions his article  as a  reaction  to earlier 
source  criticism  on  the death of Cicero tradition, in  particular  the work of Homeyer. He 
criticizes her  for  minimizing the role of the declaimers in  the development  of historical 
accounts of the orator’s death, noting that the temporal proximity  between  the actual 
event  and the appearance of these declamatory  themes makes it unlikely  that some 
earlier  written  source served as the basis for  the rhetorical  exercises.186  In  addition, 
Roller  suggests that the political  arguments put forward by  the declaimers seem  to 
develop arguments put forward by  Cicero himself in  the Philippics  and other  elements 
derived from  Octavian’s propaganda  campaign  against Marcus Antonius during  the 
conflict between the triumvirs in the 30s BCE. 187
Roller  bases his discussion  primarily  on the declamations and commentary 
concerning Cicero’s death  recorded by  Seneca  the Elder.188  In  his discussion  of the 
controversia accusing Cicero’s killer  of misconduct  (Contr.  7.2), Seneca  reveals that the 
details on  which  the declamation  rests have little basis in  evidence: “Few  of the 
historians have reported Popillius as Cicero’s killer, and these also do not  report that he 
was defended by  Cicero on an  accusation  of parricide, but  in  a  private trial; the 
declaimers decided that  he had been accused of parricide”  (Popillium  pauci ex historicis 
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186 Roller (1997) 115; he argues against Helene Homeyer (1964) Die antiken Berichte 
über den Tod Ciceros und ihre Quellen. Baden-Baden. (= Deutsche Beiträge zur 
Altertumswissenschaft, Bd. 18).
187 Roller (1997) 116-117.
188 Sen. Contr. 7.2; Suas. 6, 7.
tradiderunt interfectorem Ciceronis  et hi quoque non parricidi reum a Cicerone 
defensum,  sed in privato  iudicio; declamatoribus placuit parricidi reum fuisse., Contr. 
7.2.8). There exists no record of any  such  court  case involving Cicero’s murder, as Seneca 
himself admits.189  This is not  an  uncommon pattern  in  declamations that  refer  to 
historical events: while the event  itself has an  attested existence independent  of the 
declamatory  theme, the hypothetical  trial attaches itself only  tangentially  to the 
historical material. 190  Roller  argues that  not  only  the parricide trial  but  any  previous 
relationship between  Cicero and his killer  may  be fictitious. He suggests that, “the entire 
tradition that  Cicero defended Popillius,  on  any  charge,  and delivered a speech  of his 
behalf, is a  declamatory  fabrication  that  originated as a  color.  For  while this court  case is 
securely  attested no less than  six  times,  every  attestation  occurs in  a treatment  of the 
death  of Cicero; the court case has no existence whatsoever  outside of the death-of-
Cicero tradition.  This close connection  strongly  suggests dependence: that  the story  of 
the court case emerged within,  or  as part  of, the death-of-Cicero tradition.” 191 Roller’s 
interpretation  of this episode positions the practice of declamation  not  as some 
intellectual cul-de-sac that  draws on  historical and cultural material without feeding 
back  into the broader  flow  of contemporary  historical discussions,  but  rather  as a vibrant 
and influential arena within the broader conversation. 
Roller  identifies two tendencies in  the practice of declamation  as central  to the 
creation of events and relationships such  as Cicero’s defense of Popillius for  parricide: 
first  an  emphasis on  ethical  justifications in building  declamatory  arguments, and 
second the practice of inventing  new  actions and details in the form  of colores.192 As 
Roller  notes: “For  the declaimers… and for  other  ancient writers who appropriated the 
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189 Sic autem eum accusant tamquam defendi non possit, cum adeo possit absolvi ut ne 
accusari quidem potuerit. (Sen. Contr. 7.2.8)
190 See Beard (1993) 52 on the lack of attestation for this trial and others attached to 
“historical” themes.
191 Roller (1997) 125-26.
192 Roller (1997) 112-14.
death-of-Cicero narrative from  declamation, history  is for  the most  part  a  record of the 
moral  significance of events.”193 Writers and speakers select, adapt and supplement the 
details of a  declamatory  narrative – or  of an  exemplary  one – in  the service of moral – or, 
perhaps more accurately,  moralizing  – arguments. A  sense of familiarity,  whether  with 
some portion  of the narrative  frame or  with  the moralizing  stance taken, can  reinforce 
the credibility  of the supplementary  material.  (I discussed the importance of familiarity 
to the credibility  of narrative in  section  1.3  of the previous chapter.)  Historical  narratives 
directed toward a  moral  point require a  different  relationship with  the details of the 
event  than  do those concerned with  documentary  verifiability. Moralizing history 
produces another  sort  of truth  from  that  produced by  antiquarian  research: the truth  of a 
moralizing  narrative – such  as those produced by  declaimers and users of exempla – 
rests in the meaning it projects, not in the accuracy of its details.
In  a  less spectacular  fashion,  declamation  trains its participants to mold the 
character  of their  subjects in  accordance with  useful  conventional models or  concepts. 
For  instance, in  a  biographical sketch  of Seneca the Elder,  Janet Fairweather  notes that 
the picture that  the younger Seneca  offers of his father  is inconsistent  with  some of the 
elder’s expressed views in  the extant works.  Noting a similar  tendency  to idealize his 
mother  in  the Consolatio ad Helviam  along  the lines of standard female types from 
declamation, Fairweather  suggests that  the younger  Seneca  may  model his portrayal  of 
his father  more on certain  ideal types rather than  his actual character:  “maybe his 
references to his father  similarly  give us not  so much  a  reliable description  of the man as 
he really  was,  as a  conventional portrait of what a  Roman  father of the old school  ought 
to have been  like.” 194 As we have seen in  the previous chapter, Pliny  the Younger  proudly 
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in the Controversiae as almost exclusively interested in sententiae may be a similar 
distortion with the goal of aligning them more completely with the interests he assigns to 
the younger generation in general.
admits to distorting  and exaggerating  the merits of his friends,  a  practice he claims as a 
mark  of good will and friendship. 195 Declamation develops character  types that  persist  in 
other genres and which  may  alter  the presentation  of “real”  historical  figures. The use of 
these exercises ensures that the character  types on  which  most  declamations were built 
would be a  familiar  part  of the mental furniture of the Roman elite.196 Building  on  the 
elder  Seneca’s advice to his son  Mela in  the preface to Controversiae  2, where he  argues 
from  the example of Fabianus,  a  declaimer who became a  philosopher,  that  rhetorical 
training is useful for  everyone no matter  what field of study  they  wished to pursue, 
Fairweather summarizes Seneca’s attitude concerning  rhetorical education  – an  attitude 
she sees as characteristic of the time – as follows: “rhetoric – that  is,  given  the 
curriculum  standard in schools of that  period, declamation – is the central literary 
discipline,  which  not  only  provides a  training for  orators, but also supplies those who 
would venture into any  other  branch  of literary  composition  with  aids to effective 
expression  which  it  would be most unwise to forgo.” 197 Among  these “aids to effective 
expression”  are the personae, the character  types with  which  both  speakers and 
audiences trained through  declamation  would be familiar. The practice of declamation 
defines various categories of person and varieties of relationship,  which  are then 
inculcated in those who practice it.
Another  way  in  which  a  declamation can  act  in place of an exemplum  is to enact 
an  abstract  version  of a  current  problem. In this fashion, speakers could essentially 
generate exempla for  themselves. In  a letter  to his friend Atticus written  in  March  of 49 
BCE during the turmoil following Pompey’s departure  from  Italy  and Caesar’s seizure of 
the city  of Rome,  Cicero describes himself engaging in a  series of rhetorical exercises, 
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195 Ep. 7.28. See the discussion in section 1.2.
196 See Bloomer (1997) on rhetorical education teaching its students to recognize the 
social positions and conventional characters of many of the common classes of person 
they would encounter and deal with in their adult lives.
197 Fairweather (1984) 556.
which  he labels theses (*+,&'-, ad Att. 9.4.1). 198  These exercises are  essentially 
forerunners of the suasoriae practiced by  students of declamation.  Claiming  that he is at 
a  loss to find anything  to write about, Cicero states that  he has begun  practicing abstract 
arguments to avoid giving  in to despair: “But nevertheless so that  I may  not surrender 
myself totally  to sorrow,  I have taken  up for  myself certain theses as it were that  are  both 
concerned with  politics and the current  times,  so that  I may  both  draw  my  mind away 
from  complaints and I may  practice in  the very  issue about  which  there is concern”  (sed 
tamen ne me totum aegritudini dedam,  sumpsi mihi quasdam  tamquam *+,&'- quae et 
!./'0'1"2 sunt et temporum horum, ut et abducam animum ab querelis et in eo  ipso de 
quo agitur exercear,  ad Att.  9.4.1).  Cicero repeats this same thought in  the concluding 
paragraph  of the letter  with  similar  though  slightly  varied wording. 199 As Gunderson 
notes, Cicero figures this activity  as providing two distinct things: “The exercise offers a 
sort of spiritual  relief (abduco parumper animum a molestiis),  and it also allows Cicero 
to deliberate on  questions whose relevance is very  much  to hand (034 !#.5#(.6  0' 
delibero).” 200 Engaging in abstract  rhetorical exercises serves as a  distancing gesture by 
which  Cicero removes himself from  current  political difficulties,  but the choice of subject 
allows him  nevertheless to work  through  his possible response to the situation in  an 
indirect  manner. Gunderson  suggests that  these theses perform  a  sort  of playacting 
rehearsal for  life, but  the two distinct advantages that  Cicero identifies in  this activity  – 
the relaxation  from  troubles and the simultaneous deliberation about  those troubles – 
imply  that  the orator  himself sees this activity  as firmly  separated from  his own  political 
options, even as it  offers insight  into those exact  questions. The translation  of his 
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198 See Bonner (1949) 1-11 on the development of declamation in Rome and the character  
of these theses. Gunderson (2003) 105 follows Bonner’s work.
199 et abduco parumper animum a molestiis et 034 !#.5#(.6 0' delibero, ad Att. 9.4.3. 
The repetition of abducam animum and abduco… animum calls attention to the 
repetition of thought in the two paragraphs.
200 Gunderson (1993) 107. The two quotations are from Cic. ad Att. 9.4.3.
situation  into the abstract  as well as into Greek  offers not  just political cover but  also 
emotional distance.  Cicero does not  practice ways to act as himself,  but instead gives 
advice  to an  exemplary  figure who is parallel  to,  yet  distinct  from  himself.  Only  by 
understanding  these theses to depict a  persona  that  is not  himself, no matter  how  clearly 
parallel they  are to his own  circumstances, can  Cicero explore his political  options while 
nevertheless removing  his mind from  the attendant  anxieties. Addressing  an  abstract 
analogy provides emotional distance from the pressing political troubles he considers.
The content  of these theses, expressed in Greek perhaps as a  means to suggest a 
greater  level of abstraction  from  the current  political situation,201  nevertheless clearly 
parallel Cicero’s situation  and options in  reacting  to Caesar’s seizure of dictatorial  power 
in  Rome. 202 In  particular, the last  topic in  the list clearly  transforms Cicero himself into 
an  abstract  figure that he may  advise as if he were another  person: “If a  man has done 
great  things for  his fatherland and on account of this has suffered irreparable things and 
suffered reproach,  should he willingly  take a  risk on  behalf of his fatherland or  must it  be 
allowed to him  to give thought to himself and the members of his family, leaving political 
affairs to those in  power?”  (&7  8 )&($/" 094  !"0#:%" &;&#(&0<,"- %'=";0> 0& 0.?0. 
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201 Gunderson (1993) 107 makes a similar comment, but focused on the abstraction of 
the content of these theses: “The specific has been made strategically generic. Rather 
than offering the @!>*&,'- ‘Should I help kill Caesar?’ Cicero instead engages the *+,'- 
‘Should a tyrant be slain?’”
202 A7 )&4&0+.4 B4 0C !"0#:%' 06#"44.6)+4D- ";0E-. &7 !"402 0#>!F 06#"44:%.- 
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B/&6*&#:"- !+#'. &7 !>/&).4 B!"10+.4 0C UW#X 1"2 !./'.#1D0+.4 ";094 06#"44.6)+4D4. 
&7 1"2 )9 %.1')$V.40" 094 %'I !./+).6 1"0$/6,'4 0E- 06#"44:%.- ,64"!.(#"!0+.4 J)K- 
0.Y- Q#:,0.'-. &7 0.Y- &;&#(+0"'- 1"2 Z:/.'- ,6(1'4%64&60+.4 B4 0.Y- !./'0'1.Y- 1G4 )9 
%.13,'4 &[ N&N.6/&?,*"' !&#2 034 J/K4. &7 8 )&($/" 094 !"0#:%" &;&#(&0<,"- %'= ";0> 
0& 0.?0. Q4<1&,0" !"*\4 1"2 Z*.4D*&2- 1'4%64&M,&'&4 G4 B*&/.409- @!]# 0E- !"0#:%.- 
T BZ&0+.4 ";0R ^"60.? !.0& 1"2 034 .71&'.0$0K4 !.'&Y,*"' !#>4.'"4 QZ&)+4F 0I- !#O- 
0._- 7,UM.40"- %'"!./'0&:"-. (Cic., ad Att. 9.4.2) 
Cicero reveals his choice to use Greek in this letter to be a strategic decision by his 
subsequent comment that he practices these deliberations in both Latin and Greek (tum 
Graece tum Latine, ad Att. 9.4.3).
Q4<1&,0" !"*\4  1"2  Z*.4D*&2- 1'4%64&M,&'&4  G4  B*&/.409- @!]# 0E- !"0#:%.- T BZ&0+.4 
";0R ^"60.?  !.0& 1"2  034 .71&'.0$0K4 !.'&Y,*"'  !#>4.'"4 QZ&)+4F 0I- !#O- 0._- 
7,UM.40"- %'"!./'0&:"-,  ad Att.  9.4.2). 203 Erik Gunderson reads this practice through  the 
lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis and the language of technologies of the self. He 
characterizes these fictional performances as a  means of exploring potential ways of 
being:
The varieties of self-emplotment for  the statesman  in his civic life are found to be 
rhetorical, and this rhetoric  has as its occasion the idle hours of declamation. This 
is an  earnest sort  of leisure in  which  one studies how  best to be oneself.  The 
rhetoric  of the self has as its training  ground this world of fictional opportunities 
beyond which  beckon  virtual,  potential selves.  The many  declamatory  cases act  as 
so many  occasions for  the constitutive  call  of interpellation, occasions that are 
multiplied within  themselves as they  split  into pro  and contra.  The answers are 
not simple,  nor  is the genre reducible to allegory. Nor  may  one freely  take up and 
set  down  whatever  mask  one pleases.  The masks constrain  even  as they  enable. 
The techniques of the self herein practiced produce a  more elaborate self-relation 
than  that  presupposed by  a  simple discourse of authenticity.  Style,  comportment, 
and flair enter into the game.204
Gunderson’s description  of rhetorically  enacting  possible modes of action  delineates 
both  the flexibility  and the limitations of this mode of deliberation,  but  at  the same time 
his interpretation  of this mode as encompassing  “techniques of the self”  distorts the 
relationship between  the declaimer  and his declamation. What  Gunderson  expresses as 
re-imagining oneself through  the medium  of declamatory  play-acting  can  just  as easily 
be seen  as a  process of creating exempla  to think with. Such an  interpretation  may  in  fact 
be closer  to how  Cicero or  his contemporaries would understand the practice. The theses 
he declaims concentrate  not on  concerns such  as “How  should I feel?”  or  “What should I 
think?”  but instead relentlessly  focus on  the question  “What  must  be done?”  or  perhaps 
“What should a  good man do?”  Cicero does not here explore “how  best  to be oneself,”  but 
rather  considers patterns of action  that he may  then  adduce as exempla  either  to imitate 
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undisguisedly autobiographical.”
204 Gunderson (2003) 109-110. Gunderson’s discussion (104-110) involves this letter as 
well as ad Att. 14.22 written in another perilous time for Cicero during the turmoil 
following the death of Caesar.
or  to avoid in  his subsequent  political life.  As Cicero performs hypothetical variations on 
his political  future, he observes himself not as an  exemplum  of something  that  has been 
done but as a wide variety of exempla of things that might be done.
Shadi Bartsch’s discussion  of the ancient  attitude towards mirrors as a tool  for 
gaining  self-knowledge sheds useful  light  on  this distinction  between  considering  “how 
best to be oneself” and creating  exempla  to explore what one should do.  She contrasts 
the ancient use of mirrors to gain  self-knowledge with  the modern  view  of the mirror  as a 
metaphor  for  introspection.  For  the Romans,  the self-knowledge gained through  the use 
of mirrors was obtained by  way  of identification with  the judgment  of the community: a 
mirror  allows its user  to see what  others see.205  Bartsch  builds on a repeated link 
between  the concept  of sophrosyne  – moderation  and self-control in  line with  social 
expectations – and the well-known  dictum  “Know  yourself”  in  order  to suggest  that 
mirrors help to build self-knowledge by  allowing  the viewer  to perceive his or  her 
appropriate social position: 
Although  the idea  of ‘self-knowledge’ suggests, for  us,  a  Romantic introspection 
into the hidden  depths of the soul, or  a  Freudian  uncovering  of the unconscious 
desires of the id, the ancient  notion of sophrosyne  was directed toward 
moderation and control of the social behavior of the individual,  toward the 
approbation  of his peers rather than the flowering of an inner  potential.  This 
provides the crucial link  between  sophrosyne  as a  set  of practices and the notion 
of self-knowledge in  antiquity,  and also explains why,  for us,  the employment of 
the mirror  as a  tool to those ends might seem  empty  or  superficial, while for our 
Greco-Roman writers it provides a significant view onto the self.206
Bartsch  observes that ancient  writers neither  discuss nor  describe the mind as observing 
and reflecting on its own  operations.207 This understanding of the relationship between 
the viewer  and his or  her  own image in  the mirror  as mimicking  the position  of an 
external  observer  prepares a  person  accustomed to this form  of self-observation  to 
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207 Bartsch (2006) 16. At 232-36 she uses Christopher Gill’s model of the “objective-
participant” self as a way to think about the ancient self: She primarily references 
Christopher Gill (1996) Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in 
Dialogue. Oxford.
consider  the performance of a  declamation in  some manner  as an  external  phenomenon. 
In  practicing  his theses on  responding to tyranny,  Cicero essentially  creates a mirror 
analogue to himself whom  he can advise and imagine as a  model for  himself. He is at 
least  as concerned to understand the broader  social responses to the abstract 
possibilities for action he debates as he is to try  on  the different  masks that  his potential 
responses to Caesar offer.
As Cicero’s declamatory  creation of exempla  for  himself suggests, declamation  at 
times can substitute for  the use of historical instances.  But the connection  between  these 
rhetorical exercises and exemplarity  also operates on  a  more fundamental level.  Mary 
Beard has provocatively  suggested that  declamation  acts as a  form  of mythological 
discourse. Just  as with  the frequent  citation of exempla,  the  combination  of historical 
themes with  quasi-contemporary  ones is one method of weaving  historical time into the 
present  moment: “Declamation was one important  means of turning  dead and buried 
myth-history  into an  issue of the present: constant re-presentation.” 208  Beard 
emphasizes what she defines as the traditional character  of declamatory  exercises in 
terms that are also suggestive of the Roman treatment of exempla: 
These scenarios form  a group of traditional themes – “traditional”  in  the sense 
that  they  are presented without concern for origin  or  authorship,  but are focused 
instead on  repetition, re-telling,  re-elaboration. This is a  part  of Roman cultural 
production in which  a  nucleus of stories is repeated,  slightly  reworked,  varied or 
extended, time and time again  – not just in  the surviving  collections of 
declamatory  texts,  but  also in  the life-history  experience of those who 
participated in the “declamatory arena.” 209
The description  of declamations as stories “repeated, slightly  reworked,  varied or 
extended, time and time again”  is clearly  resonant  with  exemplarity,  in  particular  the 
well  known, oft repeated stories most  commonly  recognized as exempla.  The parallel 
between  the repetition and manipulation of famous historical  episodes, and the 
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to the declamatory, although in doing so she follows a very limited definition of 
exemplarity.
209 Beard (1993) 58, emphasis in the original.
repetition and manipulation  of often melodramatic disputes between stock  character-
types demonstrates, I believe,  the kinship between these two practices as instantiations 
of a  single underlying  mode of thought.  As Beard suggests,  the declamations that 
concern  specific  historical events encourage the contestation  of historical meaning: the 
juxtaposition  of historical  themes and abstract family  or  social conflicts “served to 
reinforce the debatability of Roman history; just  as the issues surrounding the blind 
boy’s conflict  with  the stepmother  were obviously  up for  negotiation,  so also was the 
conduct  of the heroes (and villains)  of the Graeco-Roman  past.”210  Declamation and 
exemplarity  both  create arenas in  which  narrations and re-narrations of events serve as 
material to debate ethical values and plans of action.
More broadly,  declamation  acts as a  sort  of fairy-tale discourse for  the Romans, 
allowing  them  to think  through social or  psychological  issues. Describing the practice as 
a  variety  of mythopoesis,  Beard offers the following  overview  of declamations as 
characterized through an eclectic mix of theoretical concepts:
They  construct  a  fictional world of “traditional  tales’”  for  negotiating,  and re-
negotiating, the fundamental rules of Roman  society; they  “naturalize the 
arbitrariness”  of those rules by  setting  them  in  the context  of legal sanction; they 
offer  a  vision  of higher authority – defined not  in  terms of divine intervention, 
but in  terms of the social  sanction  of Roman  law; they  provide a  focus for  the re-
presentation  and constant  re-resolution  of central Roman/human  conflicts that 
everyday  social regulations do not (and can  not)  solve; they  offer  an arena  for 
learning, practicing and recollecting what it is to be and think Roman. 211
This focus on  “what  it  is to be and think  Roman”  suggests congruence between  the 
practices of declamation and exemplarity.  Declamation offers almost  a fantasy  extension 
of exemplarity, widening  the field of reference to fantasies of legal or  political debate.  As 
Gunderson  argues, “Declamation  allows Romans to allegorize reality, to play  with  it,  and 
comment upon  it.” 212  The practice of arguing controversiae  and suasoriae trains 
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declaimers in  the art  of negotiating  the conflicts of legalism, social  expectations and 
realities.  As Beard argues, “It  was in  the repeated re-arguing  of these traditional cases (of 
rape,  disinheritance, domestic murder) that  the Roman elite  learnt  to think with their 
own  social rules and to negotiate the problems,  inconsistencies and paradox  that any 
such  system  of rules necessarily  throws up.” 213 Through  the practice of declamation, 
Romans acquired a  range of expressive resources – familiar  character  types and 
narrative forms, patterns of argument  and tactics for  negotiating  conflicts – that  were 
easily portable to other genres and contexts.
2.3: The Cross-Pollination of Exemplum and Fable in Phaedrus’ Fables.
Fable,  like  declamation, presents a  fantasy  extension  of exemplary  thought.  Phaedrus 
repeatedly  describes his poetic  fables as offering  exempla to his readers (1.3.3, 1.26.12, 
2.prol.1, 2.1.11, 2.2.2, 3.10.2,  4.3.6,  4.7.20,  5.prol.10). The typical  structure of a  fable with 
its tightly  focused narrative and clearly  stated lesson  often explicitly  encourages readers 
to adduce the characters as exempla either  for themselves or  for  those around them.  In 
addition to the more typical animal stories,  several of Phaedrus’s fables claim  to be taken 
from  his own  experiences and involve named historical figures.214  Approaching the 
connection  from  the opposite direction, some anonymous exempla even  in a  historically 
focused collection  such as that  of Valerius present fable-like narratives.  Valerius 7.6.3, 
for  example,  offers a  lesson  against  war profiteering  through  the story  of a man  who sold 
a  mouse as food for  an  enormous sum  during  the siege of Praeneste, but  who 
subsequently starved to death.
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213 Beard (1993) 60, emphasis in the original.
214 Phaedrus claims that 2.5 (Tiberius Caesar), 3.10 (Augustus) and 5.7 (the tibia-player 
Princeps) come from his own memory. Other fables including historical figures include: 
3.9 and App. 27 (both concerning Socrates), 4.23 and 4.26 (both concerning Simonides), 
5.1 (Demetrius and Menander) and App. 10 (Pompey). Fairweather (1984) 499 provides 
an overview of the contents of the collection.
The identification  of such stories as exempla  in collections ranging from 
Valerius’s primarily  historical  compilation  to Phaedrus’s fables should remind us that  the 
limitation  of exemplary  content  to the historical  acts of well-known figures is more a 
product of modern  scholarship on  exemplarity  than of the Roman  conception  of 
exempla. Quintilian, for  example,  extends the range of potential exempla  well beyond 
the purely  historical: “First  of all an  orator ought  to abound in  a store of exempla  both 
old and recent,  to such a  degree that he ought  not  only  to know  things that are written  in 
histories or  handed down as it were in  tales and things that  are done daily,  but  he even 
ought not  to neglect  those things that are created by  the better-known  poets”  (In primis 
vero abundare debet orator exemplorum  copia cum  veterum  tum etiam  novorum, adeo 
ut non ea modo quae  scripta sunt historiis  aut sermonibus velut per manus  tradita 
quaeque cotidie aguntur debeat nosse,  verum  ne ea quidem  quae sunt a clarioribus 
poetis  ficta neglegere,  Inst. 12.4.1). This description  distinguishes between references to 
historical events and poetic fictions only as sub-types of a common practice.
Likewise, Quintilian  includes fables as a  sub-type in  his chapter on the use of 
exempla (5.11.17-20: I discuss this passage in  section  1.1).  Here Aesopic fables appear  as 
one among  a  variety  of possible arguments from  comparison. Quintilian  suggests that 
such  stories have their  greatest  effect on  less educated audiences: fables “are accustomed 
to influence the minds particularly  of rustics and the inexperienced,  who both  listen  to 
fictional  things more simply, and,  when they  have been captured by  pleasure,  easily 
agree to the things that  delighted them”  (ducere animos  solent praecipue rusticorum et 
imperitorum,  qui et simplicius quae ficta sunt audiunt, et capti voluptate facile iis 
quibus delectantur consentiunt,  5.11.19). The example that follows seems to confirm  this 
class bias: Quintilian  cites the story  of Menenius Agrippa  who used a  fable in  which  the 
body’s limbs revolt  against  the stomach  to convince the plebs  to end their  first  secession 
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against the Senate in  494/3  BCE.215 Quintilian’s other  references,  however, somewhat 
mitigate this effect. Horace in  particular offers an  example of an  animal fable used in 
sophisticated poetry  (Quint., IO. 5.11.20). In  the opening  poem  of the Epistles,  he uses 
the reply  of a  cautious fox  to a  lion as a  model for  the reply  he would give to those who 
encourage him  to engage in  a  more conventional occupation. 216  Horace adduces the 
exchange between  the two animals as an  explanatory  exemplum  to defend his poetic 
vocation. He closes this fable by  likening his interlocutor, the personified Roman people, 
as a  beast more terrible than the lion: “You  are a monster  with  many  heads”  (belua 
multorum es capitum,  Ep.  1.1.76). Thus he delineates the metaphorical relationship in 
which  the beast fable provides an  exemplum  for  the poet’s refusal to fulfill  the social 
expectations of average citizens. The use of a  beast fable here also has a  further 
advantage: in  depicting  the dangers of conformity  through the image of two predators, 
Horace defines the potential for  violence as a part  of the natural world and thus beyond 
the strictures of social rules.  This fable reveals the dangers without  stressing moral 
culpability.
Some anonymous exempla  become so focused on the moral message portrayed 
through  type figures that  they  become virtually  indistinguishable from  fables by  any 
measure other than their  context.  As I mentioned in the introduction  to this section,  in 
his chapter  on  necessity, Valerius Maximus includes an  anecdote about the siege of 
Praeneste.  Among the starving  defenders, a  man  who had captured a mouse chose to sell 
it  for  an exorbitant  sum  of money  rather  than eat  it himself.  Valerius renders this event 
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215 Menenius Agrippa plebem cum patribus in gratiam traditur reduxisse nota illa de 
membris humanis adversus ventrem discordantibus fabula, Quint. IO 5.11.19. Versions 
of this story are recorded at Livy 2.32 and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6.86.1ff.
216 Quodsi me populus Romanus forte roget, cur
non ut porticibus sic iudiciis fruar isdem,
nec sequar aut fugiam quae diligit ipse vel odit,
olim quod volpes aegroto cauta leoni
respondit, referam: ‘Quia me vestigia terrent,
omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum.’ (Hor., Ep. 1.1.70-75)
as a clear  moral lesson: the seller  subsequently  starves to death  while the buyer  emerges 
from  the siege with  glory.217 In this telling, the story  of the greedy  mouse-seller  emerges 
almost  as a  fable, whose central purpose is to impart a  moral lesson  rather  than  preserve 
a  memorable and exemplary  deed. The unusual  primary  act of the exemplum  – mouse-
vending – further  emphasizes the moral character  of the two figures in  contrast  to their 
specific actions.  As the likelihood of encountering  parallel circumstances decreases,  the 
emphasis on  the underlying  attitudes and motivations increases: the unusual  narrative 
content  shifts the emphasis of comparison from  practical imitation to moral character.218 
The conveniently  moralistic dual  outcome – the profiteer starves to death, the mouse-
buyer  not  only  survives but  performs heroically  – suggests that  at  least that  portion  of 
the narrative may  be fiction. As I discussed in  the previous section, Roller  has 
demonstrated that declamations on  the death  of Cicero seem  to have undergone a  similar 
elaboration  in  order  to reinforce a  moralizing  argument. 219 Another  example I discussed 
in  the previous chapter  displays the same reasoning: Cicero’s wish  to emend the death  of 
Coriolanus to express a  more desirable lesson  demonstrates the same impulse that  could 
motivate the creation of this sort of ending (Brut. 42-44. I discuss this passage in  section 
1.3  above).  This exemplum  thus reveals the border  between exempla  and fables as 
indistinct and porous.
At the beginning of his second book,  Phaedrus proclaims that  fables belong  to the 
category  of exempla.  The opening line of the prologue bluntly  declares: “Aesop’s type [of 
story] is composed of exempla”  (Exemplis continetur Aesopi genus,  2.prol.1). As if to 
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217 avaro enim [et] fame consumpto manubiis sordium suarum frui non licuit, aequi 
animi vir ad salutarem inpensam faciendam care quidem, verum necessarie conparato  
cibo vixit (Val. Max. 7.6.3).
218 Compare Beard (1993) 60 on the use of fictional laws in declamation: “The symbolic 
validation for these mythic debates is being provided not by the everyday legal code, but 
by legalism itself and by the idea of law in its purest (because imaginary) form.”
219 See Roller (1997) 112-13 on the primacy of moral arguments, and 124-26 on the 
potential that not only the charge of parricide, but any relationship between Cicero and 
his killer was a declamatory invention.
confirm  the exemplary  function  of fables,  the poet explicitly  labels the next  two poems as 
exempla (2.1.11; 2.2.2). He thus asserts that  fables are equivalent to exempla,  or  at least 
constitute a  type of exemplum. But  what type of exempla  are they? The following  lines 
define ethical education as the purpose of these exemplary fables:
Nor is anything else sought through fables
than that the mistakes of mortals may be corrected
and that careful diligence may exercise itself.
nec aliud quicquam per fabellas quaeritur
quam corrigatur error ut mortalium,
acuatque sese diligens industria.
    Phaedrus, 2.prol.2-4
The fabulist  aligns his work with  the  educational function  of exempla rather  than  with 
forensic  or  deliberative uses. 220 Phaedrus does not limit this function  to the education  of 
children, but  extends it  to encompass the correction  and improvement of all people 
(mortalium). The talking  animals, the anonymous social or  professional types,  and 
occasional named figures offer  his readers models that ostensibly  will train them  to 
understand and interpret the world correctly.
Fables,  of course, also have a  place in  formal  rhetorical  education, a  role  that 
prefigures the use of declamation for  training  more advanced students. Quintilian 
suggests that,  among the first  exercises in  speaking  taught by  the grammaticus 
(quaedam  dicendi primordia,  1.9.1),  students should learn  to paraphrase and rewrite 
Aesop’s fables.221 These fables are in  verse, and are thus likely  to include those written  by 
Phaedrus,  as Quintilian’s description  of the increasingly  complex  tasks to be assigned to 
the students shows: “First  [they  should learn] to break  the verses,  soon  to expound them 
with  changed words,  then  to change them  more boldly  in  paraphrase, in  which  it is 
permitted both  to abbreviate and to adorn  certain  things provided that  the poet’s 
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220 For the use of exempla in education, see e.g. Horace, Ser. 1.4.105-21; Quintilian, Inst. 
2.4.20 and 12.2.29-30. I discuss this function of exempla in section 0.1.
221 Igitur Aesopi fabellas, quae fabulis nutricularum proxime succedunt, narrare 
sermone puro et nihil se supra modum extollente, deinde eandem gracilitatem stilo 
exigere condiscant. (IO 1.9.2)
meaning  is maintained”  (Versus  primo solvere,  mox mutatis  verbis  interpretari,  tum 
paraphrasi audacius vertere,  qua et breviare quaedam et exornare salvo  modo poetae 
sensu permittitur,  1.9.2). 222  This exercise of rewriting  fables does not  simply  train 
students in  oral and written  expression. Quintilian’s stipulation  that  the meaning  of the 
story  be preserved (salvo  modo poetae sensu)  reveals a  deeper  function  of this practice, 
namely  training the participants to convey  moral  meaning  effectively  through  narrative. 
As declamation  will  at  a later  stage of rhetorical education,  the use of fables acculturates 
students “to think with their  own  social  rules and to negotiate the problems, 
inconsistencies and paradox  that any  such system  of rules necessarily  throws up.” 223 
Despite Quintilian’s dismissal  of fable as only  one step beyond the stories told by 
children’s nurses, 224 such  stories are a  powerful tool for  inculcating ethical attitudes and 
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222 Some scholars, troubled that Quintilian never mentions Phaedrus’s name, suggest 
that the source for these fables must be some other collection. Perry, for example, argues 
that Quintilian here refers to the fables of Babrius written in Greek verse. Perry’s 
argument rests on two main bases. (1) Babrius claims to be the first poet to write Aesopic 
fables in Greek verse. Phaedrus, however, is probably the first to put Aesop into verse 
(Perry 1965, xi). Because Quintilian states elsewhere that children should learn Greek 
before Latin (1.1.12), he must intend these fables for practice in writing Greek. Therefore 
Quintilian here refers to Babrius or his imitators (Perry 1965, l-li). (2) Phaedrus, who is 
unknown to Seneca and called improbus by Martial (Ep. 3.20.5), must therefore be 
considered too inferior to be known by Quintilian (Perry 1965, li-lii). The second 
objection is easily dealt with: Quintilian consistently refers to fables as suited primarily 
for children or the ignorant (1.9.2; 5.11.19), so his failure to name any writer of verse 
fable – Phaedrus, Babrius or any other – does not indicate much. The general silence on 
Phaedrus may simply reflect the negative attitudes the fabulist himself repeatedly argues 
against in his work (e.g. 3.prol.23; 3.12; 4.prol.15-16; 4.7; 4.22). On the first point, in his 
insistence on the primacy of Greek in Quintilian’s recommendations on early education, 
Perry ignores the remainder of the rhetorician’s advice on education in the two 
languages. While Quintilian does suggest that Greek should precede Latin, he explicitly 
cautions against continuing Greek-only instruction for too long (Non tamen hoc adeo 
superstitiose fieri velim ut diu discat, sicut plerisque moris est. IO 1.1.13). The goal, in 
fact, is to build bilingual facility: “So Latin ought not to follow at a distance and quickly it 
should go at the same pace. In this way it will bring it about that, when we begin to look 
to each language with equal care, neither will hinder the other” (Non longe itaque Latina 
subsequi debent et cito pariter ire. Ita fiet ut, cum aequali cura linguam utramque tueri 
coeperimus, neutra alteri officiat, 1.1.14). Rather than assuming that paraphrasing 
fables is an exercise in Greek alone, it seems far more likely to be a bilingual exercise. 
Consequently both Phaedrus and Babrius would be likely candidates for the sources of 
these verse fables.
223 Beard (1993) 60 discussing the mythical function of Roman declamation.
224 …Aesopi fabellas, quae fabulis nutricularum proxime succedunt, Quint. IO 1.9.2
frameworks.  In  a  way  that parallels the expansion  of the educational exercise  of 
declamation  into the broader  social and intellectual life  of the early  Principate as 
chronicled by  the elder  Seneca,  Phaedrus’s fables attempt to create a  reciprocal 
relationship between the spheres of rhetorical education and poetic art.
Phaedrus combines a  number  of Roman  anecdotes with  his more conventionally 
Aesopic  material to create a  sketch  of the contemporary  Roman thought-world.  His work 
explores the conflict between abstract  morality  and social power.  As Currie comments, 
“the moral and social presuppositions of Phaedrus are much  more important and varied 
than  the formal moral attached to any  particular  fable as the conclusion  to be drawn 
from  it. Phaedrus adopts the old Aesopic conception  of the non-moral and individual 
forces that conflict  with  the morality  which  he accepts. This conflict  he expresses in  the 
very  fabric  of his fables,  fictions which  demonstrate how  precarious is the existence of 
virtue in a world of force.” 225 Through  these fables the fabulist  attempts to mythologize 
Roman  reality  in a  manner  much like that  of declamation. Although  Phaedrus initially 
defines and presents his work  as a  polished verse translation  of Aesop – “The material 
that  Aesop the author  discovered, I have refined in  senarian  verse” (Aesopus  auctor 
quam  materiam  repperit,  | hanc ego polivi versibus senariis,  1.prol.1-2) 226 – in  the 
successive books he proclaims his own  contributions to the genre with  increasing 
boldness. 227  By  the time he reaches the prologue to book four, he distinguishes his 
production of “Aesopic  fables”  from  “Aesop’s fables,”  claiming that his poems offer  new 
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225 Currie (1984) 508. Henderson (2001) approaches the same interaction in a more 
circumscribed framework, focusing on the exploration of the position of the princeps in 
the post-Augustan world, and reading the collection as Telling Tales on Caesar.
226 The content of the first book accords well with this description, consisting almost 
entirely of brief animal fables.
227 Henderson (2001) 60-62 discusses the increasing authorial self-assertion from book 1  
through 3, defining 3.prol, the most extended of the direct authorial statements, as a 
‘Centerpiece Prologue.’
material  in  the older form. 228 John Henderson  argues that, in bringing  Aesop into Latin 
verse, Phaedrus concurrently  builds Aesopic  fable into a  model  of Julio-Claudian  Rome: 
“the fabulist  is ‘Romanizing’ all the tales he tells—not  just because he puts them  into 
Latin,  but  by  his choice of material,  by  his editorial framing,  by  his montage  of the 
collection (as the design of a  controlling  ‘author’,  and a  ‘poet’, at  that…).  Turn  this round, 
and you’ll  see that  this mock-empire of narratives authorizes a  distinctive take on  Rome 
and Roman  cognition.” 229 Like Horace, to whom  he makes repeated allusion,  Phaedrus 
uses his fables to dramatize problems of social power relations in  contemporary  Rome. 
At times the fabulist  illustrates these conflicts by  contesting the morals offered by  his 
fables.
After  the confident declaration that  his work offers morally  improving  exempla 
(2.prol.1-4),  Phaedrus quickly  moves to complicate the relationship between  exemplum 
and social reality. The second book’s prologue lead directly  into the following  fable, with 
the closing  lines acting  as a  sort  of promythium, an  introductory  statement  of the lesson 
to be drawn  from  the fable: “Learn why  you  ought  to say  no to greedy  people,  but  even 
offer  to modest  people what  they  have not  asked for.”  (attende cur negare cupidis 
debeas,  | modestis etiam offerre  quod non petierint,  2.prol.14-15). The poet  then 
illustrates this lesson  with  a  brief animal fable (2.1.1-10).  A  lion  has killed a  cow; he 
chases away  a  robber  who wants a  portion  of the meat,  but then  offers a portion  to a 
traveler  who is afraid to approach. Essentially  this story  is nothing  more than a slightly 
elaborated version of the initial lesson, dressed up as a  narrative rather than a precept. 
Phaedrus confidently  praises the example this talking lion offers: “an  absolutely 
outstanding  and praiseworthy  exemplum” (exemplum egregium prorsus  et laudabile, 
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228    …fabulis,
quas Aesopias, non Aesopi, nomino,
quia paucas ille ostendit, ego plures sero,
usus vetusto genere sed rebus novis (4.prol.10-12)
229 Henderson (2001) 2.
2.1.11). But  he immediately  undermines this statement,  acknowledging  that  the exact 
opposite is most often true: “but  in  truth  avarice is rich  and modesty  poor”  (verum  est 
aviditas dives  et pauper pudor, 2.1.12). Henderson  interprets this progression  from 
lesson  through  fable to contradicted moral as “satirizing  the very  Theory  of Fable—‘out 
to straighten  out people’s mistakes | and get  them  to pitch  themselves into hard work’ (2 
Prol.  3f.)—that  it  was supposed to be implementing without  more ado.” 230  But  this 
contradiction  also complicates the application  and interpretation  of exempla  themselves: 
a declaration of what people should do runs directly into a statement of how things are.
Phaedrus makes a  similar  gesture in  fable 3.4,  where he again  reverses the lesson 
of the story  in  his closing  comments.  The fabulist  labels the fable of the ape hanging  in 
the butcher’s shop – “It  tastes just like it  looks”  (‘quale’  inquit ‘caput est, talis praestatur 
sapor’ 3.4.4)  – as being more a  joke than  a  statement of truth  (ridicule magis hoc dictum 
quam  vere aestimo, 3.4.5). Just  as in  2.1,  the poet  closes the poem  with  a  lesson  opposed 
to his narrative.  He describes this commentary  as the result  of his own personal 
observation: “since I have often found beautiful people to be the worst,  and I have 
learned that many  with  ugly  faces are the best  people”  (quando  et formosos saepe inveni 
pessimos,  | et turpi facie multos cognovi optimos,  3.4.6-7).  The actual  lesson of this 
fable,  then,  is antithetical  to its content.  The fabulist opposes one category  of exemplum 
— his personal social observations — to another — the exemplary  potential  of fable.  His 
presentation  of the lesson  thus foregrounds the variations in  interpretation  produced by 
the choice of material for  comparison.  Phaedrus here reverses a  commonplace of elite 
social judgment.  Seneca  the Younger, for  instance,  introduces this common assumption 
to help explain  the perceived decline of oratory: “just as men’s speech  was, so was their 
life”  (talis  hominibus  fuit oratio  qualis  vita,  Seneca,  Ep. 114.1). In  twisting  the lesson  of 
this fable, Phaedrus may  provide a  subtle argument against  the public  disdain for  his 
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230 Henderson (2001) 71.
poetry: “I am  received into the company  [of poets]  with  digust”  (fastidiose tamen in 
coetum recipior,  3.prol.23). 231 He thus suggests that  the negative reaction  to his poetry 
relies on  unreflective attitudes toward his status as a  freedman rather  than  an  unbiased 
evaluation of this work.
Phaedrus 3.10, the longest poem  in  the collection, describes a  declamation-like 
trial – or  perhaps a  declamation  dressed up as a  trial – argued before Augustus.  This 
work  illustrates the incorporation  of Roman  life and the Imperial  court into the medium 
of fable,  and suggests a  connection  between  this judicial fable and the mythopoetic 
activity  of declamation. The concern with  adultery  and domestic violence mirrors one of 
the primary  concerns in  declamatory  cases. 232 As Beard argues about  declamation,  the 
presentation  of a fictionalized legal  contest  at  the core of this fable mythologizes the 
process of conflict  resolution  through  the medium  of law: “The symbolic  validation  for 
these mythic debates is being  provided not  by  the everyday  legal  code, but by  legalism 
itself and by  the idea of law  in  its purest  (because imaginary)  form. … Law  is operating 
not so much  as a  model science, or  even  as a  practical guide to proper  everyday 
behaviour — but as a  culturally  embedded way  of thinking, as part of the mythic field.” 233 
In  this fable,  the trial  before Augustus enacts the authority  of legalism  just  as in  the 
practice of declamation.
The fabulist  frames the lengthy  narrative of domestic  murder  and a  subsequent 
trial with  several gnomic  pronouncements about his theme: the necessity  to balance trust 
and suspicion. The poem  opens with  a  one-line statement  of the general  topic – “It  is 
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231 Most of Phaedrus’s remarks against his critics are far more blunt (e.g. 2.10-11, 3.12, 
4.7). See Perry (1965) lxxv-lxxvi and Currie (1984) 501-502 on Phaedrus’s defensiveness 
about his poetry.
232 On declamation’s interest in “family and sexual conflict (adultery, rape, bastardy, the 
ransoming of kidnapped relatives, disinheritance, parricide, the support or neglect of 
needy parents)”, see Beard (1993) 52.
233 Beard (1993) 60, emphasis in original. Henderson (2001) 39 also quotes Beard to 
discuss Phaedrus 3.10, but he focuses on the role of Augustus as “the genie who watches 
over the narrativity of Rome.”
dangerous to believe and not  to believe” (Periculosum  est credere et non credere,  3.10.1) 
– and illustrates these two lessons with  brief references to the mythological exempla  of 
Hippolytus and Cassandra.234  In  contrast to these mythological  figures,  Phaedrus 
presents the central narrative as a  true incident that, he implies, he himself witnessed: 
“But,  lest  you  should make light of mythical  antiquity,  I will tell you  a  story  that 
happened in  my  own memory”  (sed,  fabulosam  ne vetustatem  eleves,  | narrabo tibi 
memoria quod factum est mea, 3.10.7-8).  In  contrast to the cultural power  of tragic 
figures like Hippolytus and Cassandra,  the poet claims that  the story  of a  domestic 
dispute among  anonymous type figures will be more persuasive to his readers because 
he,  the narrator,  remembers it. 235 Essentially  he attempts surpass a  pair  of exempla from 
Greek myth with  an  anonymous exemplum  supposedly  drawn from  contemporary 
society. This preference for  more recent exempla  mirrors the pattern  displayed in  other 
genres; for  example,  Chaplin  identifies a  consistent preference for recent exempla  in  Livy 
and other  historians. 236 Notably,  in  adding an exemplum  from  his own  memory  to his 
mythic-literary  pair, Phaedrus corrects only  half of the potential  objection  to “antiquity 
celebrated in  fables”  (fabulosam… vetustatem): his tale of familial  intrigue and 
Augustus’s judgment is contemporary,  but  in  generic terms it  too is “celebrated in 
fables” (fabulosum).237 The poet  transforms this first  familial, then  legal  dispute into a 
fable on believing  stories.  He caps his narrative with  a  triple rehearsal of the moral of the 
fable,  first  stated by  Augustus as a  character  within  the narrative itself (3.10.47-50), 
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234 utriusque exemplum breviter adponam rei.
Hippolytus obiit, quia novercae creditum est;
Cassandrae quia non creditum, ruit Ilium. (Phaedrus 3.10.2-4)
235 The hypothetical objection Phaedrus imagines here follows a tactic that Quintilian 
recommends for dealing with archaic exempla: Exempla rerum varie tractanda sunt, si 
nocebunt: quae si vetera erunt, fabulosa dicere licebit, 5.13.24. I discuss this passage in 
section 1.1. Henderson (1993) 37 reads this as a contest in cultural one-upmanship 
between Greek myth and Roman ‘myth.’
236 Chaplin (2000) 124-26.
237 Henderson (2001) 43-44 seems to make a similar point about Phaedrus’s claims to 
honesty in these lines.
followed by  two variations in  the author’s own  voice (3.10.51-53,  54-58).  The final 
observation  of the third iteration of the lesson reflects back on  the preference for 
personal observation  that  introduced this story: “That  man  will be known whom  you 
have come to know  through  personal  experience”  (erit ille notus quem  per te cognoveris, 
3.10.51).238  The fable thus reaffirms the centrality  of direct  observation  in  justifying 
belief.
The events leading up to the murder-suicide read like the theme for  a 
declamation.239 The characters are identified solely  by  their  roles in  the household: “a 
certain husband”  (maritus  quidam,  3.10.9),  his wife (coniugem,  3.10.9), their  son  (filio, 
3.10.10),  and the husband’s freedman  (liberto… suo,  3.10.11).  By  limiting the 
identification  of the various characters – husband,  wife, son,  freedman  – solely  to their 
domestic roles,  the poet  both establishes them  primarily  as types rather  than individuals 
and reinforces the similarity  to declamation.  As declamations were performed before 
Augustus and his circle,  it  is possible that  this performance was in fact a  declamation 
dressed up here as a real trial. 240 In  describing the complexity  of the case as the basis for 
referring it to Augustus – “because the winding of the charge had tied them  [the judges] 
in  knots”  (quod ipsos  error implicuisset criminis,  3.10.41)  – the fabulist  may  in  fact  be 
describing  the intricate arguing  and re-arguing  of a  declamatory  theme more than  the 
activity  in  an  actual law  court. By  presenting  a  (potential)  declamation  as a  trial  in a 
fable,  Phaedrus suggests the similarity  between  the mythologizing  functions of fable and 
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238 This is not, however, the final line of the poem. Phaedrus follows his variations on a 
theme with a two-line excuse for his lack of brevity.
239 A man loves his wife and his son (3.10.9-10). His freedman, hoping to become his 
master’s heir, makes many accusations against the wife and son, most importantly 
accusing the wife of adultery (3.10.11-17). The man pretends to leave town, but sneaks 
back into his house the same night (3.10.19-21). Finding his son sleeping next to his wife 
in the dark, the father unknowingly kills his son (3.10.25-28). When lights are brought 
in, the father realizes what he has done and kills himself (3.10.29-33). The wife is 
accused (Accusatores postularunt mulierem, 3.10.34).
240 For Augustus as an audience for declamation, see e.g. Seneca the Elder Contr. 
2.4.12-13; 2.5.20; 4.pr.7; 6.8; 10.5.21-22.
declamation.  Henderson links the subject  matter  of this dispute to that of declamation as 
described by  Beard,  but nevertheless maintains the reality  of the event  as a judicial 
proceeding despite the difficulties of understanding legal procedure as described by 
Phaedrus. 241 Particularly  revealing of Henderson’s attitude is the following comment: 
“We,  or  at  any  rate I, need not  puzzle out  how  a  civil case might develop from  a 
testamentary  charge.” 242 The claim  that Phaedrus represents an  actual civil  case in  this 
fable,  however,  misses the parallel with  legal procedure as depicted in  declamation. In 
both  treatments of the operation of law,  the divergence from  real legal  procedure helps to 
describe (again  borrowing  Beard’s formulation) “legalism  … and the idea  of law, in  its 
purest (because imaginary) form.” 243
Whether  a  declamation  or a  trial  dressed up to sound like declamation,  however, 
Phaedrus’s poem  enacts several accumulated layers of mythmaking.  The accusation  and 
defense of the sole  surviving member of this family  enacts the same mythopoetic 
processes as declamation. Augustus then  inserts himself into the declamatory  conflict  as 
the guarantor of legalism, the higher  power  of Roman  myth  as read by  Beard. Finally 
Phaedrus the fabulist frames these layers of mythic  negotiation  within  his moralizing 
translation  of Julio-Claudian  Rome into a collection  of fables.  As we have seen  in  the 
previous section, Cicero uses declamation  to build exempla for  himself in  order  to 
explore his possibilities for  action  in  the conflict  between  Caesar  and Pompey. In similar 
fashion,  both the narrative content  and the frame of Phaedrus 3.10  build exempla as they 
mythologize the role of legalism  and the princeps  in  the maintenance of familial order. 244 
By  dressing  up a  declamation as a  real trial in  a  fable (or  else configuring  a  real  trial as a 
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241 See Henderson (2001) 47-48, 49-51 and 199 n. 4 on the parallels to declamation. See 
p. 49 with 203 n. 38 and 51-52 on the relevant legal forms and potential difficulties of the 
account as an actual court case.
242 Henderson (2001) 203, n. 38.
243 Beard (1993) 60.
244 Henderson (2001) 39-41 reads Augustus as the defender of the Roman family through  
his attempts to prevent and punish adultery.
declamation  within  a fable),  Phaedrus reveals the replication  of modes of thought 
between  these discourses, both  fictional  and factual.  As Roman  law  and morality  are 
rehearsed in  mythologized forms, so do those moralizing discourses train their 
participants in  patterns of judgment  and evaluation  that  structure social and political 
interactions.
We might  view  exempla,  fables and declamation  as forming  a  triangle of 
relationships, each  relating  in  some fashion  to the others.  Exempla  become the basis for 
declamations and (at  least  in  Phaedrus) fables.  The arguments and inventions of 
declamation  mold and supplement  the content  of exempla.  Fables act  as exemplary 
models and, like declamation, they  function  as repeated,  traditional stories (as per 
Beard’s reading), rehearsing  patterns of thought  that  are  replicated in  ‘real world’ 
situations.  The educational  fictions enable students to acculturate themselves to Roman 
reality  through  the mythologized forms of discourse.  Exempla imitate both  fables and 
declamation, as observers recast  factual events in  the molds provided by  these fictional 
narratives.
2.4: Conclusion
The seemingly  paradoxical  notion of anonymous exempla  productively  expands our  map 
of the field of exemplarity. As we have seen,  the less historical particularity  an  exemplum 
displays, the closer  the figure draws to more abstract  forms of narrative such  as those 
enacted in declamation  and Aesopic  fables. Unnamed figures in exempla may  display 
varying  degrees of anonymity, ranging from  persons who,  though  nameless,  remain 
completely  recognizable  to those who cannot be identified and are thus truly  anonymous. 
As nameless exempla approach  the less particular  end of the scale they  offer  increasing 
advantages against  the more historically  specific types. They  may  avoid causing  offense, 
forestall  debate about  details of the particular  instance or  present the actors more readily 
as general types. In  their  focus on general type-figures, such  exempla enter  into an 
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exchange with the practice of declamation. 
Both  declamations and fables enact  forms through  which  exemplary  events may 
realize an  ethical meaning. Moralizing  narratives,  whether exemplary, declamatory  or 
fabulous,  rehearse mental structures within  which Romans learned to interpret and 
negotiate social conflicts. Suasoriae or controversiae enable speakers to create fictional 
exempla for  themselves. At times declamations based on  historical  events may  alter  or 
expand the historical tradition  in  pursuit  of moral meaning. This practice of fictive 
debate acculturates its participants to a  range of social expectations.  Fable likewise trains 
its readers think  through  social  conflicts.  Through  repetition  and rehearsal, the narrative 
patterns and character  types of declamation  and fable become familiar parts of the 
mental furniture of the Roman  mind. On  a more fundamental level,  these practices 
function as varieties of mythological discourse within  which  Romans learned to think 
with  and negotiate their  social rules.  This chapter  has mapped out  a  triangle  of 
interactions and relationships between  the discourses of exemplarity,  declamation  and 
fable.  Exemplary  narratives that  purport  to represent  the Life of Roman reality  display 
the marks of influence from  these fictional analogues and thus in  some sense should be 
seen as imitating Art.
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Illustrating Moderation, Tolerance and Social Authority
Roman  writers and speakers sometimes use exempla to demonstrate general  patterns of 
activity  rather  than  specific  individual actions. Such  illustrations serve a  primarily 
descriptive function  rather  than  a  directly  prescriptive one: they  provide representative 
samples of human  behavior, not  models for  imitation.  When they  function  as 
illustrations,  exempla  sometimes encourage moderation or  a  relaxation  in  standards. 
Speakers and writers may  in fact  use them  to argue against too strict  an  application  of 
moral  judgment.  Such illustrations may  demonstrate the advantages obtained by 
maintaining  a  careful balance between  the good and the bad,  or  promote an 
understanding  of the common fallibility  of both the judge of morals and the object of 
judgment.  But illustrations of shared qualities may  reinforce positive claims as well. 
Exempla that demonstrate the shared possession  of laudable traits or  attitudes enhance 
the position  of a  social  group as a  whole and consequently  reflect  on  the personal 
reputations of its individual members.  In  a  further development of this line of argument, 
by  illustrating  the excellence of more obscure or  less important  members of the elite or 
another social group, writers and speakers may  enhance the position  of the group and 
consequently  their  own reputations as members of that group. In  part,  this chapter will 
build on  the idea  of anonymous exempla  to demonstrate how  these illustrations could be 
used to depict  the unity  of a  particular  social  group or  even a  commonality  between 
different social groups.
Roller  labels this type of exemplum  as “illustrative” in  comparison  with  the 
“injunctive”  type on which  his model focuses: “An  example deployed illustratively  is,  or 
purports to be, an  utterly  typical instance of a  series of similar  objects,  a  ‘one among 
many.’ Conversely, an  example deployed as an injunction  is singled out  as distinctive,  as 
crucially  unlike other  objects,  especially  in  its ethical import (that is, it  is uniquely  good 
or  bad), and to single it out  amounts to demanding that other  objects should be like or 
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unlike this one.”245 His brief discussion, however, even here focuses on  the reproduction 
of exemplary  content, rather  than  other  functions that illustration may  serve. In  contrast, 
this chapter  charts some strategies that use such exempla precisely  to argue for  their 
accuracy  as illustrations. Romans sometimes used this approach to excuse the actions of 
an  individual as manifestations of universal  human  failings. In  many  cases broad claims 
of human fallibility  serve as a  defense against ad hominem  attacks by  defusing  moralistic 
claims within  a  broader  sense of ethical  flexibility.  The exceptional character  attributed 
to many  exemplary  figures may  also reveal the general  diffusion  of faults and 
consequently  urge moderation in  judgment  concerning  less exalted individuals.  The 
contrast  between  a  few  outstanding  individuals and the general  mass of humanity 
emphasizes the gap between  the typical Roman citizen and such  figures as Fabricius and 
Curius, and thus encourages an  audience to exercise leniency  in  judging others.  The 
satirists’ concerns with  potential audience reactions to their  criticisms demonstrate the 
flexibility  of the line between exceptional and universal.  These poets attempt to 
manipulate the tendency  of their  readers to identify  themselves with  the objects of satiric 
criticism. Finally, speakers and writers may  use illustrative exempla  to enhance the 
overall  reputation  of a  social group (typically  their  own social group).  In  one application 
of this tactic,  authors praise the less respected or  more obscure members of their 
audience,  and so improve their  own  reputation  by  reflection.  As a  whole,  these strategies 
encourage their  readers to understand themselves as part  of a  homogenous group and 
consequently to judge themselves and others on the basis of that perceived commonality.
3.1: Average vs. Extraordinary: Moral Decline or Moderation?
Roman  writers and speakers were frequently  concerned with  a decline that  they  claimed 
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245 Roller (2004) 52. Emphasis in the original. He describes this division as useful, but 
nevertheless recognizes that the two modes often intermingle.
to identify  in  their  society’s moral standards.246  Joy  Connolly  describes this sort of 
moralizing  as an  important  catalyst  for  creating  an atmosphere of political  consensus 
within  the entire Roman  people despite political and economic inequality. 247  Such 
discussions,  however,  do not  always take negative form. Sometimes, the perceived 
relaxation  from  ancestral severity  could be interpreted instead as a  welcome moderation. 
Speakers and writers sometimes insist  on the rarity  of exceptionally  virtuous exempla in 
order  to emphasize the fallibility  of everyone else.  The vast majority  of average people,  so 
the argument goes,  cannot justly  be held to the standard established by  exceptional 
cultural  heroes. The contrast  between average people and exceptional individual 
exempla depicts ethical  lapses as requiring  tolerance in all but  the most  egregious 
instances. Such  an  argument may  be used to argue against  the desire to act  upon harsh 
judgments,  as Cicero does in  his defense of Caelius (Pro Caelio  39-40).  This tactic 
positions the major  historical-mythical exempla  as nearly  unachievable ideals. A  related 
pattern  of argument uses the less reputable acts of otherwise idolized cultural figures to 
demonstrate the rarity  of complete perfection.  Valerius Maximus, for  example,  includes a 
chapter  that  focuses on various men – including  Scipio Africanus, Fabius Maximus 
Allobrogicus, Catulus and Sulla  – who left behind dissolute youths to become important 
military  and political  figures (6.9).  This idea  exerts a  leveling influence, insisting that 
even  those who might  be considered exceptional were neither  always nor  completely  free 
of human failings.
At times, the assumption  of widespread moral  decline could be directed less 
toward moralistic judgment than  to excusing contemporary  individuals for  lapses in 
behavior.  In  his defense of Caelius, for  example,  Cicero defends the training he gave his 
protégé by  contrasting  what he paints as an  unobtainable ideal established by  the great 
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246 Edwards (1993) discusses the patterns taken by this frequent concern. See 1-33 for an 
overview of the Roman focus on immorality and moral decline. See also Corbeill (1996) 
104-5, 128-31.
247 Connolly (2007) 58-65.
political and military  figures of the Roman  past  with  the best that  may  be expected from 
the people of his time. He builds his argument on  the idea  of applying  moderation,  both 
in  the course of living  one’s own life  and in  judging  others (here Caelius). Cicero 
distinguishes between  the few  who are able to remove themselves completely  from 
pleasure in  their  pursuit  of duty  and the general body  of people, stating about the 
former: “Of this sort I reckon were those men  like Camillus, Fabricius,  Curius and all 
those who made this city  so great  from  the smallest beginnings.  But these sorts of virtue 
are scarcely  found now  not  only  in  our  own characters but even  in  books”  (Ex hoc  genere 
illos fuisse  arbitror Camillos, Fabricios, Curios, omnisque eos qui haec ex minimis  tanta 
fecerunt.  Verum haec genera virtutum non solum in moribus nostris  sed vix iam  in 
libris  reperiuntur, Cael.  39-40).  Cicero stresses the exceptional character  of the named 
exemplars to draw  a  clear  distinction  between  such  individual cultural heroes and the 
general mass of good but imperfect men.
Prior  to making  this specific contrast,  Cicero carefully  depicts the  abstract  version 
of the ideal represented by  Camillus,  Fabricius and Curius in  such strict  terms as to 
render the idea of being such a person incredibly onerous:
If,  judges,  there were any  man  with  such  strength  of mind and such  an innate 
disposition for  manliness and restraint  that he would spurn  all pleasures and 
complete the whole course of his life in  exertion  of the body  and striving  of the 
mind,  a  man whom  neither  rest  nor relaxation  nor  the inclinations of his 
contemporaries nor  diversions nor  feasting  would delight, who would think that 
nothing in  life  should be sought  except that which  is bound together with  praise 
and with  worthiness,  in  my  opinion I think  that  this man has been  endowed and 
equipped with some sort of divine gifts.
Ego, si quis,  iudices, hoc  robore animi atque hac indole  virtutis  ac continentiae 
fuit ut respueret omnis voluptates  omnemque vitae suae cursum  in labore 
corporis  atque in animi contentione conficeret, quem  non quies, non remissio, 
non aequalium studia, non ludi,  non convivium  delectaret,  nihil in vita 
expetendum putaret nisi quod esset cum  laude et cum  dignitate coniunctum, 
hunc mea sententia divinis quibusdam bonis instructum atque ornatum puto. 
      (Cael. 39)
Cicero begins with  broad terms of praise before narrowing  the picture by  enumerating 
the limits these incredible men  impose upon themselves.  He tempers general types of 
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praise — “such strength  of mind and such an  innate disposition for  manliness and 
restraint”  (hoc robore animi atque  hac  indole virtutis  ac continentiae) — with 
descriptions of what  must  be rejected to devote oneself so completely  to public service — 
“he would spurn  all  pleasures” (respueret omnis  voluptates) and be “a man  whom 
neither  rest  nor  relaxation  nor  the inclinations of his contemporaries nor  diversions nor 
feasting  would delight”  (quem non quies,  non remissio,  non aequalium studia, non ludi, 
non convivium  delectaret).248 While these requirements do align  with  traditional  Roman 
notions of virtuous service to the city  and its people,  Cicero focuses relentlessly  on  the 
negative aspects of the definition.  He lists at  length  what this man  must not  do, what he 
must  reject,  but  elides almost  all positive aspects.  In  this almost  grotesquely  exaggerated 
construction, such cultural  heroes become little more than  joyless workhorses, forever 
toiling  away  without  rest.  Cicero presents the virtues of these great  men  of Roman 
history  in  a  manner  that  is consonant  with  familiar moralizing tropes, but he amplifies 
and combines them  in  such  a  way  as to make the composite image an  unattractive model 
for living.
This emphasis on  rejecting any  sort of pleasure leads into a  brief answering 
discussion of how  various philosophical schools find a  role for  pleasure in  a  virtuous life. 
As I noted above,  Cicero describes the disappearance of such  single-minded refusal as 
encompassing both  the social and intellectual spheres: “these sorts of virtue are scarcely 
found now  not only  in  our own  characters but  even in  books”  (haec genera virtutum  non 
solum in moribus  nostris  sed vix iam  in libris  reperiuntur, Cael.  40).  In  the following 
sentence, Cicero notes that in line with  the decline in  personal  behaviors the sentiments 
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248 Edwards (1993) 23 briefly discusses the linkage between intellectual activities, such 
as literature and contemplation, and pleasure as a moral problem for Romans.
expressed in  Greek  philosophy  have changed as well.249 On  another  level, this movement 
from  observable social activities to descriptions in  books mirrors the ranking  of exempla 
described by  many  ancient  texts. Seneca,  for  example,  argues that, while reading  books 
provides a  substitute should live exempla be  unavailable,  personal observation  is the 
most effective and direct  path to knowledge: “Nevertheless the living voice and social 
interaction  will  benefit  you more than  discussion; you  ought to come into the actual 
presence,  first  because people trust their  eyes more than  their  ears,  second because the 
journey  through precepts is long, but  the one through  exempla is quick  and 
efficient”  (Plus tamen tibi et viva vox et convictus  quam oratio proderit; in rem 
praesentem venias oportet, primum quia homines  amplius  oculis quam auribus 
credunt, deinde quia longum iter est per praecepta,  breve et efficax per exempla,  Sen., 
Ep.  6.5).250 As Cicero presents his contemporary  world in  the pro Caelio, nearly  everyone 
has ceased to reproduce or  even  represent  models of strict,  ascetic  service to the 
Republic. His statement describes a  growing  lack  of ascetic  exempla  that might  inhabit 
the thought  world of his contemporaries.  As his account  subsequently  progresses from 
lived Roman  reality  to Greek philosophy  and finally  to the enticements of nature,  he 
renders this concept  of ascetic devotion  to duty  increasingly  remote from  his audience. 
Of course, the argumentative thrust  of this passage requires that the judges still 
recognize models like Fabricius, Camillus and Curius, but also that  they  be prepared to 
imagine such  men as incompatible with  modern  life.  By  defining  such figures with  the 
extreme image of a  man  who rejects any  and every  form  of pleasurable sensory 
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249 Cicero expands this description to include both Romans and Greeks in the general 
decline, although with typical Roman condescension Cicero claims the Greeks only ever 
obtained those virtues in words, not in deeds: Chartae quoque quae illam pristinam 
severitatem continebant obsoleverunt; neque solum apud nos qui hanc sectam 
rationemque vitae re magis quam verbis secuti sumus sed etiam apud Graecos, 
doctissimos homines, quibus, cum facere non possent, loqui tamen et scribere honeste et 
magnifice licebat, alia quaedam mutatis Graeciae temporibus praecepta exstiterunt, 
Cael. 40. On the contrast between Greek words and Roman deeds, see also Edwards 
(1993) 22-23 with n. 75.
250 I discuss this letter more extensively in section 0.1.
experience, Cicero exaggerates a  traditional moralizing  suspicion  of pleasure into the 
image of an  almost  pathological  refusal.  He pushes the image of such  model  citizens 
toward the idea of fanatical asceticism  in order  to create a  wider  space in  which  to depict 
Caelius as a  moderate man  who has been  reasonable  in  his pursuit  of youthful pleasures, 
rather than as the libertine described by his opponents. 251
Having  established this sense of remoteness from  his contemporary  world, Cicero 
imagines the reaction  such a  figure would occasion  if one existed.  Here he describes 
essentially  an absent  exemplum,  a  model who cannot be observed in  society  but rather  is 
almost  purely  theoretical. What would such  a contemporary  figure look  like,  and how 
would others react to his existence? Once again  Cicero defines this person  in  negative 
terms, enumerating each  of the five senses to depict someone who rejects any  pleasant 
experience: “Therefore if by  chance you  will find anyone who would reject  the beauty  of 
things with  his eyes, who would not be captivated by  any  scent, touch  or  taste,  who 
would shut out everything that  is sweet  from  his ears, I perhaps and a  few  others will 
think that the gods are kind to this person, but  most  people will  think  that  they  are angry 
at  him” (Quam  ob rem si quem forte inveneritis  qui aspernetur oculis  pulchritudinem 
rerum, non odore ullo, non tactu,  non sapore capiatur, excludat auribus omnem 
suavitatem, huic homini ego fortasse et pauci deos  propitios, plerique  autem iratos 
putabunt,  Cael. 42).  Cicero frames his description  of this ascetic  wonder  with  the two 
most prominent  senses — sight  and hearing — and defines their  objects with  widely 
applicable, moral ly  neutral  terms of aesthetic  value: “the beauty  of 
things”  (pulchritudinem  rerum) and “everything  that  is sweet”  (omnem suavitatem).  In 
this way  he positions the idea  of such  cultural heroes as rejecting  one system  of values 
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251 Compare Edwards (1993) 179. At 189-90 she discusses the same argument for 
moderation in satire, focusing on the financial aspects of pleasure and vice: “Roman 
satirists, in particular, do not condemn all pleasures in themselves but offer an 
alternative model of the life of pleasures (in moderation) which does not require ruinous 
expense.” She cites Hor. Sat. 2.2, 2.7; Juv. 11 and 14.
(aesthetics) in  favor of complete devotion  to another.  In  depicting these competing 
claims, however,  he casts the conflict  almost entirely  in  aesthetic or  sensual terms, and 
thus ensures that  the traditional ideal of devoted service to the Republic  appears 
inadequate. While Cicero is careful  throughout this passage to figure his remarks 
ostensibly  as praise for the traditional model of citizenship — note for example how  he 
includes himself in  this final  statement  among  the few  who would recognize the true 
value of this ascetic workhorse: “I perhaps and a  few  others will  think that the gods are 
kind to this person”  (huic homini ego fortasse et pauci deos  propitios… putabunt) — he 
focuses his comments in  such  a  way  as to render this model  decidedly  uncomfortable  as a 
pattern  of living. In  conclusion he recommends rejecting the narrow  definition  of virtue 
he has so carefully  crafted — “Therefore let  this deserted and untended path, now  shut  in 
with  boughs and thickets,  be left  behind” (Ergo haec  deserta via et inculta atque 
interclusa iam  frondibus  et virgultis  relinquatur,  Cael.  42) — in  favor  of a  moderation 
that  allows time for relaxation  and pleasure, provided no real harm  is done.252 He urges 
that  such  license should be given to youth,  in  particular  to Caelius’s activities as a  youth. 
Through  this discussion,  Cicero has managed to transform  the exempla of Camillus, 
Fabricius, and “all those who made these things so great  from  the smallest 
beginnings” (omnisque eos qui haec  ex minimis tanta fecerunt,  Cael.  39) into an 
unpleasantly  narrow  path  of living in  contrast  to a  more modern  idea  of moderate 
balance between duty  and recreation,  all the while claiming to praise ancient  austerity 
and to accept  pleasure only  grudgingly.  Thus in  his defense of Caelius,  Cicero transforms 
the Roman  trope of moral decline into a  welcome relaxation  toward a  balanced life of 
moderation.
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252 Cael. 42. This thought echoes an earlier statement of the idea at Cael. 28. See also 
Edwards (1993) 179 on this theme and the measurement of the damage caused by 
pleasure throughout the speech primarily in financial terms.
In  his defense of the consul-designate L.  Licinius Murena, Cicero mounts a 
similar  defense of moderation  in  order  to refute the authority  of Cato the Younger.  This 
passage relies more on a gently  satirical presentation of its target  than  on  the strictly 
circumscribed praise that provided the motive engine in  the pro Caelio.  Once again the 
overall  argument encourages moderation,  but  here the orator  caricatures his opponent 
as a rigid doctrinarian.  Just  as in  the pro  Caelio,  Cicero combines ostensible praise for  a 
highly  respected figure with  a  strategy  designed to undercut  that respect. In a  strategy 
unlike that  in  his defense of Caelius where Cicero twists about the image of moral 
decline,  the orator  here ignores any  such  notion, focusing  instead on  the importation  of 
Stoic doctrine as overriding  a more beneficial  Roman comity  and thus fostering  an  overly 
severe morality  expressed through  Cato’s public  bearing. Cicero distinguishes Cato’s 
innate character  from  the supposedly  external influence of Stoicism: “In  the case of M. 
Cato, judges, know  that  these good things, that  we view  as divine and outstanding, 
belong  to the man  himself; the things that  we sometimes find lacking, all  of these are not 
derived from  his nature, but from  his teacher”  (In M.  Catone, iudices,  haec bona,  quae 
videmus  divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse  propria; quae nonnumquam  requirimus, 
ea sunt omnia non a natura,  verum  a magistro,  Mur. 61). This comment leads into a 
satirical  exposition  of several  Stoic paradoxes and doctrines,  phrased in  such  a  way  as to 
accentuate the apparent  absurdity  of these propositions (61-62).  In  one of the more 
broadly  comic touches,  for  example, Cicero illustrates the Stoic  claim  that  all crimes are 
equal by  equating  parricide with  untimely  pullicide: “And the man who strangles a 
poultry-cock when  it  is not  necessary  does no less wrong than  the man  who strangles his 
father”  (nec minus  delinquere  eum,  qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit,  quam 
eum, qui patrem suffocaverit, Mur. 61). 
Cicero suggests that the teachings of the Academic or  Peripatetic  schools would 
have proven  more beneficial  to Cato,  although, in  a  construction  he repeats several times 
throughout the passage, he defines the potential change as very  slight  in comparison to 
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the innate virtues of Cato’s character: “If some chance had led you  with  that  nature of 
yours to these teachers, indeed you  would not be a  better  man nor  a  braver  nor a more 
sober  nor  a  juster  one (for  you  could not be better),  but  you  would be slightly  more 
inclined to mildness”  (Hos ad magistros  si qua te fortuna, Cato,  cum  ista natura 
detulisset,  non tu quidem melior esses nec fortior nec temperantior nec  iustior (neque 
enim  esse potes), sed paulo ad lenitatem propensior,  Mur. 64). 253 In  this manner, Cicero 
repeatedly  insists on  the perfection  of the younger  Cato’s innate virtues,  but he devotes a 
much  larger  portion  of his argument  to the veneer  of supposed Stoic doctrine that, he 
claims, has marred Cato’s otherwise perfect character.  These protestations of admiration 
dress up the satire of the younger  man’s Stoic beliefs as generally  respectful advice from 
an  older  friend.254  Cicero even  uses his advantage in  age to present  philosophical 
precepts as merely  a  device used by  youth  to bolster  its uncertainty  about  its own 
abilities. In  a condescending bit  of mock advice,  he presents himself when  he was 
younger  as having done the same thing  he implies that Cato is doing: “Indeed I will 
confess,  Cato,  that  I also in  my  youth  mistrusted my  own ability  and sought the aid of 
doctrine”  (fatebor enim, Cato, me quoque in adulescentia diffisum ingenio meo 
quaesisse adiumenta doctrinae,  Mur. 63).  Just  as in  the pro Caelio where Cicero 
presents his discussion  ostensibly  as praise for antique austerity  while undermining it, 
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253 Cicero makes comments of this form three other times in the passage from Mur. 
60-66: verissime dixerim peccare te nihil neque ulla in re te esse huius modi, ut 
corrigendus potius quam leviter inflectendus esse videare, 60; In M. Catone, iudices, 
haec bona, quae videmus divina et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria; quae 
nonnumquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a natura, verum a magistro, 61 (cited 
above); Sed si illius comitatem et facilitatem tuae gravitati severitatique adperseris, 
non ista quidem erunt meliora, quae nunc sunt optima, sed certe condita iucundius, 66 
(discussed below).
254 Cicero in fact opens this section of the speech with a reference to the instruction of 
Achilles by either Chiron or Phoenix: ‘Non multa peccas,’ inquit illi fortissimo viro 
senior magister, ‘sed peccas; te regere possum.’ Mur. 60. The quotation is ascribed to 
Attius’s tragedy Myrmidones (Freese 1967, ad loc.). Cato (b. 95 BCE) was just over a 
decade younger than Cicero (b. 106 BCE).
here he constantly  praises Cato while  concurrently  mocking his overly  careful devotion  to 
living by philosophical doctrine. 255
Through  a  comparison  with  Cato’s great  grandfather, Cato the Elder, Cicero 
defines moderation  and affability  as native and necessary  parts of the Roman 
character. 256 His depiction  of the well-known censor  strongly  contrasts with  the frequent 
representations of him  as a  model  of strict Roman morality.  Valerius Maximus,  for 
example,  refers to the elder  in  one passage as “both  Censor and Cato, a  twofold 
exemplum  of severity”  (et censor et Cato, duplex severitatis  exemplum,  2.9.3).257 Cicero, 
however, reverses this depiction  through his contrast  between the censor  and his great 
grandson.  He argues that  the younger  Cato has exceeded the normal bounds of severity 
through  his adherence to Stoic doctrine.  Cicero briefly  mentions several famous Romans 
of earlier generations — Scipio Aemilianus,  C.  Laelius (cos. 140 BCE), L.  Furius Philus 
(cos.  136  BCE) and C. Sulpicius Galus (cos. 166  BCE) — as models for  uniting interest in 
Stoic philosophy  with  a more reasonable and pleasant demeanor (Mur.  66). He then 
introduces the elder  Cato as a  domestic,  and therefore particularly  powerful, exemplum 
in  order  to instruct the younger  man  in  the proper  balance between  severity  and 
moderation.  Cicero’s language here suggests that  this reference replies to Cato’s own  use 
of his great-grandfather in  his speech for  the  prosecution. 258  Cicero’s comparison 
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255 Cato is reported to have responded to this speech with a comment, perhaps sarcastic, 
on Cicero’s wit: 0O4 .[4 `$0K4$ Z",' %'")&'%'$,"40" !#O- 0._- !"#>40"- &7!&Y4! a 
b4%#&-, c- (&/.Y.4 d!"0.4 eU.)&4, Plut. Cat. 21. The Latin translation consul urbanus 
suggests a pun on the office of praetor urbanus.
256 Later in the speech Cicero will identify and praise the Roman ability to properly mix 
work and pleasure by comparison with the more severe customs of Sparta and Crete: 
Neque tamen Lacedaemonii, auctores istius vitae atque orationis, qui cotidianis epulis 
in robore accumbunt, neque vero Cretes, quorum nemo gustavit umquam cubans, 
melius quam Romani homines, qui tempora voluptatis laborisque dispertiunt, res 
publicas suas retinuerunt; quorum alteri uno adventu nostri exercitus deleti sunt, alteri 
nostri imperii praesidio disciplinam suam legesque conservant, Mur. 74.
257 The typical picture of Cato the Elder’s severity is also reflected in the use modern 
scholarship makes of him as a representative early font of Roman moralism, e.g. 
Edwards (1993) 1-2.
258 De cuius praestanti virtute cum vere graviterque diceres, domesticum te habere 
dixisti exemplum ad imitandum. Mur. 66.
between  the characters of the two Catos positions the elder in  a somewhat  unexpected 
role as a  model  of comity  and affability.259 He describes the relationship between the two 
men  as more than  simply  the one emulating  the exemplum of the other,  and he links the 
younger  Cato’s innately  virtuous nature to his descent  from  his great-grandfather.260 
Consequently  an  even  closer  resemblance to his revered ancestor  will smooth the Stoic’s 
rough edges: “But if you  sprinkle that  man’s courtesy  and social ease on  your  gravity  and 
severity,  those qualities of yours at  least  will not be better,  which  are already  the best,  but 
certainly  they  will  be more happily  seasoned” (Sed si illius  comitatem et facilitatem  tuae 
gravitati severitatique adperseris,  non ista quidem erunt meliora, quae nunc sunt 
optima, sed certe condita iucundius,  Mur.  66). Cicero thus replies to Cato’s use of his 
great  grandfather  as an  exemplum  of severe judgment, by  highlighting  those other 
qualities which the young  Stoic  has failed to imitate.  While the strictness and severity  of 
the elder  form  the basis for  his more frequent  role as an  exemplum  elsewhere,  Cicero 
here implicitly  suggests that by  too close adherence to those qualities alone his 
descendant may fail to truly emulate his ancestor’s greatness.
Cicero returns to this theme later  in  the speech,  introducing  another  exemplum 
to illustrate the incompatibility  between  the strictest  representatives of Stoicism  and 
success in  Roman politics.  In 129  BCE, Q. Aelius Tubero offended the Roman  people 
during  a public funeral  banquet  for  his maternal  uncle Scipio Africanus Aemilianus by 
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259 Perhaps, however, we might consider Cato’s reaction to meeting a man leaving a 
brothel with praise for the benefits of visiting prostitutes at Hor. Serm. 1.2.31-35 as an 
example of this comity. In this brief anecdote, Horace portrays Cato as upholding Roman  
morality not by stern reproof but rather by ratifying the other man’s choice of sexual 
partner:
quidam notus homo cum exiret fornice, ‘macte
virtute esto’ inquit sententia dia Catonis;
‘nam simul ac venas inflavit taetra libido,
huc iuvenes aequom est descendere, non alienas
permolere uxores.’
260 See Hölkeskamp (1996) 319-21 and Roller (2004) 24-25 on the Roman view that 
character traits run in families. Suetonius, Tiberius 2 on the arrogance of the gens 
Claudia provides a clear illustration of the perception of particular traits as family 
characteristics.
the extreme simplicity  of the way  he decorated the table: “That  man,  a  very  educated 
person  and a  Stoic,  covered Punic-style wooden  benches with  goatskins and set  out 
Samian  earthenware vessels,  as if Diogenes the Cynic had died and it  was not  the death 
of the divine man  Africanus being honored”  (ille,  homo eruditissimus ac  Stoicus,  stravit 
pelliculis  haedinis  lectulos  Punicanos  et exposuit vasa Samia, quasi vero esset Diogenes 
Cynicus mortuus  et non divini hominis  Africani mors  honestaretur,  Mur.  75).  Cicero 
uses this earlier  exponent  of Stoic strictness to illustrate the potential conflict  between 
Cato’s Stoicism  and his future success in  election to political  office. 261 He labels Tubero’s 
cheapness “perverse philosophy”  (perversam sapientiam, 75),  and proceeds to explain 
that  there is a  time and place for everything: “The Roman people hate  private luxury,  but 
love public  magnificence; they  do not  love extravagant  banquets,  but they  love stinginess 
and incivility  much  less; they  distinguish  the interchange of work and pleasure by  the 
measure of duties and occasions”  (Odit populus Romanus privatam  luxuriam, publicam 
magnificentiam  diligit; non amat profusas  epulas, sordes  et inhumanitatem  multo 
minus; distinguit ratione officiorum ac temporum  vicissitudinem laboris  ac voluptatis, 
Mur. 76).
Valerius Maximus develops this argument  into a  brief rubric. He uses an 
abbreviated paraphrase of Cicero’s discussion  of Tubero in  the pro  Murena  as the first 
instance in his section on electoral defeats (7.5.1).  Cato the Younger’s defeat in  running 
for  the praetorship (55  BCE) provides the final  exemplum (7.5.6).  Tubero’s position  at 
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261 Sen. Ep. 95.72-73 makes rather different use of this exemplum. He includes Tubero in  
a list of other great men who should be imitated and claims that his earthenware vessels 
will live for all time. His argument seems to come in direct reply to Cicero’s emphasis in 
the pro Murena on acting in such a way as to increase or maintain popularity: … 
Tuberonis ligneos lectos, cum in publicum sterneret, haedinasque pro stragulis pelles et 
ante ipsius Iovis cellam adposita conviviis vasa fictilia. Quid aliud paupertatem in 
Capitolio consecrare? Ut nullum aliud factum eius habeam quo illum Catonibus 
inseram, hoc parum credimus? Censura fuit illa, non cena. O quam ignorant homines 
cupidi gloriae quid illa sit aut quemadmodum petenda! Illo die populus Romanus 
multorum supellectilem spectavit, unius miratus est. Omnium illorum aurum 
argentumque fractum est et [in] milliens conflatum, at omnibus saeculis Tuberonis 
fictilia durabunt.
the opening,  somewhat  outside the otherwise roughly  chronological sequence of this 
section,  along  with  the closing position  of Cato’s defeat  may  derive from  the influence of 
Cicero’s comments on the difficulties in  reconciling  Stoic severity  with electoral  success. 
Cicero’s use of Tubero’s exemplum  to advise Cato is answered by  the result  of Cato’s 
failure to heed that advice.  Valerius describes this section  as encouraging  equanimity  and 
comforting  those who are attempting to obtain political office. These events are not 
primarily  models to be imitated, but illustrations of how  things are. By  recalling  the 
setbacks suffered by  men  who later  accomplished great things, Valerius provides a  model 
for  hope: “Depicting  the circumstances of elections will  usefully  prepare those embarking 
on  a  political  path  to endure electoral defeats more bravely,  because,  with  the rejections 
of very  famous men placed before their  eyes,  they  will seek office not  so much  with  less 
hope as with  more sensible judgment of mind”  (Campi quoque repraesentata condicio 
ambitiosam ingredientes  viam ad fortius sustinendos parum  prosperos comitiorum 
eventus  utiliter instruxerit, quia propositis ante oculos  clarissimorum  virorum repulsis 
ut non minore cum  spe honores ita prudentiore cum  animi iudicio  petent, 7.5.praef.). 
The instances that follow  do not for the most  part  emphasize continued determination 
following  a defeat,  but  instead simply  contrast  the fact  of defeat  with  subsequent 
accomplishments.262
Valerius provides similar comforting  illustrations in  other sections.  Sometimes 
the less admirable or successful actions of well-known  figures could foster  a  sense of 
calm  or  reduce anxiety  about  such  matters, including  disreputable youthful  behavior. 263 
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262 The one exception to the general pattern of this section is Val. Max. 7.5.3: Nullus 
error talis in L. Aemilio Paullo conspectus est, sed tamen aliquotiens frustra 
consulatum petiit, idemque, cum iam campum repulsis suis fatigasset, bis consul et 
censor factus amplissimum etiam dignitatis gradum obtinuit. cuius virtutem iniuriae 
non fregerunt sed acuerunt, quoniam quidem ipsa nota accensam cupiditatem summi 
honoris ardentiorem ad comitia detulit, ut populum, quia nobilitatis splendore et animi 
bonis movere non potuerat, pertinacia vinceret.
263 Multum animis hominum et fiduciae adicere et sollicitudinis detrahere potest 
morum ac fortunae in claris viris recognita mutatio, sive nostros status sive 
proximorum ingenia contemplemur, Val. Max. 6.9.praef.
For  example, under  the rubric  “Concerning  the change of character  or  fortune” (de 
mutatione morum  aut fortunae, 6.9),  Valerius includes a  series of famous men who 
become important  political or  military  figures following  disreputable youths,  notably  the 
elder  Scipio Africanus, Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus (cos.  121),  Q.  Lutatius Catulus 
(cos.  78) and Sulla  (Val.  Max.  6.9.2-6).264 These narratives provide comforting patterns 
by  which people may  hope for future improvements: “for  when by  witnessing  the 
fortunes of others we see that fame has emerged from  humble and despised 
circumstances, what will result  except that we will  always think  better  about  ourselves, 
remembering that it  is foolish  to condemn  ourselves beforehand to unhappiness and 
meanwhile to change hope,  which  rightly  is cherished even  when it  is uncertain, into 
certain despair?”  (nam  cum aliorum fortunas spectando  ex condicione abiecta atque 
contempta emersisse claritatem  videamus,  quid aberit quin et ipsi meliora de  nobis 
semper cogitemus, memores stultum esse perpetuae infelicitatis  se  praedamnare 
spemque,  quae etiam  incerta recte fovetur, interdum certam in desperationem 
convertere? 6.9.praef.).  Throughout  this section,  Valerius treats change in  personal 
character  and change in  external  circumstances as almost equivalent. This combination 
likely  reflects the potential field of concerns that Valerius describes in his introduction: 
“whether  we examine our  own situations or  the natures of those closest  to us”  (sive 
nostros  status sive proximorum  ingenia contemplemur,  6.9.praef.). These illustrations 
of change in  character  are most  probably  directed toward those concerned about 
relatives or  friends.  Because these exempla would thus alleviate anxiety  about  the 
character  or  actions of someone else,  such  narratives do not present  an opportunity  for 
conscious emulation  in  the way  exempla in  a  more injunctive mode do.  The possibility  of 
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264 Cf. Gell. 7.8.5, Plut. Sull. 1f., Sall. Iug. 95, Firm. Math. 1.7.28. Concerning Fabius 
Maximus, Shackleton Bailey (2000) ad loc. suggests that his presence in this passage 
may be a confusion with another Fabius: “His earlier bad reputation is attested only 
here, perhaps by confusion with his cousin by adoption Eburnus, if Eburnus is indeed 
the Fabius Maximus of VM 2.7.3.”
repetition may  encourage a  sense of hope, but the reader  cannot  directly  effect a  outcome 
parallel to the illustration.
Whether  these arguments transform  exemplary  figures into unobtainable ideals 
or  bring them  down  to earth  as more maculate figures,  they  foreground a  process of 
reevaluating  the moral expectations for the conduct of Roman  citizens. The Ciceronian 
passages I discuss above represent  an  argumentative form  of exemplary  illustration, 
while Valerius Maximus provides illustrations in  more of a  ‘self-help’ mode. We have 
previously  seen  a  similar  practice of undercutting  exemplary  conclusions in  Phaedrus’s 
tactic of contradicting  the lessons of his own  fables (e.g.  Phaedrus 2.1  and 3.4.  I discuss 
these poems in  section 2.3  of the previous chapter). 265 These discussions emphasize the 
wide diffusion of imperfection  by  carefully  circumscribing  the possibility  of moral 
achievement.  In the following  section  I discuss the mirror  image of this argument: 
illustrating the prevalence of human fallibility through typical examples.
3.2: Exemplum Hominis: Describing Human Fallibility through Exempla.
In  discussing  Roman  views on  immorality,  scholars have more often  focused on 
condemnations of immoral behavior  than on the corresponding defenses arguing either 
against overly  severe judgments or  for  more lenient acceptance of human  foibles.  As I 
have discussed in  the previous section,  Roman  writers and speakers sometimes mitigate 
the perceived strictness of archaic morals either  by  depicting  such  severity  as alien to 
contemporary  life or  by  diluting the aura  of Rome’s cultural heroes with  less admirable 
aspects of their  life.  In  this section  I examine another  aspect of such  ameliorative 
arguments: exempla of imperfect people used to illustrate the wide diffusion  of such 
behavior.  Writers and speakers use such  exempla  to argue for  an  exchange of mutual 
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265 Compare Martial 1.8, where the poet advises a friend to imitate the beliefs of Cato and 
Thrasea Paetus, but not their deaths: Nolo virum facili redemit qui sanguine famam, | 
hunc volo laudari qui sine morte potest, Mart. 1.8.5-6
tolerance in  social  situations when different  tastes or  attitudes result in  varying  reactions 
to persons or  events. Likewise broader  discussions of human  faults may  structure social 
interactions around the shared recognition  of the need for  patience with  one another’s 
weaknesses.
Writers and speakers who urge moderation  in  judgment frequently  figure 
fallibility  as an  integral aspect  of human  nature.  Depending  on the structure of their 
arguments,  these authors may  label  their  subjects, their  audience and also themselves as 
homines, that  is “people”  in  an ethically  neutral  sense. 266 Texts urging  moderation in 
judgment  often  define a  reciprocal  relationship between  the notion of fallibility  inherent 
in  the term  homo  and the idea  of humane conduct  (humanitas) that  they  sometimes 
adduce as the correct  response to such  failings. Within  such  arguments,  average persons 
engaged in common  failings demonstrate the universality  of human  frailty.  Exempla 
used in this fashion  may  feature unnamed actors in order  to avoid a  blatant  show  of 
hypocrisy  in  condemning  others while arguing for  moderation. References to groups of 
type figures or  even  to all of humanity  play  a  similar  role by  diffusing the implied blame 
across a  wide number  of persons.  At  times writers or  speakers explicitly  signal that  their 
refusal to name names forms an  integral part  of their  argument: by  offering  the mask of 
anonymity  to these exempla  of ethical failure, the authors model  the moderation  of 
judgment  they  encourage.267 In  making  such  arguments, writers and speakers stress the 
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266 See Santoro-l’Hoir (1992), esp. 1-2, 9-10 and 158-59 on contrast between the status 
word vir and the neutral or pejorative homo, and on the various uses of homo.
267 We have already seen part of this pattern in Cicero’s reference to important men who 
had disreputable youths in the pro Caelio. (I discuss this passage in section 2.1 of the last 
chapter.) There Cicero left it to his audience to find examples for themselves, rather than 
single out anyone for judgment: Ac multi et nostra et patrum maiorumque memoria, 
iudices, summi homines et clarissimi cives fuerunt, quorum cum adulescentiae 
cupiditates defervissent, eximiae virtutes firmata iam aetate exstiterunt. Ex quibus 
neminem mihi libet nominare; vosmet vobiscum recordamini. Nolo enim cuiusquam 
fortis ac illustris viri ne minimum quidem erratum cum maxima laude coniungere. Cic. 
Cael. 43. The anonymity of the actors here may also allow auditors or readers to imagine 
themselves more easily in the position of the negative exemplar. Pliny also makes 
frequent use of this tactic: see e.g. my discussions of  Ep. 8.22, 9.12 and 9.26 which also 
appear in section 2.1.
fallibility  that both  the moral  judge and the object of criticism  share.  Horace,  for 
example,  defines the problem  as an  exchange of tolerance for  personal  blemishes: “A 
person  who asks a  friend not to find fault  with  his boils should pardon  that  man’s warts: 
it  is just that  someone seeking  pardon  for  faults grant  pardon in  return”  (qui ne 
tuberibus propriis  offendat amicum | postulat, ignoscet verrucis  illius: aequum  est | 
peccatis  veniam poscentem  reddere rursus,  Hor.  Sat.  1.3.73-75). The need for  such 
tolerance and leniency  forms a  significant strand in  advice on  friendship and other  social 
relationships.
Giving advice,  moral or  otherwise,  is a  common  activity  in  Roman  writing. One 
aspect  of this,  of course,  is the concern  with  the public  regulation  of personal  behavior 
which  is connected above all with  the office of the censor. Citing  Plutarch’s description  of 
the office,  Edwards notes that  “concern  for  what  might be termed private morality  was 
seen by  Greeks familiar  with  Roman  culture,  as well as by  Romans themselves,  as a 
distinctively  Roman  characteristic.” 268  In  a  slightly  less formal  capacity, Anthony 
Corbeill identifies an “ethical  basis” to oratorical  invective that provides “an  extralegal 
means of enforcing  social codes.”269 Focusing more on the secondary  functions of this 
sort of ethical  discourse in  the Roman  republic, Joy  Connolly  describes moralism  in 
political speech  as essential both  for  transmuting  political  disagreement  into moral 
difference and for creating  a perception  of equality  between  the crowd and the elite 
speaker. 270 Reflecting  their  interest in  invective speech, these discussions of moralism  in 
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268 Edwards (1993) 30-31, citing Plut. Cat. mai. 16.1-2. See also 1-2 on the Roman view of 
themselves as correctors of morals.
269 Corbeill (1996) 19-20, along with 5-6. See, however, Arena (2007) 157-58 who 
qualifies Corbeill’s insistence on the reality and effectiveness of such invective in defining  
its target as a deviant and thus destroying his identity as a Roman citizen. 
270 Connolly (2007) 59: “moralist speech, by remaking the assembly in the forum or the 
crowd around the jury in the forum into a living microrepublic of virtue, constructs the 
ostensible equality of liberty in the republic, by rendering citizens as equal in their 
capacity as moral judges. This is the full significance of moralism in political discourse: 
it is proof and guarantor of republican liberty, because it creates the perception of 
equality.” See 58-65 for her full discussion of the function of moralism in political 
oratory.
the political  sphere focus almost  exclusively  on  moralistic  condemnation.  Theoretical 
discussion of free  speech  in  poetry  and private contexts sometimes takes a  more 
balanced view, partly  through  an interest  in  the topic of flattery  and friendship. Letters, 
such  as Seneca’s Epistulae Morales  and Pliny’s collection,  constitute an obvious medium 
in  which  to advise others.  We might also consider  the genre of satire,  concerned as it 
often  is with a  performance of moralistic reproach or  admonition, to function frequently 
as a  form  of advice poetry. 271 Exempla  frequently  play  a  role in  giving  advice. Augustus, 
for  instance, reportedly  culled his reading  for  useful sayings and exempla to send to 
friends, relatives and subordinates (Suetonius Div. Aug.  89). 272 In  a  private context,  both 
Seneca the younger  and Pliny  the younger  sometimes introduce exempla  to provide 
themselves with  opportunities for  dispensing  advice. 273  One recurrent  topic of advice 
centers on  the need to moderate judgments or  tolerate minor  offenses in  order  to 
encourage social  and familial concord.  These arguments follow  two basic patterns: an 
argument from  similarity  (we too have done or  might  do the same sort of actions we 
judge) or  from  mutual tolerance (tolerate others so that  they  will  tolerate you  in turn). 
These two forms construct  the relationship between  people and their faults or  vices in 
somewhat  different ways.  The argument  from  similarity  tends to assume that most 
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271 See e.g. Freudenberg (1993) 72-108 on Horace’s relationship to the iambic tradition 
and to theoretical discussions of invective or admonitory speech and Oliensis (1998) 
19-21. See also Hunter (1985), esp. 481-86 on Horace Epist. 1.18 in relation to 
philosophical theories of friendship.
272 See also Feldherr (1998) 35 on Vell. Pat. 2.126.4 discussing Augustus himself as an 
exemplum “stressing precisely the relationship between the exercise of imperium and 
instruction through exempla.” Braund (1988) 92-100 discusses advice given to provincial  
governors by both emperors and others from a number of sources including Cic. Q. Fr. 
1.1 and Pliny, Ep. 8.24 and the Panegyricus. Damon (1997) centers on the use of the 
stock figure of the parasite to express negative views of hierarchal social relationships in 
satire as well as comedy and oratory.
273 For Seneca, see e.g. Shelton (1995) on the use of exempla in the ad Marciam (She 
primarily deals with consolation as a form of instruction or therapy, but these are easily 
assimilated to the category of advice) and Ker (2009) 90-103, 105, 108-110 on 
consolation more broadly in Seneca’s work and 147-74 on philosophical instruction in 
the Epistulae Morales, focusing on the topic of death. For Pliny, see e.g. Ep. 2.6, 7.26, 
8.22, 9.12, 9.17. I discuss these letters in both section 2.1 of the previous chapter and this 
section.
people are generally  good but will make mistakes from  time to time. The argument for 
tolerance, on  the other  hand,  assumes that  minor faults or conflicting  preferences are 
constants of human  nature and therefore that everyone should accept these minor 
annoyances in one another for the sake of social harmony.
As we have seen in  the previous chapter  (section  2.1), the younger  Pliny 
repeatedly  uses exempla,  mostly  anonymous, as occasions for  dispensing advice to his 
friends. In letter  8.22  Pliny  discusses the relationship between judgment  and personal 
fallibility  in  general  terms. (I also discuss this letter  in  section  2.1  of the previous 
chapter.)  As he reveals in  closing,  the immediate inspiration  for  these reflections was an 
encounter  with a  certain  man  whose identity  Pliny  leaves ostentatiously  unmentioned in 
order  to depict  himself as virtuously  refraining  from  judgment.274  He introduces this 
discussion by  referring to a broad class of people,  instances of whom  he expects his 
readers to recall from  their  own  experience: “Are you  acquainted with  those men who, 
though  they  are slaves to every  passion,  rage at  the vices of others in  such  a way  as if they 
envied them, and punish  most  severely  those whom  they  most imitate?”  (Nostine hos  qui 
omnium  libidinum servi,  sic aliorum  vitiis  irascuntur quasi invideant, et gravissime 
puniunt, quos  maxime imitantur? 8.22.1).  Pliny  here frames the discussion  in  vivid 
terms with  the characterization  of these men as “slaves to every  passion”  (omnium 
libidinum servi) and the pair  of superlative adverbs that structure the closing  thought: 
“they  punish  most  severely  those whom  they  most  imitate”  (gravissime puniunt quos 
maxime imitantur).  He emphasizes the apparent envy  (quasi invideant) demonstrated 
by  this class of people in  order  to set  hypocrisy  and not  moral  judgment itself as the 
central  problem. By  stressing the conflict between immoral speakers and moralizing 
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274 Nuper quidam—sed melius coram; quamquam ne tunc quidem. Vereor enim ne id 
quod improbo consectari carpere referre huic quod cum maxime praecipimus 
repugnet. Quisquis ille qualiscumque sileatur, quem insignire exempli nihil, non 
insignire humanitatis plurimum refert. Ep. 8.22.4. Sherwin-White (1966) ad loc. “Pliny 
gives Rosianus a delicate lesson. The story is not taken up in any other letter.” My 
discussion of this letter in section 2.1 focuses primarily on this closing passage.
criticism, Pliny  thus insulates the expression  of moralism  itself from  the thrust  of his 
critique.  Speakers of this type are the central problem, not  the content  of their  speech. 
This form  of hypocrisy  is also recognized elsewhere,  as in  Valerius Maximus’s chapter  on 
those who themselves committed the same vices that  they  condemned in  others (qui 
quae in aliis  vindicarant ipsi commiserunt, 8.6). In  a letter  to Cicero, Caelius reports 
Appius Claudius’s hypocrisy  in  the exercise of the censorship in 50  BCE (Cic. ad Fam. 
8.14.4).  Quintilian also discusses accusing  someone for the same acts the accuser has 
committed (11.1.78). 275
In  his general treatment,  Pliny  defines the best  type of person  as one who never 
uses personal character  as a  license for  castigating  others: “I judge best and most  refined 
the man  who forgives others as if he  himself daily  does wrong, [and] refrains from 
wrongs as if he himself would forgive no one else”  (Atque ego optimum et 
emendatissimum existimo, qui ceteris  ita ignoscit, tamquam ipse cotidie peccet, ita 
peccatis  abstinet tamquam  nemini ignoscat, Ep.  8.22.2).  This “best  and most  refined” 
person  exactly  reverses the qualities that  Pliny  cites to identify  the class of men  he 
condemns. As in  his opening  question,  Pliny  once again  defines his best  man in 
superlative terms in  order  to delineate as incisively  as possible the behavior  he 
recommends. The closer  his readers are able to approach  this ideal in  their  own 
behavior,  the better  and more refined they  will be.  In  the overall  structure of his 
argument as well, Pliny  links the categories of tolerance and personal action  to 
emphasize only  the furthest ends of the spectrum: tolerant wrongdoers and virtuous 
scolds disappear  within  the rhetorical structure of this discussion. By  limiting  the 
identified categories of evaluation, he attempts to mold his own  self-presentation. As 
discussed in  the preceding  chapter,  Pliny’s comments on the anonymous man who 
inspired these reflections risk portraying  himself as judgmental, thus placing  him  in  the 
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275 Sen. Contr. 2.6 presents a more dramatic version of this conflict in which a father and 
son accuse each other of luxurious living.
unnamed category  of virtuous scold.  To avoid such  an impression, he frames his 
observations in  the most abstract, universalized form  available, using  an  anonymous 
exemplum  to avoid identifying  a  particular  target. This care for  self-presentation  reflects 
Pliny’s implicit purpose to present  himself as an  exemplum  of the correct  way  to convey 
moral judgment.
Pliny  cites Thrasea  Paetus as an authority  for  such  leniency  toward the faults of 
others: “let  us entrust  to memory  what the most gentle and because of this also the 
greatest  man  Thrasea  was frequently  accustomed to say: ‘A  person  who hates vices, hates 
people’”  (mandemusque memoriae quod vir mitissimus  et ob hoc  quoque maximus 
Thrasea crebro dicere solebat: ‘Qui vitia odit,  homines odit’,  8.22.3).276  Thrasea’s 
statement  defines vice as a  necessary  part  of being  human. Pliny’s superlative praise for 
this Stoic hero defines his greatness as a product of his gentleness: “the most  gentle and 
because of this also the greatest  man”  (vir mitissimus  et ob  hoc quoque maximus). 
Concerned as he is throughout this letter with  harmonious social dynamics,  Pliny  singles 
out gentleness — lenitas  (8.22.1) or  humanitas  (8.22.4) — as a  core value in  human 
interaction  and assigns this value first to Thrasea  and then in  closing  to himself.277 As 
faults are an integral aspect  of being a  human  person (homo),  a  sense of shared 
humanity  (humanitas) necessarily  mitigates the need to judge others. Instead,  Pliny 
suggests that  moral judgment is best applied only  to to oneself: “Therefore let us hold 
this idea  at  home or  in  public in  every  sort  of life, that  we should be implacable to 
ourselves,  but  easily  entreated even by  those people who do not know  how  to give pardon 
except to themselves”  (Proinde hoc domi hoc foris  hoc in omni vitae  genere  teneamus, 
ut nobis  implacabiles simus,  exorabiles istis etiam  qui dare  veniam  nisi sibi nesciunt, 
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276 Pliny also cites Thrasea elsewhere as an authority: Ep. 6.29 (on what types of cases a 
speaker should undertake). Quintilian Inst. 5.11.36-39 presents the use of such 
authoritative pronouncements as closely related to the use of exempla.
277 Quisquis ille qualiscumque sileatur, quem insignire exempli nihil, non insignire 
humanitatis plurimum refert. 8.22.4.
8.22.3).  He thus redirects moralist  discourse into a  practice of self-criticism. Pliny 
recommends policing  oneself here as the logical conclusion  of his definition  of the most 
refined man who “refrains from  wrongs as if he himself would forgive no one”  (ita 
peccatis  abstinet tamquam  nemini ignoscat,  Ep. 8.22.2). By  maintaining this distinction 
between  self-criticism  and the judgment  of others,  he attempts to reconcile moralism 
and moral tolerance. Pliny’s ideal person would act  as if subject  to the most severe 
criticism  while nonetheless adopting the posture of broad permissiveness.  Everyone 
should focus judgment  upon themselves and thus take up the role of their  own personal 
moral  critic as a  substitute for  wider  social  criticism. In  defining  this attitude through the 
contrast  between self-judgment  and the judgment  of others,  Pliny  establishes this 
practice as a  means of forestalling external judgments by  preempting  opportunities for 
criticism. Not  only  will  refraining  from  criticizing others encourage reciprocal  tolerance, 
but severe  self-criticism  limits the potential material for  others to judge while 
simultaneously forestalling the possibility of descending into complete amorality.
In  Satire 1.3  Horace frames this issue as an  economy  of vices in  which everyone 
must  balance their  own  faults against  those of others.  Mutual forbearance is necessary  in 
order  to avoid social  tension  or  hypocrisy: “it  is just  that someone seeking  pardon for 
faults grant pardon in  return”  (aequum  est | peccatis  veniam  poscentem  reddere rursus, 
Hor. S.  1.3.74-75).  This version  of the argument for  tolerance assumes some degree of 
vice as a  constant for  all people: “For  no one is born  without vices: best  is that  man  who 
is burdened by  the least”  (nam  vitiis  nemo sine nascitur: optimus ille est | qui minimis 
urgetur,  1.3.68-69).  Catherine Schlegel describes Satire  1.3  as concerned with  “limits to 
behavior  in  terms of the desires of others and in  terms of social interaction.” 278 In her 
interpretation, Horace concerns himself with  the proper  way  of negotiating  the 
boundaries between  ourselves and others.  Reading  the three diatribe satires that  open 
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278 Schlegel (2005) 30. See 30-37 for her full commentary on the poem.
the first  book of Satires  as describing  an  expanding  series of limits on  the self and its 
desires,279 she takes the self as the central term  of analysis and the primary  model for 
understanding  others: “self-love is the guide to understanding  the other: our  own  self-
love teaches us about the self-love of others; our  own self-love then  has to accommodate 
the self-love of another.” 280 In  her  focus on  the self and its desires,  Schlegel,  while 
substantially  correct  in her  outline of the social  dynamics under  discussion,  transmutes 
the external, often physical  focus of Horace’s satire into a more psychologically  oriented 
framework.281 The use of physical characteristics like  warts and boils (Serm.  1.3.73-74) as 
analogues for  behavioral faults aligns the satirist’s advice more closely  to a  vision  of 
faults as ambient environmental factors rather  than  personal affronts. While such 
blemishes may  evoke a  sense of distaste in  observers, they  do not actively  impinge on  the 
individual person  of a  bystander.  In  this satire an image of habitual but annoying 
behavior  replaces the idea  of chosen  or  intentional wrong-doing.  This characterization 
implicitly configures the basis mutual tolerance as a recognition of inadvertent flaws.
Horace treats the subject  of mutual tolerance as correcting an  imbalance between 
self-criticism  and criticism  of others: “Since you  survey  your  own faults with  cloudy, 
ointment-smeared eyes,  why  do look as sharply  at  your  friends’ faults as an eagle or  an 
Epidaurian  snake?”  (Cum  tua pervideas  oculis  mala lippus  inunctis, | cur in amicorum 
vitiis  tam cernis  acutum  | quam  aut aquila aut serpens  Epidaurius? Serm. 1.3.25-27).282 
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279 Schlegel (2005) 20: “Each of the first three satires explores the context of a certain 
limit on human desire, and the discussion moves outward from the narcissistic situation 
of own’s relation to desires for objects that gratify the self, to one’s relation to the desires 
of other human beings.”
280 Schlegel (2005) 34.
281 For the external focus of this satire, see e.g. 1.3.29-32, 38-40, 44-53, 63-66, 73-74, 
80-83, 85-95. Compare Braund (1988) 90 on the similar focus on “public men” within 
the discussions of noble character in Hor. Sat. 1.6, Persius 4 and Juv. 8. Edwards (1993) 
24-27 discusses the almost exclusive focus by Roman moralists on the behavior of the 
elite, and 173-206 describes the permeability between ideas of moral and financial 
profligacy.
282 Catullus 22.18-21, Persius 4.23-24 and Phaedrus 4.10 provide other versions of this 
same theme.
The poet  universalizes the lesson  by  addressing it  to his reader  in  the second person.  The 
second person  in  this “chat”  (sermo) thus treats each individual reader  as the actor in  a 
negative exemplum  in  a  similar  but  more direct  variation  on  Cicero’s suggestion that  the 
jurors recall for themselves exempla of men  who have left youthful faults behind in the 
pro Caelio.283  In  this satire, Horace also provides a  named figure who serves as an 
exemplum  of the judgmental wrongdoer: “While  Maenius slanders the absent  Novius, 
‘Look you,’ someone says, ‘do you  not know  yourself, or  do you  think to deceive us as if 
you  were unknown?’ ‘I forgive  myself’ Maenius says”  (Maenius  absentem Novium  cum 
carperet,  ‘heus  tu’ | quidam  ait,  ‘ignoras  te, an ut ignotum dare nobis  | verba putas?’ 
‘egomet mi ignosco’ Maenius  inquit.  Sat. 1.3.21-23).  Maenius here demonstrates the 
attitude of someone who fails to recognize the necessary  reciprocity  in  social 
interactions. The imbalance between  his self-regard and harassment of others activates 
the response of satiric  censure. 284 As Pliny  does in  letter 8.22, Horace urges his readers 
to become their  own  moral critics: “Finally  examine yourself to see whether  nature or 
even  bad habits have at  some time implanted any  faults”  (Denique te ipsum  | concute, 
num  qua tibi vitiorum  inseverit olim | natura aut etiam consuetudo mala,  Serm. 
1.3.34-36). 285  As with  Pliny’s advice,  this recommendation  also has the potential  to 
forestall  criticism  from  others. Horace includes himself in  his depiction of unequal 
standards of judgment,  but  with  humorous understatement he suggests that  his own 
faults may  be less consequential than  those of others. “Now  someone may  say  to me: 
‘What about  you? Do you  have no faults?’ Certainly  I have other, perhaps smaller 
ones” (Nunc aliquis  dicat mihi: ‘quid tu? | nullane habes  vitia?’ immo alia et fortasse 
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283 Ac multi et nostra et patrum maiorumque memoria, iudices, summi homines et 
clarissimi cives fuerunt, quorum cum adulescentiae cupiditates defervissent, eximiae 
virtutes firmata iam aetate exstiterunt. Ex quibus neminem mihi libet nominare; 
vosmet vobiscum recordamini. Cic. Cael. 43.
284 Cf. Schlegel (2005) 32, 34.
285 Edwards (1993) 32 describes “a shift towards a more internalized morality” as a 
product of the first centuries CE, but this satire of Horace seems to indicate that such a 
concept was fairly developed already at the beginning of the Augustan principate.
minora,  1.3.19-20).  In  this admission, he slyly  adopts a  lesser  version  of the self-regard 
he criticizes.  Through  this display  of similar  fallibility,  Horace presents his poetic 
persona  as both  advisor  and object  lesson, and thus positions his role as a satirist,  a 
corrector  of morals,  within a  wider view  of general fallibility.286 His performance here 
becomes an  exemplum  demonstrating partial success in  following  his own  advice: his 
poetic  voice becomes a  sort of non-specific, universal  conscience that urges his readers to 
examine their  own  lives while nevertheless remaining tethered to a  fallible human 
speaker.  In  this poem  he presents his role as a  satirist  as being  both  an  exponent  of self-
criticism and a model for the moral blindness he works to overcome.
Pliny  demonstrates how  this claim  of general fallibility  may  function  in  a 
communication  among friends. He opens one letter  with  an  anecdote in  which  he offers 
unrequested advice to an  acquaintance on  treating his son’s faults with  greater  leniency 
(Ep.  9.12). His letter,  however,  reports little more about the relationship between  father 
and son than  a  minimal  statement  of the circumstances.287 The bulk  of this narrative in 
fact  is occupied by  Pliny’s own  advice to the anonymous man, which  adopts an  ad 
hominem  approach  to encourage that man  to recognize himself as an  exemplum  of moral 
imperfection. He is careful not  to intervene directly  in the relationship between father 
and son, but instead offers advice to the father  alone (Huic ego iuvene digresso). As 
Pliny  reports the lecture  he gave to the man, he expands the notion  of fallibility  from  a 
characteristic  of youth to a  constant  aspect of being  human: “Hey  you,  have you  never 
done something that could be reproached by  your  father? Do I say  ‘Have you  done’? 
Don’t  you  sometimes do something that  your  son,  if suddenly  he were the father  and you 
the son, would censure with  equal severity? Are not  all  people led on  by  some error? 
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286 Schlegel (2005) 31, 34-35 links the criticism of others as discussed in the poem to the 
practice of satire itself, and describes Horace in Sat. 1.3 as discussing the underlying 
impulses and proper limits of satiric poetry.
287 Castigabat quidam filium suum quod paulo sumptuosius equos et canes emeret. Ep. 
9.12.1
Does not this man  indulge himself in  that thing, another man  in  this thing?”  (‘Heus  tu, 
numquamne fecisti, quod a patre  corripi posset? “Fecisti” dico? Non interdum  facis 
quod filius  tuus,  si repente pater ille tu filius, pari gravitate reprehendat? Non omnes 
homines  aliquo errore ducuntur? Non hic in illo sibi, in hoc  alius  indulget?’ 9.12.1). 
These questions press the addressee to view  himself as an  exemplum  of human fallibility. 
With  each successive question,  Pliny  widens the number  of fallible persons while 
narrowing  the moral authority  to reproach  their  errors. From  a  request  to the father  to 
recall  his own  youth,  Pliny  suggests that  the moral  positions of son  and father  might 
sometimes reverse themselves and then closes with  broad statements about the universal 
nature of error. 288
Pliny’s anecdote serves little purpose other  than  as an excuse to repeat this 
lecture to his reader.  In  the second half of the letter, he repeats this advice directly  to his 
addressee for  the  treatment of his own son  and again stresses the universality  of such 
faults: “Consider  that  he is a boy  and you  were one,  and act as a  father  in  such  a  way  as to 
remember  that you  are a  human being  and the father  of a  human  being” (Cogita et illum 
puerum esse et te fuisse, atque ita hoc quod es  pater utere, ut memineris  et hominem 
esse te et hominis patrem,  9.12.2). 289 Once again he implicitly  urges a father  to take 
himself as an  exemplum  that  provides the proper  standard by  which  to judge his son. 
This letter  offers a  double rehearsal  of the same lesson, first  through  Pliny’s lecture to the 
anonymous father  in  the opening anecdote,  then in  the transference of this lesson  to the 
recipient of the letter. Once again  the idea  of common  human fallibility  expressed 
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288 Sen. Contr. 2.6 (quidam luxuriante filio luxuriari coepit. filius accusat patrem 
dementiae) works through variations on the theme of shared faults between father and 
son in the context of a declamatory contest. On this declamation, see Gunderson (2003) 
120-21 and 125-29. See also Quint. Inst. 11.1.78 where the rhetorician mentions the 
problem of accusing another for the same faults you yourself practice, including a 
reference to this declamatory theme.
289 Cf. Santoro L’Hoir (1992) 159 on the use of homo to discuss human failings. Pliny’s 
closing remark ut memineris et hominem esse te et hominis patrem may recall Terence’s 
line homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto (Heauton Timorumenos 77).
through  the repeated use of the word homo  — “you  are a  human being  and the father  of a 
human  being”  (et hominem  esse te et hominis patrem)  — equates the various persons 
involved with  one another.  The repetition  itself echoes the advice in  the lecture to the 
overly  severe father: “Are not all  people led on  by  some error?”  (Non omnes  homines 
aliquo errore ducuntur?).  Just as in  Horace’s satire,  the use of the second person  to 
deliver  this advice helps universalize the suggestion, and implies that  any  reader  would 
supply  an illustrative exemplum  of this problem.  The wider  application may  be more 
muted in  this case as, unlike the satire,  this letter  has a  named addressee. 290  In 
publishing  this letter  in  a  collection of such correspondence,  however,  Pliny  effectively 
widens the audience for his advice to include any reader.
In  this letter,  Pliny  expresses the idea  of gentleness in  response to human  faults 
through  his argument  against  its opposite,  labelled “an  exemplum  of unmeasured 
severity”  (immodicae severitatis  exemplo,  9.12.2).  Notably, however, Pliny  includes 
almost  no details of the criticism  that occasioned his advice: “A  certain  man  was 
reproaching his son  because he had spent  money  on  horses and dogs a  little too 
lavishly”  (Castigabat quidam  filium  suum  quod paulo  sumptuosius  equos  et canes 
emeret,  9.12.1). His expressed fear  for  his addressee’s behavior  — “I have written lest at 
some time you  also should treat  your  son too sharply  and harshly”  (scripsi, ne  quando tu 
quoque filium tuum  acerbius duriusque tractares,  9.12.2) — offers nearly  as much detail 
about  this imagined transgression as the opening  anecdote did about  the anonymous 
father. Rather  than  focus on his “exemplum  of unmeasured severity” Pliny  instead 
highlights his own role as advice-giver. He presents this practice as a  mark  of affection 
(pro  amore mutuo, 9.12.2). Thus he almost  entirely  elides the exemplum  of severity  in 
favor  of presenting  himself implicitly  as an exemplum  of the correct method of 
dispensing moral advice and correction.
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290 The letter is addressed to Terentius Iunior, whom I discuss in section 3.3 below.
This strategy  for  encouraging  mutual  tolerance translates easily  to discussions of 
personal taste in less moralistic  conflicts.  Adapting  this pattern  to a  less moralistic 
argument, Pliny  suggests that  a  sort of social exchange of tolerance is necessary  to 
encourage gracious acceptance of one’s own  preferences. In  epistle 9.17, Pliny  replies to 
the rhetor  Julius Genitor  who has complained that  an  otherwise excellent  dinner  party 
(quamvis  lautissimam cenam) was ruined “because jesters, sissies,  and fools were 
wandering  about  the tables”  (quia scurrae cinaedi moriones mensis  inerrabant, 
9.17.1).291  Rather  than  simply  agreeing with  his correspondent’s complaints,  however, 
Pliny  instead counsels the rhetor  on  the advantages in  tolerating  other  peoples’ tastes. 
He defines himself as a  model for  the proper  response: “Indeed I have no such 
entertainment,  but  nevertheless I tolerate people who do”  (Equidem nihil tale  habeo, 
habentes tamen fero,  9.17.2).  Although,  like Genitor,  he views such  entertainments as 
vulgar, 292  he defines his preference as a  matter  of taste rather  than  reason (Non 
rationem sed stomachum  tibi narro,  9.17.2). Thus he deflects the potentially  moralistic 
tone of the complaint toward the more neutral field of personal aesthetic preferences. 
His discussion  of the two types still  implies a ranking  between  the two groups — the 
refined Pliny  and Genitor  compared to the more vulgar  lovers of jesters,  sissies and fools 
— but  by  figuring  the conflict  in  terms of taste, he decouples judgment  of others’ 
entertainments from any necessary condemnation.
Pliny  encourages tolerance for  others’ pleasures by  contrasting Genitor  and 
himself with  a  far  larger  anonymous crowd which holds the opposite preference: “And 
indeed think how  many  people there are whom  the things by  which  you  and I are 
captivated and enticed offend, partly  as being  tasteless,  partly  as very  annoying! How 
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291 Here I borrow the term “sissy” which I use to translate cinaedus from a term used to 
describe a class of witty, effeminate characters in some early films. See e.g. Russo (1987) 
The Celluloid Closet. Homosexuality in the Movies. Rev. Ed. New York.
292 Cur ergo non habeo? Quia nequaquam me ut inexpectatum festivumve delectat, si 
quid molle a cinaedo, petulans a scurra, stultum a morione proferatur. 9.17.2
many  people,  when  a  reader  or  lyre-player  or  comic  actor  is brought in, ask for  their 
shoes or  lie back  with  no less disgust  than  you  suffered those monsters (for  that’s what 
you  called them)!”  (Atque  adeo quam  multos  putas  esse,  quos ea quibus  ego et tu 
capimur et ducimur, partim  ut inepta partim  ut molestissima offendant! Quam  multi, 
cum lector aut lyristes aut comoedus  inductus est,  calceos poscunt aut non minore cum 
taedio  recubant, quam tu ista (sic enim adpellas)  prodigia perpessus  es! 9.17.3). The 
repeated emphasis on  the size of the other  group — “how  many… how  many…”  (quam 
multos… Quam  multi…) — positions Pliny  and his friend as a  small minority  compared 
to those who enjoy  other  forms of entertainment,  and consequently  implies that, rather 
than  being  able to dictate standards of taste,  they  must  instead hope for  the tolerance of 
others.  Although  he maintains a  positive tone,  Pliny’s closing  suggestion  clearly 
delineates the exchange of tolerance he hopes to encourage: “Therefore let  us give 
pardon  to others’ delights so that we may  obtain  the same for  ours”  (Demus igitur alienis 
oblectationibus  veniam, ut nostris  impetremus,  9.17.4).  Pliny’s argument suggests that 
he and his audience represent a  minority  who must encourage tolerance for  their  own 
interests rather  than dictate to others. While this claim  is rather  disingenuous given  the 
pervasiveness of Roman moralizing  discourse, the argument demonstrates how  the 
frequent  picture of widespread immorality  could become a  means of presenting  the 
moralists as an isolated and besieged group.
Such arguments for  mutual forbearance do not  pass unnoticed in  moralizing 
discourse. In  several  of his satires, Juvenal reacts against  these arguments and labels the 
acknowledgment  of common faults as a  problem.  In  satire 8, he places strict  limits on 
such  a  line of defense: “An  apologist  for  the fault will  tell me ‘We too did these things as 
young men.’ Granted,  but  you  certainly  ceased your  error and did not  pursue it further. 
Let  your  shameful darings be brief; certain  crimes should be cut  off with  your  first  beard. 
Give pardon  to boys”  (defensor culpae dicet mihi ‘fecimus  et nos  | haec iuvenes.’ esto, 
desisti nempe nec ultra | fovisti errorem. breve sit quod turpiter audes,  | quaedam cum 
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prima resecentur crimina barba.  | indulge veniam pueris,  8.163-67).  In  contrast to 
Horace, Juvenal  uses a  strict  metric of age to distinguish between  faults that should or 
should not be indulged.  He thus defines a  two-tiered system  of ethical evaluation, 
making  allowance for  boys while  strictly  dividing  men  into the good and the bad. 293 
Where Cicero in  his defense of Caelius defines exempla of the type of Fabricius or Curius 
as exceptional  rarities compared to the general mass of good but  fallible  men,294 Juvenal 
refuses to allow  for  such  a  permissive category.  While Cicero urges his audience to be 
lenient,  especially  to young  men, Juvenal  only  acknowledges two possible categories for 
adults: the thoroughly  wicked and the good.  By  creating  segregated evaluative systems 
for  boys and mature men,  he attempts to construct  a  wall against  the diffusion of 
leniency  toward common  faults.  The satirist ties this view  of wrongdoing to an 
expectation  of successive moral decline: “What? Do we never  offer  exempla so foul and 
so shameful that even  worse ones will not  remain?”  (Quid si numquam  adeo foedis 
adeoque pudendis  | utimur exemplis,  ut non peiora supersint? 8.183-84). 295 In this 
pessimistic depiction,  rather  than  offering  partial excuse for  similar  activities in  the next 
generation, each successive wrongdoer strives to surpass his predecessors in villainy.
Toward the close of his first  satire,  however, Juvenal claims that his 
contemporaries have already  reached the most  depraved state possible: “There will be 
nothing further  that  posterity  may  add to our  character. Our  descendants will  do and 
want the same things.  Everything  has come to stand at  the pinnacle of vices”  (nil erit 
ulterius quod nostris moribus addat | posteritas,  eadem facient cupientque minores, | 
omne in praecipiti vitium  stetit, 1.47-49).  Just as in  the eighth  satire, he emphasizes the 
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293 Cf. Braund (1988) 116-17. She suggests that the shift from the first person ‘fecimus et 
nos | haec iuvenes’ to the second person desisti nempe nec ultra | fovisti errorem 
attempts to define the speaker of the poem as occupying a superior moral position to his 
addressee.
294 Cic. Cael. 39-40. See section 3.1. above.
295 See Braund (1988) 118-21 on the function of this statement and the subsequent series 
of exempla in the structure of the poem and Juvenal’s parody of a moralist here.
broad diffusion  of vice: in  these arguments, blameworthy  actions cannot  justify  other 
equally  blameworthy  actions by  analogy.  As he argues elsewhere, failure to regulate one’s 
own  actions undermines the moral  authority  to judge others.  Juvenal harshly  questions 
the type-figure of a father  who provides the pattern  for  his son’s vices,  but then  attempts 
to criticize those vices:  “Where do you  find the expression  and frankness of a  father, 
when  you  do worse things as an  old man  and for  a  long  time now  the windy  cupping-
glass296  seeks this head devoid of understanding?”  (unde tibi frontem libertatemque 
parentis, | cum facias peiora senex vacuumque cerebro | iam  pridem  caput hoc  ventosa 
cucurbita quaerat? 14.56-58). Shared personal fallibility  undermines the basis for 
moralistic  reproach. This observation, of course, adduces the same pattern that  Pliny  did 
in  his letter encouraging  fathers to recognize themselves as exempla  of human 
imperfection  and thus to be lenient  toward their  sons’ faults (9.12),  but  the satirist  uses it 
to draw  the opposite conclusion. Where Pliny  encourages tolerance through  recognition 
of common  fallibility, Juvenal instead laments the diminution  of moral authority. The 
satirist’s role as moralist  (or  as a  parody  of a  moralist) encourages this anxiety  about  the 
basis of moral authority. 297 Pliny’s congenial  and (at least outwardly)  confident social 
commentary  assumes an  optimistic  view  of the  writer  and his friends; Juvenal’s satire in 
contrast  finds vice and degeneracy  everywhere.  These opposing attitudes structure the 
differing responses to the diffusion  of human  fallibility.  The satirist’s voice must  attempt 
to assert its moral authority  while Pliny’s letters,  speaking  with  an  assumed confidence 
in  the underlying rectitude of both  writer  and addressee,  easily  admit  fault with  the 
implicit  understanding that  such  faults are no more than minor flaws in  an  otherwise 
praiseworthy  character. Both  encourage their  readers to see moralists as exempla of 
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296 A medical device used for letting blood; see Pliny, NH 32.123; Scribonius Largus, 
Comp. 46, 67.
297 See e.g. Braund (1988) 108-111 on the speaker in Juvenal’s satires as a pseudo-
moralist and various models for this pose.
moral  imperfection, but the one offers an  optimistic interpretation, the other  an 
unmitigatedly pessimistic one.
3.3: Equestrian Exempla. Encouraging Unity within the Roman Elite.
Just  as authors use exempla  of mistakes or  vices to demonstrate shared human 
fallibility,  they  also may  introduce exempla  to depict values shared within  or  between 
social groups.  Exempla  that describe comparable acts performed by  actors who occupy 
different grades in  the social  scale  follow  the same pattern by  which  similar  behavior 
affirms ethical  similarity. This line of thought encourages a  view  of the aristocracy  as a 
harmonious group by  emphasizing  common  interests or  cooperation  in  contrast  to the 
conflicts that  may  arise between individual aristocrats over  matters of prestige. Connolly 
describes an  analogous effect  at  the level of mass politics: moralistic  discourse recruits 
the effectively  disenfranchised lower  classes into joining  the elite speaker  in  judging 
another elite figure.  This equality  of moralistic  judgment  then  obfuscates the political, 
ideological structures of domination  that underlie the relationship between  the lower 
class and the elite: “Moralism  creates a  world of meanings all its own, a  master fiction 
that  conceals the reality  of economic,  social, and political inequality,  that offers the 
moralist  equality  as a compensatory  replacement  for  political equality.”298  In  this 
section,  I am  concerned less with  such  collective ideological  functions than  with  those on 
a  more interpersonal level.  I focus primarily  on  relationships among  aristocrats ranging 
from  the cosmopolitan  senatorial elite to the lower, more rustic sections of the 
equestrian  order.  A  sense of moralistic  equality  may  be built  upon positive similarities as 
well as negative judgments.
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298 Connolly (2007) 64. For her full discussion of moralist equality in contrast to modern, 
liberal moral equality, see p. 56-65. Connolly builds her discussion on Achille Mbembe’s 
postcolonial analysis of political life in Cameroon: Mbembe, Achille (1992) “Provisional 
Notes on the Postcolony.” Africa 62: 1-37.
A  comparison  between actors of differing  social status may  suggest an ethical 
similarity  between  disparate social groups.  Such  comparisons encourage the perception 
of a  shared moral vision  that  binds disparate groups together. For  example,  as I 
discussed in the previous chapter  (section 2.1), Valerius Maximus links a pair of 
anonymous lower  class brothers to several well known aristocratic and imperial pairs 
(most prominently  the future emperor  Tiberius and his brother  Drusus) in his chapter 
on  fraternal  piety  (5.5.4).  By  capping the sequence of anecdotes with  an  illustration  of 
the same quality  in  a  pair  of common  soldiers,  he broadens the representation of this 
quality  to include the general populace.  Pliny  the younger  likewise praises an  anonymous 
woman from  Comum  as equal  to Arria  the elder,  except  in  social importance (Ep.  6.24). 
As he interprets the contrast  between  the two exempla,  social importance serves more to 
encourage distribution  of the anecdote than  to guarantee the moral worth of the actor. 
The replication  of Roman  senatorial  mores  by  a  woman  of the minor  municipal 
aristocracy  implies an  ethical  continuity  between  the values of the senatorial elite and 
those of other social classes.  Pliny’s use of this anonymous local exemplum  thus justifies 
a  preference for  senatorial  exempla  while purporting to demonstrate the universality  of 
the aristocratic values they represent. 299
The Roman  aristocracy  itself, despite its relatively  small  size, did not  form  a 
naturally  harmonious group. Competition  for  offices provides one frequently  cited 
source for  internal conflicts.  But  other  sources of power  and prestige also play  a  role in 
intra-elite competition. Family  importance or  connections may  encourage conflicts. 
Some families have more prestigious ancestries than  others. 300  Additionally  various 
members of the aristocracy  may  possess widely  varying  levels of wealth.  There  are also 
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299 I discuss both of these exempla in section 2.1 of the previous chapter.
300 Van der Blom (2010) 35-41 discusses the history of scholarship on the terms nobilis 
and homo novus in defining members of the Roman elite. See also Millar (1988) 47, who 
suggests that generosus may be the key term we should look for in examining the 
element of aristocracy-by-birth in the Roman elite.
potential tensions between those who follow  the path  of magistracies to membership  in 
the Senate,  and those who engage in  commerce or  other  financial activities barred to 
their senatorial compatriots.
In  the last  couple of decades, critics have emphasized the theatrical or 
performative aspect of such  conflicts and in  Roman political life  in general.301  This 
concept  of theatricality  often  highlights aggressive interactions among  competing 
individuals within the elite and, in  work on  post-Augustan  Rome,  on the ways in  which 
the upper reaches of the aristocracy  dealt with  the curtailment  of their  public influence 
by  the new  authority  of the emperor. While this emphasis clearly  reflects an important 
trend in  Roman politics, it  tends to privilege the roles of the most  powerful  or  otherwise 
most visible political  actors.302  Other, less publicly  oriented forms of political 
involvement  receive correspondingly  less critical emphasis. The emphasis on  the 
spectacular  has likewise narrowed the field of figures and actions that  have been studied 
as exempla.  This theoretical bias is reinforced by  the limited body  of our  extant sources, 
whose survival displays a  strong congruence to the fame either  of the author  or  of its 
subjects.303  Both  the preservation  and the interpretation  of the extant sources for  the 
Roman  world,  then,  tend to privilege the most  spectacular, the most self-advertising, or, 
best of all, those who combine both of those qualities.304 
In  this section,  I focus on  the roles of the less spectacular  or  obviously  influential 
members of the aristocracy  and the use of such  figures in  building  or  encouraging  an 
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301 See e.g. Bartsch (1994). In studies of exemplarity, Hölkeskamp (1996) 320-26 and 
Roller (2004) 3-5, 8-9 emphasize the importance of spectacularity or the theatricality of 
Roman society on the culture of exemplarity.
302 See also Millar (1988) 46-47 who argues that the senatorial and equestrian classes are 
much more closely interrelated than they often appear in modern work on the period 
and that membership was more commonly a matter of personal choice of role than 
unvarying family tradition.
303 See Millar (1988) 41 on the bias of our evidence for rank in Roman society towards a 
view from above, and the rare opportunity presented by Nepos’s biography of Atticus to 
examine the subject from a different angle.
304 Cicero and Augustus are salient examples of this third type.
image of elite unity.  My  two primary  examples in  the following  discussion are the 
influential equestrian  banker  and scholar  T.  Pomponius Atticus and Terentius Iunior,  a 
former  provincial  procurator  who subsequently  retired to his villa  and who surprised 
Pliny  the younger  with  his erudite conversation (Ep.  7.25). 305  Writers,  in  particular 
Cornelius Nepos in the case  of Atticus and Pliny  in  the case of Terentius,  find exempla in 
the lives of these two men  that  they  use to encourage a  vision  of elite  consensus.  Atticus, 
with  his close links to many  of the leading  figures during  the last  decades of the Republic, 
not only  illustrates a  type of relationship among  aristocrats that  prefers mutual 
cooperation to competition, but  also demonstrates the potential  of such  cooperative 
relationships to protect  both  himself and others in  periods of violent strife such  as the 
triumviral proscriptions. Thus,  as he is presented in Nepos’s biography, he models an 
alternate path of political involvement that  becomes increasingly  important  under  the 
principate.  Terentius Iunior,  on  the other hand, has much  less individual significance 
than  Atticus,  but represents a  social type that Pliny  adduces to illustrate  the diffusion  of 
educated culture within  the elite beyond the limited group who actively  participate in 
literary  life. These two men  provide exempla  that bookend a  range of possible social 
roles separate from  the striving  for  individual prominence that critics have described as 
central to Roman exemplarity.
In  his biography  of Atticus, Cornelius Nepos presents his patron  as a model for 
social harmony: “He behaved himself in  such  a  way  that he seemed familiar  to the lowest 
and equal  to the leading men” (Hic autem sic se  gerebat,  ut communis  infimis, par 
principibus  videretur,  Atticus 3.1). As Nepos characterizes him, this respected Roman 
knight  exemplifies accessible social grace. Though this statement  specifically  describes 
his behavior  while living  in  Athens, it  establishes a  pattern  repeated many  times in  his 
later  life. Throughout the biography, Nepos emphasizes Atticus’s ability  to retain  the 
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305 Terentius later becomes one of Pliny’s correspondents, receiving letters 8.15 and 9.12, 
the latter of which I discuss in the preceding section.
respect and good will  of everyone. 306 He defines Atticus’s social sense (humanitas)  as the 
basis for  his easy  relations with  widely  varying  persons: “I can  offer  no greater  testimony 
of his social sense, than  that the same man when  he was young  was very  agreeable to 
Sulla  who was an  old man,  as an  old man  he was very  agreeable to the young  M.  Brutus; 
moreover  with  his contemporaries Q. Hortensius and M. Cicero he lived in  such a  way 
that  it  is difficult  to decide to which  generation  he was best fitted”  (Humanitatis  vero 
nullum adferre maius  testimonium possum,  quam  quod adulescens  idem seni Sullae 
fuit iucundissimus, senex adulescenti M.  Bruto,  cum  aequalibus autem  suis Q. 
Hortensio et M. Cicerone sic vixit,  ut iudicare difficile sit,  cui aetati fuerit aptissimus, 
16.1).  Nepos here uses the metric of age to demonstrate  the wide range of friendships 
Atticus maintained, but  the events related throughout the biography  also demonstrate 
his ability  to maintain  positive relationships among the varying factions of the civil  wars 
of the first  century  BCE. 307  This description encourages readers to strive for social 
concord through  a  demonstration  of the benefits of such  a  social strategy. As other 
writers have noted, Atticus’s method of ensuring  his security  through  friendships with  a 
wide range of powerful aristocrats exemplifies a  form  of political involvement  that 
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306 Central among his motivations for fostering general good will, Nepos presents Atticus 
as continually concerned to remain neutral in the civil wars. In the first of only two 
instances of direct speech in the biography, Atticus asks Sulla not to attempt to get him 
to return to Italy: “‘Do not, I beg you,’ said Atticus, ‘desire to led me against those men. I 
left Italy so that I would not bear arms with them against you.’” (‘noli, oro te,’ inquit 
Pomponius ‘adversum eos me velle ducere, cum quibus ne contra te arma ferrem, 
Italiam reliqui.’ Att. 4.2). The most notable success of this strategy would likely be his 
escape from the triumviral proscriptions, from which Antony exempted both Atticus and 
at his request Q. Gellius Canus in gratitude for the aid he gave to Antony’s wife Fulvia 
and his friends following his defeat at Mutina (Att. 9-10). See also Millar (1988), 
especially 42-45 and 52-53.
307 See especially 7-12 on Atticus’s activities from the conflict between Caesar and 
Pompey down to the conflict between Antony and Octavian. Most prominent among the 
figures whose relationships with Atticus Nepos discusses are: Cicero (1, 4-5, 9-10, 16), 
Sulla (Att. 4, 16), Julius Caesar (7), Brutus (8-10, 16), Marc Antony (9-10, 20), Agrippa 
(12, 21-22), and Augustus (19-20).
becomes increasingly  important  with  the diminution  of the primacy  of the Senate under 
the Principate.308
In  interpreting  exempla that  discuss social status it  is important  to remember  the 
complexity  of the Roman  hierarchy. Some modern  discussions of rank within  Roman 
society  focus heavily  on the formal criteria  of political office.309  Other  factors such  as 
ancestry,  wealth  and friendship networks, however, also play  an  important  role in 
calculating the hierarchical distinctions between social actors.  Atticus again  provides a 
useful example.  Although  he never  pursued any  public office, he nevertheless enjoyed a 
highly  respected and influential position  in society. A  passing  comment in  Thomas 
Habinek’s otherwise perceptive discussion  of the role  of candor  in  Roman  friendship 
displays the dangers of such  an  overly  simple assumption  of congruence between 
political office and social rank. Habinek finds candid criticism  to be a  traditional 
characteristic  of relationships between friends of unequal  rank,  and includes within  this 
category  the friendship between  Cicero and Atticus.  He adduces a  letter  that Cicero wrote 
to Atticus in  December  61  BCE (ad Att. 1.17  = SB 17) to discuss the importance of the 
relationship between  the two men  for Cicero’s theoretical  treatment  of friendship in  the 
de Amicitia and elsewhere. 310 In  this letter  Cicero attempts to dispel tension  between  the 
two friends arising from  a squabble between  Atticus and Cicero’s brother  Quintus. 311 To 
this end,  he assures his friend of the essential  likeness he perceives between  them, 
despite their  different modes of life: “I have never  considered there to be any  difference 
between  me and you  except  the choice of our  plan  of life, except  that  a  certain  desire  for 
honor  led me to a  desire for  offices,  but a  different,  not to be censured judgment  led you 
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308 See Millar (1988), especially 53-54, and Welch (1995) 471.
309 See e.g. van der Blom (2010) 35-41 describing various attempts to define nobilis and 
homo novus. The emphasis on political office in her discussion is of course strongly 
related to her central interest in Cicero’s political career and tactics as a homo novus.
310 Even on a formal level, Atticus plays an important role in the de Amicitia: Cicero 
addresses the treatise to him (de Am. 4).
311 On the murky details of this quarrel, related to Atticus’s refusal to join Q. Cicero’s staff 
as governor of Asia, see Shackleton-Bailey (1965-1970) ad loc.
to respectable leisure”  (neque ego inter me atque te quicquam  interesse umquam duxi 
praeter voluntatem  institutae vitae,  quod me ambitio  quaedam ad honorum studium, 
te autem alia minime reprehendenda ratio  ad honestum  otium duxit, ad Att.  1.17.5). 
Noting  Cicero’s subsequent praise for  Atticus’s frank advice,  Habinek sees here a conflict 
between  the free advice typical  of unequal friendships and Cicero’s protestations of 
absolute equality.  Habinek  relies entirely  on  the criterion  of political office in  defining 
“the absurdity  of his claim  of equality  between  the two men”: “Cicero,  it should be 
remembered, had two years earlier  held the consulship at  the earliest legal  age and 
during  his term  of office  suppressed the Catilinarian Conspiracy  primarily  by  civilian 
means; Atticus,  in  contrast,  had turned down  a  much  lower  position  in  the retinue of 
Cicero’s brother.” 312 This contrast,  however,  ignores the ties of dependence that also run 
in  the opposite direction: Cicero as a  “new  man” (novus  homo)  from  outside Rome relied 
on  Atticus’s connections to more traditionally  active politicians from  established families 
in  his political activities.313  Shackleton Bailey, in  the introduction to his monumental 
edition  of the ad Atticum,  in  fact  describes the ties of dependence as running  in  the 
opposite direction, beginning  around the time of Cicero’s consulship (63  BCE).314 The 
letter  under  discussion  here displays some sign  of this vector of influence: as Hall reads 
this letter,  Cicero adopts an  unusual degree of formality  in  addressing  Atticus as a 
demonstration of respect  in  order to dissolve  the tension  created by  the quarrel between 
Quintus and Atticus.315
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312 Habinek (1991) 180.
313 For early activities prior to Cicero’s consulship, see e.g. ad Att. 1.10.6 = SB 6 and 
especially 1.2.2 = SB 11. See also ad Att. 3.7.1 and 3.20.2 on Atticus’s aid to Cicero during 
his exile. Atticus came from a very old Roman family: T. Pomponius Atticus, ab origine 
ultima stirpis Romanae generatus, perpetuo a maioribus acceptam equestrem obtinuit 
dignitatem. (Nepos, Att. 1.1)
314 Shackleton-Bailey (1965-70) 13. See also Millar (1988) 43-44 on Atticus’s refusal of 
the office of legatus as a means of preserving his own dignitas, and Welch (1995) who 
describes Atticus as an enormously influential and well-connected “back room” political 
operator.
315 Hall (2009) 64-65.
Habinek  suggests that  Cicero here makes two innovations in  his relationship with 
Atticus that contribute to the views he expresses later  in  the de Amicitia.  In  effect he 
argues that the relationship between the two men provides an  exemplum  on  which 
Cicero bases his philosophical  view  of friendship. First  is the insistence that  moral 
equality  between  the two men  rather  than  political rank  constitutes the essential basis 
for  judging  each  other’s worth; second is the division  between  their  spheres of activity 
that,  Habinek argues,  removes the potential for  competition  between the two friends and 
thus allows them  to engage in  the frank discussion  more commonly  ascribed to friends of 
divergent status: “In terms of traditional  Roman  ideology, Cicero’s argument  here is an 
interesting  combination  of conservatism  and innovation.  Conservative in  its insistence 
on  ranking and assessment, even  within  a  supposedly  intimate friendship; yet innovative 
both  in  its recognition  of standards other  than mere success and in its solution  to the 
problem  of competition  between  equals through  a  recognition  of a  possible distribution 
of honors or  separate spheres of influence.” 316 This argument  for  innovation, however, 
implicitly  treats an important but  politically  inactive equestrian like Atticus as if he were 
an  unprecedented social  type.  Consequently  what innovation may  exist  here (if in fact 
there is any  innovation) should perhaps be assigned to Atticus rather  than  his 
correspondent  Cicero. 317 The orator’s view  of friendship certainly  may  derive from  the 
example of his relationship with  Atticus,  but the apparent novelty  of such  a  relationship 
may reflect nothing more than the absence of extant earlier parallels.
But  what is novel  in  the case of Atticus may  be less his resolutely  uncommitted 
political stance than  his wealth  and unusual visibility  in  the extant sources.  It  is precisely 
for  this reason  that  Atticus provides an  important  source for  understanding how  Romans 
could consider  an  essentially  private figure as an exemplum. Consider  that, if not  for 
Cicero’s letters and other  works addressed to him, and to a  lesser  extent Nepos’s 
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316 Habinek (1991) 180.
317 See Welch (1995) 451-52 on Atticus’s choice to forego a political career.
biography, we might know  little  more than  his name. 318  For example,  despite his 
interactions with  most  of the major  figures during the fighting  between  Antony, 
Octavian, Brutus,  Cassius and the rest  following  Caesar’s assassination  (Nepos,  Att. 
8-12),  Atticus appears, if at all,  as a  peripheral figure in  most  accounts of those events.  It 
is not that  he was unimportant, but  rather that  he was resolutely  unspectacular  in  his 
public activities. 319 Atticus,  as Nepos describes him, is exemplary  precisely  in  his ability 
to remain  both  innocuous and unharmed throughout  the chaos of the civil  wars by 
adhering  to the ideals of disinterested goodwill and friendship. 320 Given  how  near  to 
historical invisibility  Atticus would likely  be without his correspondence with the best 
known orator  in  Roman  antiquity,  it  may  be that  rather than  being innovative, his 
relationship with Cicero and his influence with  a  broad circle of aristocratic friends are 
unusual  simply  in  being  well  attested.  The letters that  Cicero sent to Atticus are, of 
course,  a  major  source for the political  history  of the late Republic,  but  they  are far  more 
often  read for  the simple reason  that Cicero wrote them. 321 Atticus functions on  most 
readings solely  as the occasion  and the original  archivist. Considered in  and of himself, 
however, Atticus demonstrates how  other  factors may  level some equestrians with  those 
who follow  a  political career. His life as recorded by  Nepos provides unspectacular 
exempla, demonstrating  how  to navigate the society  of the  powerful  and treacherous 
political conflicts without incurring anyone’s ill will.
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318 Welch (1995) 451 suggests that Atticus in his choice of private otium may represent a 
large group of equestrians at the time.
319 A few articles have discussed Atticus’s role in the events of the time. Millar (1988) 
spends a good deal of space discussing what Atticus did and did not do in the political 
turmoils. Welch (1995) constructs a persuasive account of Atticus as a powerful and 
influential background political actor who used his relationships with other, more 
traditionally active politicians to further his own interests.
320 See especially Att. 11.3-6.
321 Welch (1995) 452 remarks on the same trend even in recent discussions of Nepos’s 
biography in which critics focus more on Nepos’s treatment of Atticus than on the 
subject himself.
Atticus’s efforts to ensure his personal safety  and to further  his own  interests, 
financial or  otherwise,  through  cooperative political  relationships in  many  ways 
presuppose a  climate of strife.  But the exemplary  features that Nepos identifies in  his 
activities argue for  fostering  a  political  atmosphere of the opposite  character  in  which 
senators and equestrians would see themselves connected to one another  by  bonds of 
mutual  interdependence.  His success encourages a  wider  diffusion of this less directly 
competitive political practice through elite cooperation  or,  to put  it in  more cynical 
terms, collusion. This potential shift  from  interpersonal competition  for offices to 
collaboration  between  aristocrats with divergent  interests expresses in individual terms a 
view  that  seeks to unify  the elite in  furthering their  own  particular  interests through 
mutual  aid.  Such  advocacy  for  political quietism  probably  should not  be divorced from 
the frequent  eruptions of political  violence beginning  most  spectacularly  with the 
conflicts between Marius and Sulla,  and continuing  not  only  through  the last  decades of 
the Republic but also through  the first  century  of the principate.322 This re-imagined 
mode of political  interaction  bolsters the importance of figures such  as Atticus as models 
for  aristocratic accommodation  to the evolving autocracy  of the Principate.323 Nepos’s 
biography  advertises the banker  and scholar  as an exemplum  worthy  of notice,  and thus 
demonstrates the basic  operation  of exemplarity: everyone’s activities were open  to 
observation, judgment  and emulation should they  provide a useful model. As the value of 
political advancement through  the traditional magistracies declines in  the face of the 
winner-takes-all military  conflicts of the late Republic,  the life of Atticus demonstrates 
how  an  aristocrat  can  adopt  an  ancillary  role as both  a  financial and a  cultural  authority 
that  affords him  great  influence while nonetheless avoiding direct  competition with 
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322 Atticus himself is an important example: Nepos, of course, identifies the violence of 
the era as the primary impetus for Atticus’s political quietism. See also Millar (1988) 
42-45 and Welch (1995) 451-52.
323 See Millar (1988), especially 53-54, and Welch (1995) 471 on other aristocrats 
adopting similar strategies for self-preservation.
those striving  for  political dominance.324 Atticus may  not have intended to furnish  an 
exemplum,  but his success at  personal  survival  enabled others to treat  him  as one, just  as 
Nepos implicitly  does in  publishing  his biography.  In  the development of such  an 
accommodative practice, an  emphasis on  aristocratic cohesion  encourages members of 
the elite to shift the basis of their  self-construction  at  least  in part  from  their  individual 
political position  to their  share in  the collective authority  of the elite as a  whole.  Such  a 
revaluation, of course, does not  eliminate the importance of hierarchy  in  social 
determinations of worth, but  rather  reduces the weight  of formal office-holding  in 
comparison to a variety of less easily quantifiable factors.
The concept of a  unified, pan-elite interest runs counter to the emphasis, 
identified in  much  scholarship on  exemplarity, that individuals should strive to equal or 
to surpass accomplished predecessors.325  In  this division  lies a  conflict  between 
individual and collective views of the elite.  The concept of individual emulation 
encourages aristocrats to view  personal distinction  primarily  in  relation  to other 
aristocratic  actors.  In  contrast,  by  locating  social importance within  a  broader  view  of the 
elite as an  interdependent  group, members of the elite may  recognize that in absolute 
terms their  own social importance depends on  the authority  of the upper class as a 
whole.  Of course, neither view  is completely  definitive. While the various subsets of the 
aristocracy  do form  a  relatively  homogenous group within  the full spectrum  of the 
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324 Both Millar (1988) 48-54 and Welch (1995) 468-70 emphasize the role of Atticus’s 
antiquarian scholarship in providing some of the foundations for Augustan cultural 
authority. See also Habinek (1995) who discusses Cicero’s philosophical prefaces as co-
opting Greek philosophy in order to bolster the authority of elite culture workers and 
thus to balance the power of military and to maintain cultural cohesion. 
325 This is not to say that previous discussions ignore the relationship between 
exemplarity and the political dominance of the elite. For discussions of the ideological 
role of the culture of exempla in reinforcing and naturalizing elite dominance, see 
Hölkeskamp (1996) 326-27.
Roman  people, 326  when  viewed from  an  intra-elite perspective, distinctions between 
various grades and ranks of aristocrats spring  into view.  Most interesting  in  this context 
is the perception  of disparity  between  various grades of senators,  equestrians and local 
municipal  elites against  which authors may  use exempla to argue for  the essential 
homogeneity  of those who possess landed wealth.  Pliny  the younger, for  example, 
explicitly  sets out  the idea  that  personal  reputation  depends on  magnifying  the status of 
others.  In  discussing  the importance of praise at literary  recitations,  he urges that  those 
in  attendance should praise everyone without regard to their  relative worth (Ep.  6.17). 
Riggsby  notes that  Pliny  presents this encouragement  with  an expectation that standards 
of judgment  are portable across different conceptual categories: “Pliny  expects the same 
kinds of rules of judgment  to apply  in what  we might distinguish  as moral  and literary 
spheres.” 327 Thus members of the elite should recognize that  their  personal reputations 
depend directly  on those with  whom  they  are in direct  competition: “Finally  whether  you 
are more or  less or  equally  distinguished,  praise your inferior,  your  superior or  your 
equal: your  superior because,  unless he is praised, you  yourself cannot  be praised, your 
inferior  or  your  equal  because it matters for  your  own reputation  that  a  person  you 
surpass or  equal appear  as great  as possible”  (Denique sive  plus  sive minus sive idem 
praestas,  lauda vel inferiorem  vel superiorem vel parem: superiorem quia nisi 
laudandus  ille  non potes  ispe laudari,  inferiorem  aut parem  quia pertinet ad tuam 
gloriam  quam  maximum videri, quem praecedis  vel exaequas,  Ep.  6.17.4). 
Consequently  the collective reputation  of the upper  classes becomes a concern  for  each 
individual member  of the aristocracy.  In  this context, unspectacular exempla  such  as 
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326 See e.g. Millar (1988) 46-47 who, in a discussion of Atticus’s social and political 
activities, emphasizes the social continuity between the senatorial and equestrian orders. 
As he describes the situation, members of the Senate form less a separate social class 
than a sub-group within a relatively homogenous moneyed elite.
327 Riggsby (1998) 88.
those in  the life of Atticus demonstrate  how  those who choose a  life of honorable leisure 
(honestum otium, Cic. ad Att. 1.17.5) nonetheless may exemplify core aristocratic values.
Education and literary  interests may  establish  a  clear  connection between  those 
from  the upper  and lower  strata  of the elite. Here relatively  unknown figures provide 
useful exempla for  illustrating shared qualities or  interests.  In  some cases their  very 
obscurity  enhances their  utility  as they  are thus able more easily  to represent  a  wide 
range of similarly  undistinguished persons. For  example, in  one letter  Pliny  the younger 
describes meeting  a  gentleman-farmer who challenged his expectation that an equestrian 
who chose a  retired life at  a  villa  would be interested primarily  in  agricultural matters 
(Ep.  7.25).  Pliny  implicitly  characterizes the description of this man  as an  exemplum  by 
identifying  his observations about him  as the basis for  his claims: “Having  experienced it 
myself I write what  I write”  (Expertus  scribo  quod scribo,  Ep.  7.25.2). As he describes 
this meeting,  he minimizes the economic  and political considerations that underlie his 
assumptions,  emphasizing instead only  the criteria of educated speech  and intellectual 
pursuits.  Pliny’s opening  exclamation  sets the focus: “O,  how  much  renown of educated 
men  either  their  unassuming  conduct or  quiet  life conceals and removes!”  (O quantum 
eruditorum aut modestia ipsorum  aut quies operit ac subtrahit famae, 7.25.1).  His 
concern  is more with  reputation  (fama) than with actual character.  The public estimate 
of an  individual’s intellectual  attainments provides a more vital  metric for  their 
reputation  than  their  actual  abilities do. By  identifying unassuming  conduct (modestia) 
or  a quiet  life  (quies)  as the cause of their  obscurity, he defines the situation  primarily  as 
a matter of individual preference, rather than financial resources or location. 
Pliny’s new  acquaintance Terentius Iunior had held equestrian  rank in  the army 
and later served as a  provincial procurator  before  retiring  to his villa.328 Expecting to 
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328 Terentius Iunior, equestribus militiis atque etiam procuratione Narbonensis 
proviniciae integerrime functus, recepit se in agros suos, paratisque honoribus 
tranquillissimum otium praetulit. Ep. 7.25.2. See Sherwin-White (1966) 434 on the 
probable identity and some possible family connections of this Terentius Iunior.
meet a  farmer,  Pliny  is surprised by  their  conversation: “Invited as a  guest,  I viewed this 
man as a  good head of a  family  and as a  diligent  farmer, intending  to speak  about  those 
matters in  which  I believed he was involved; and I began  to do so,  when  he recalled me to 
study  with  the most learned speech” (Hunc  ego  invitatus  hospitio  ut bonum patrem 
familiae,  ut diligentem  agricolam intuebar, de his locuturus, in quibus  illum versari 
putabam; et coeperam, cum  ille  me doctissimo sermone revocavit ad studia,  7.25.3). 
Pliny  is careful to present his preconceptions about  Terentius within  the positive view  of 
archaic Roman  rustic virtue. Prior  to his visit, he expects Terentius to be a  good farmer 
and pater familias  in  line with  the stereotypical figure of the rustic Roman  of older 
times,  and thus he expects his host  to be culturally  rustic as well.  Consequently  he is 
surprised by  Terentius’s “most  learned speech”  (doctissimo sermone,  7.25.3). Although 
Pliny’s expectations of rusticity  prove unfounded, he characterizes Terentius as an 
exception:  “You  would think  that the man  lived in  Athens, not  in a  villa”  (Athenis  vivere 
hominem, non in villa putes,  7.25.4).329  He thus defines two potential  modes of life 
outside public service: a  scholarly  leisure conducted in  an  established center  of learning 
such  as Athens,  and a  rustic  life overseeing  one’s own land. This dichotomy  assumes that 
intellectual pursuits function  primarily  as a  social  endeavor  conducted through  face-to-
face interaction with others.
It is instructive to compare this equestrian  former procurator who turned down 
prospects for  advancement, preferring a  quiet  life  at  his villa, to the older senator 
Vestricius Spurinna,  whose lifestyle in retirement provides the subject  for  Ep.  3.1.330 As 
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329 Pliny’s use of homo rather than vir to refer to Terentius here is a conventional way to 
discuss equestrians and more modest members of the elite. See Santoro-l’Hoir (1992) 
158-59 on Pliny’s use of the term homo.
330 Henderson (2002) 58-66 offers some comments on old age and life plans in Pliny Ep. 
3.1, although his discussion is colored by his distaste for Pliny’s attitude toward his older 
predecessors; see, for example, 62 for a disparaging comparison between Pliny’s 
relationship with Spurinna and that between Mr. Collins and his patroness Lady 
Catherine in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice.
Pliny  describes a  typical  day  for  his model of life in  old age, 331 he notes several times 
when  Spurinna listens to readings or  holds discussions with  visiting  friends (3.1.4-5, 9). 
The retired senator  also demonstrates his linguistic facility  by  composing lyric poetry  in 
both  Latin  and Greek.332 Pliny  explicitly  labels Spurinna’s relaxed life as a  reward for  his 
earlier  political service: “That man  also,  for  as long  as it  brought  him  honor,  discharged 
duties,  performed public  offices,  ruled provinces, and by  much labor deserved this 
leisure”  (nam  ille quoque,  quoad honestum  fuit, obiit officia, gessit magistratus, 
provincias rexit, multoque labore hoc otium meruit, Ep. 3.1.12).
Aside from  the obvious status difference that separates the ex-consul  Spurinna 
from  the former procurator  Terentius,  another  factor  encourages Pliny’s mistaken 
expectations of rusticity: more frequent access to recitations and learned discussion. His 
new  friend Terentius, who excels in his flawless speech  in  both  Latin  and Greek, 
dissolves this misapprehension by  appearing through  his conversation  to have been 
involved in  extensive intellectual  discussion.333 It  is precisely  Terentius’s bilingual facility 
that  demonstrates his intellectual attainments to his visitor: “he recalled me to study 
with  the most  learned speech. How  nice everything  was,  both  in Latin  and in  Greek! For 
he is so fluent  in  each  language that  he  seems to excel more in  the one he is speaking  at 
the current  moment”  (… ille me doctissimo sermone revocavit ad studia. Quam tersa 
omnia,  quam  Latina,  quam Graeca! Nam tantum  utraque lingua valet,  ut ea magis 
videatur excellere,  qua cum maxime loquitur.  Ep.  7.25.3-4).  Only  in  following  does Pliny 
remark  on  Terentius’s extensive reading and great  memory.334 The vision  of educated 
life, as the focus here on  spoken  language demonstrates, centers around social 
interactions through  recitations and conversation. While such exchanges may  be carried 
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331 neminem magis in senectute, si modo senescere datum est, aemulari velim, Ep. 3.1.1.
332 Scribit enim et quidem utraque lingua lyrica doctissima; mira illis dulcedo, mira 
suavitas, mira hilaritas, cuius gratiam cumulat sanctitas scribentis. 3.1.7.
333 Compare Pliny Ep. 3.1.4, 6-7 on Spurinna’s conversations with visiting friends.
334 Quantum ille legit, quantum tenet! 7.25.4.
on  through  letters and more formal  written  texts, 335 the primary  engine of such  discourse 
remains face-to-face  communication. 336 In  addition  to Terentius’s restricted ability  to 
attend cultural events,  he also has fewer  opportunities to display  his own  abilities in  the 
way  he is able to do for  Pliny  as a  guest. In  forming  Pliny’s initial  expectations, a  retired 
senator  like Spurinna  would have two apparent  advantages over  Terentius: he spent  a 
good deal  of time in  Rome during  the course of his long political  career,  and he likely  has 
more frequent  visitors. In  the contrast between  his description  of the retired senator  and 
his expectations for  a  former procurator  living  at  a  rural  villa  Pliny  assumes a  basic 
reality  of elite social interaction  in  the Roman  world: a  more eminent person  will have 
more frequent visitors than  an  equestrian  farmer  like Pliny’s new  friend.337 Though  they 
offer  a  less formal intellectual interaction  than a  recitation would, the visits Spurinna 
receives offer  a  means to remain  connected to the broader  literary  community  of the 
Roman  aristocracy.  This view  of intellectual life  figures an  education  less as a  static 
attainment  than  a continuing  engagement with  others.  The importance of recitations and 
other literary-social interactions both  for  developing  and for  displaying  education  is 
reaffirmed by  a  figure such as Titinius Capito,  another  equestrian  friend of Pliny  who 
encourages literary life primarily through hosting and attending recitations.338
The lesson Pliny  derives from  this exemplum  of a  rural  intellectual  is that a  rustic 
appearance does not necessarily  imply  limited education.  He sets this idea  in  the context 
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335 For an example of the exchange of books and letters, Pliny, Ep. 8.15 shows an 
exchange of books between Pliny and this same Terentius. See Hall (2009) 15-27, 
focusing on the letters of Cicero, on the normative expectation of face-to-face interaction 
that underlies the formality of Roman letters. At 26-27 he comments briefly on the later 
development of letters from the late Republic to the times of Pliny and Fronto.
336 The second sentence of Pliny’s letter focuses specifically on verbal interaction in the 
space of the recitation hall: At nos eos tantum dicturi aliquid aut lecturi timemus, qui 
studia sua proferunt, cum illi qui tacent hoc amplius praestent, quod maximum opus 
silentio reverentur, 7.25.1.
337 See e.g. White (1978) 76-78; Hall (2009) 16. Dupont (1997) 52-54 describes 
attendance at recitationes as another indication of social status.
338 Pliny, Ep. 8.12. See also Ep. 1.17 and 5.8. I discuss Capito further in sections 4.1 and 
4.2 of the following chapter.
of literary  recitations,  linking  an  erudite but  unknown  figure like Terentius Iunior  to 
those who listen  silently  and do not  voice their  opinions. Terentius’s rural retirement and 
the recitation  audience’s reticent  silence are, of course,  rather  different, but  Pliny  relates 
the two things around the role of self-assertion  in social evaluation. In  framing this 
anecdote,  he comments on  the potentially  misleading connection between  public 
reputation  and self-advertisement: “But we,  when we are going  to speak or  read 
something, only  fear  those who broadcast  their  own studies, while those who keep quiet 
offer  this more generous thing, that  they  honor  the greatest work with  silence”  (At nos 
eos  tantum  dicturi aliquid aut lecturi timemus,  qui studia sua proferunt, cum  illi qui 
tacent hoc  amplius  praestent,  quod maximum opus  silentio  reverentur,  7.25.1).339 Pliny 
here encourages those preparing  a  recitation to consider the entire audience,  not  just 
those who they  know  will voice an  opinion.340 Within  this letter,  intellectual or  social 
reticence becomes a  problem  that  must be solved in  order to ensure an accurate estimate 
of audience response. To correct this imbalance, Pliny  recommends supplementing 
public reputation  through  an  active investigation  of cultural ability. In this letter  he 
approaches the issue as someone who gives recitations speaking  to others who do the 
same. Consequently  he recommends that  speakers should concern  themselves with 
improving  their  audience’s reputation  through close  observation: “He increased my 
concern  and made me respect  those retired and apparently  rustic men  no less than those 
whom  I know  to be very  learned.  I recommend the same thing  to you: for  just  as in 
military  service so also in  our  letters there are many  men of rustic  appearance,  but  if you 
look carefully  you  will find them  girded and armed and indeed endowed with  the most 
glowing  talent”  (Auxit sollicitudinem  meam effecitque ut illis  quos  doctissimos novi, non 
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339 As I noted above, the opening sentence sets out this idea even more clearly: O 
quantum eruditorum aut modestia ipsorum aut quies operit ac subtrahit famae, 7.25.1.
340 Dupont (1997) 54 cites Pliny Ep. 6.17 to argue that some laudatory or critical response 
was expected from all in attendance, but this letter seems to assume that different 
portions of the audience were expected to react in different ways.
minus  hos seductos et quasi rusticos  verear. Idem  suadeo tibi: sunt enim ut in castris 
sic etiam in litteris  nostris, plures cultu pagano  quos  cinctos  et armatos,  et quidem 
ardentissimo ingenio, diligenter scrutatus invenies,  7.25.5-6). Pliny  here assigns 
speakers a  new  task: closely  investigating their  audience to assure a fuller  understanding 
of their  response.  As their  reputations are linked to one another,  by  supplying  through 
careful observation (diligenter scrutatus) the lack created by  others’ modesty, the 
observer may  consequently  enhance his own  position.  As he augments the intellectual 
estimate of the audience,  the reciter  increases his own  reputation  by  assigning a higher 
value to their  silence: they  “offer this more generous thing, that they  honor the greatest 
work  with  silence”  (…hoc amplius  praestent,  quod maximum opus  silentio reverentur, 
7.25.1). Pliny’s description  of Terentius implicitly  demonstrates how  a  speaker  or  writer 
may  deploy  this closer  knowledge of more obscure but accomplished persons.  Unfolding 
as if it  were a  fortuitous discovery, the narrative of Pliny’s meeting with  his new  friend 
implicitly  supplies a  template for reevaluating  modest  or  otherwise obscure members of 
the elite.
3.4: Conclusion.
In  this chapter,  I have examined a series of strategies that  use exempla to assert  the 
existence of a  moral  similarity  or other  shared quality  within  a  group of people,  or  among 
different groups. Whether  these strategies function  by  emphasizing  the divide between 
the average person  and revered cultural  heroes,  or  by  encouraging  the audience to 
recognize the similarities between themselves and figures who represent the average 
person, they  differ  from  the typical critical  views of exempla  in  purporting  to describe 
people as they  are rather  than  demonstrating  how  they  should or  should not act. In 
particular  I would like to emphasize that these uses are not  simply  describing  a  common 
perception, but attempting to convince their audiences of the veracity of the illustrations.
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Exempla as Emblems
“We’ll be like those Indian  women  who go into the forest  to have babies,”  said 
Suzanne, “only  we have no forest,  we have no babies,  and we’re  not Indians. 
Otherwise, the resemblance is stunning.”
     Carrie Fisher, Postcards from the Edge
In  65  BCE while serving  as aedile, Julius Caesar  had a  statue of Marius along  with 
Victories bearing  trophies erected overnight on  the Capitol. The accompanying 
inscription recalled Marius’s victory  against  the Cimbri. According  to Plutarch,  as word 
of this gesture and of who had made it  spread,  people gathered to see the new 
monument.  Some viewers accused Caesar  of aiming  at  tyranny, others wept  with  joy  at 
the sight  of the statue (Plut.  Caes. 6).  Andrew  Gregory,  using  this episode to illustrate 
“the assertion of political allegiance and political  sympathy  through images,”  comments 
that:  “Plutarch  speaks mistakenly  of Caesar’s intentions to revive a  Marian  party; what 
Caesar  was trying  to do was to assert his own  familial connections with  Marius,  widely 
revered as a great  general,  and to carve out  a  political  identity  as anti-Sullan.” 341 By 
erecting  this statue, Caesar  publicly  adopted Marius as an  emblem  for  himself. 342 Unlike 
an  exemplum  that functions in a  categorical or  structural comparison  between  narrative 
accounts of two actions, the emblematic  linkage here largely  eschews such  narrative 
details and instead bluntly  asserts a connection  between  the two men by  the simple 
display  of an emblem. Although  in  retrospect we might connect the emphasis on 
Marius’s campaign against  the Cimbri to Caesar’s subsequent one against the Gauls,  at 
the time neither  Caesar  nor  his contemporaries could have anticipated his later  career, 
and consequently  Caesar’s gesture was concerned less with  imitating the earlier  dictator 
than with claiming the social and political authority of his image.
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341 Gregory (1994) 90.
342 He had done this on a previous occasion as well when he delivered the funeral oration  
for Marius’s wife Julia in 69 BCE.
Essentially  what  I am  describing  is a  division  of exempla into two separate but 
symbiotically  linked forms: example and emblem. The two modes are  of course not 
mutually  exclusive, but  they  do fulfill separate roles that  function  in  tandem  less often 
than  previous descriptions of exemplarity  would imply. In  the earlier  chapters of this 
dissertation  I have concentrated on  the use of exemplary  narratives as examples, 
deployed either to provide practical  models for  future  actions or  to build rhetorical 
arguments.  In this chapter, I turn to the other  major  function  of exempla as emblems of 
cultural  authority. While examples draw  primarily  on particular  actions,  emblems most 
often  are specific  authoritative persons.  Two central factors characterize exemplary 
emblems: (1)  observers assume that  the owner  or  the author  of an emblematic 
representation  shares the emblem’s character, whether or  not  evidence supports such a 
claim  of similarity, and (2) the emblematic  figure itself evokes little or  no narrative  detail 
in  order  to better  facilitate its function  as an  emblem. It  is not  that the audience of an 
emblematic  representation  could not  bring  a  deeper  knowledge of the figure to bear,  but 
rather  that they  simply  do not  do so.  An  emblem  tends to function  independently  of 
careful interpretation,  and may  even  work to discourage close consideration  of its 
imagery.
In  this chapter, I situate various forms of monument (including  statues,  houses 
and biographies)  in  relation to the alternate model of exemplary  thought  that  I describe 
in  this dissertation. 343  The first  two sections of this chapter  argue that people use 
relationships with  the emblems they  display  to shape their  position in society,  while the 
final section  focuses on  emblematic messages constructed by  assembling  multiple figures 
into collections. In  the opening  section, I discuss less public emblematic displays. 
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343 Such monuments are core elements in the discussions of Hölkeskamp and Roller: see 
Hölkeskamp (1996) 301-308 and Roller (2004) 5-6, 8-9, 10-23 on theories of cultural 
memory and the importance of monuments in their conceptions of Roman exemplarity. 
Roller 10-12 provides an overview of the variety of cultural products that may function as 
monuments; see also Jaeger (1997) 17-18.
Aristocrats could be seen  to embody  the qualities symbolized by  objects in  their  art 
collections.  Likewise,  portrait rings indicate an  emotional or  intellectual connection 
between  the portrait  and the wearer.344 The second section  of the chapter  expands this 
focus to more public assertions of connections with  well known  emblematic  figures. 
Authors, especially  biographers, may  acquire for  themselves the ethical value they  assign 
to their  subjects. The final section  examines the effect  of compilations of emblematic 
figures. I argue that  the composite effect of a  collection  of exemplary  figures tends to set 
aside the particular  details of each  member  of the collection  in  favor of an 
impressionistic collective message. Some of these compound emblems simply  attempt to 
impress their  audience by  the sheer magnitude or  number  of the component figures. 
Textual forms of this practice  range from  brief lists of names (e.g.  Cic.  Cael.  39; Quint. 
Inst. 12.2.30; Juv.  2.153-55) to extended catalogues of figures (e.g.  Verg. Aen. 6.756-859; 
Manil.  1.777-804; Tac. Ann.  15.50.1,  15.71.3-5),  and even  to book-length  collections of 
biographical or exemplary  accounts such  as Valerius Maximus’s collection as well  as 
other lost  works by  Varro, Atticus and others.345  Physical representations include 
monumental sculpture programs such as the statues of the summi viri that  lined the 
Forum  of Augustus. The monuments that  filled the public spaces of Rome, viewed as a 
collection,  could evoke the same sense.346 All  these forms of emblematic representation 
tend to deploy widely recognized figures to assert some notion of value.
4.1: You Are What You Own.
Romans assigned ethical value to the possession  of images of particular figures.  Such 
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344 For instance, writing from exile Ovid mentions a group of friends who wear rings 
bearing his image (Tr. 1.7.5-10). See also Zanker (1995) 206 on rings bearing portraits of 
Greek poets or philosophers, and Gregory (1994) 92-93 on the recognizability of the 
images on seal rings.
345 Bloomer (1992) 18, David (1998a) 13-16 and Skidmore (1996) 44-48 discuss the 
evidence for Valerius’ predecessors.
346 Cf. Hölkeskamp (1996) 305-8, 321-26; Roller (2004) 32.
connections could be either  negative or  positive.  On  the negative side we may  consider 
various condemnations based on  the possession  of images of previously  condemned 
persons. In  some cases these are the images of family  members,  in  others these are 
images of political  allies,  for  example the condemnation  of Sex.  Titius for  possession  of a 
bust of Saturninus (Cic. Pro Rab. Perd.  24; Val.  Max. 8.1.damn.3), or the condemnation 
of C.  Silius, in part for  possessing an image of his own  father  (Tac. Ann. 11.35). 347 On  the 
positive side,  authors may  offer  praise for  possessing  images of culturally  approved 
figures, as Pliny  praises Titinius Capito for  his collection  of images of Cato, Brutus and 
Cassius (Ep. 1.17).  In  this section  I focus less on  the meaning of art objects in  and of 
themselves than  on  the meaning  created by  the relationship between  an  object  and its 
owner. Private art collections and other  such  personal symbolic displays encourage 
comparison  between  owners and their  possessions.  A physical representation  of a  well-
known person  such  as a statue or  bust allows great  latitude for  interpretation. The 
symbolic meaning of these figures often draws on  vague or  partial  impressions of the 
figures rather  than  the whole  range of specific  details about them. When  they  encounter 
an  exemplary  emblem, observers may  perform  what  I have previously  described as 
‘creative contextualization,’ framing a  narrative and its particular  details to arrive at a 
particular  desired meaning. (I discuss this process in section  1.3.) This interpretive 
flexibility  also extends to the relationship between  the owner and the emblematic  image. 
Physical objects could function  as signifiers of personal character  in  ways that  might or 
might  not  be intended by  their  owner. Representations of exemplary  figures frequently 
serve as emblems of cultural authority, and social  actors appropriate exempla for 
purposes that  have only  tangential  relationships to their  initial content  (e.g.  Cato, Brutus 
and Cassius as emblems of anti-Neronian,  anti-Flavian, or  anti-Domitianic positions).348 
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347 See also Tac. Ann. 16.7 for an accusation against C. Cassius for keeping an image of 
his ancestor who had killed Caesar among his imagines.
348 I discuss the variety of uses to which a figure like Cato was put in section 1.3.
Romans could also recognize such  deployments of exempla  and other  symbolic gestures 
as pretenses, as some attitudes toward philosophers,  for  example,  indicate (e.g. 
Quintilian 1.proem.15, 12.3.12; Juv. 2.4-7).
The possession  of an  image of a  well-known  figure may  serve as proof of an 
ethical sympathy  between  the possessor  and the person  depicted. Cicero’s speech  pro 
Rabirio  perduellionis  cites the condemnation and exile of Sextus Titius for  the 
possession  of an  image of L. Saturninus as a  demonstration  of the dangers in  having  a 
bust or  picture of a  disapproved figure. 349 The orator  claims that this judgment creates a 
precedent  for  treating  possession of an  image of a hostile citizen  as evidence for  hostility 
toward the city. 350 In  Cicero’s description, keeping  such  a representation  indicates three 
possible intentions: (1)  honoring the death of this proclaimed “enemy  of the state”  (aut 
mortem  eius  honestaret),  (2) stirring up resentment among the “ignorant” (aut 
desideria imperitorum  misericordia commoveret) — “ignorant”  here implicitly 
designating  those who disagree with  the political  position  that  Cicero and his audience 
are imagined to share — or  (3)  imitating the wicked acts of the earlier  figure (aut suam 
significaret imitandae improbitatis  voluntatem,  Rab. Perd. 24). 351 The third and final 
option  in  this list of increasingly  dangerous possibilities ties possession  of an  image to 
the exemplary  pattern  of modeling  one’s own  actions on  those of another. Cicero claims 
that  owning a  representation  of a  person  indicates an  intent to imitate that  person. The 
orator’s argument  in this passage makes the partisan  political basis of this condemnation 
clear:  “And indeed we see that  the following three things were in  the realm  of possibility, 
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349 Val. Max. 8.1.damn.3 describes Titius as innocent and assigns the entire cause for his 
condemnation to the possession of the image. Bartsch (2006) 124 briefly discusses the 
role of the imago in the condemnation of Sex. Titius. For a later example, cf. Tac. Ann. 
11.35 where the condemnation of C. Silius under Claudius is accelerated by his 
possession of a statue of his condemned father.
350 Statuerunt equites Romani illo iudicio improbum civem esse et non retinendum in 
civitate, qui hominis hostilem in modum seditiosi imagine aut mortem eius honestaret, 
aut desideria imperitorum misericordia commoveret, aut suam significaret imitandae 
improbitatis voluntatem. Cic. Rab. Perd. 24.
351 See also Gregory (1994) 90-91 on Cicero’s comments about this statue.
that  either  he would be with  Saturninus,  or  with  the good men, or  that  he would keep out 
of sight.”  (Atqui videmus  haec in rerum  natura tria  fuisse, ut aut cum Saturnino esset, 
aut cum  bonis, aut lateret,  Rab.  Perd. 24).  The political use of the adjective bonus  to 
describe the conservative senatorial faction starkly  divides potential political allegiances 
into either  being  “good”  or  being with  Saturninus.  Just before  this,  Cicero establishes the 
political force of the faction  aligned against  Saturninus,  listing  the names of nearly  two 
dozen individual  consulares, as well as half a  dozen  important families.352 As he builds 
this list, the accumulation  of names takes on  an  almost  incantatory  quality  as the orator 
drives home his point  through  the sheer  number  of authoritative names.  Listing  these 
persons, most  without  any  individual comment,  deploys these persons as emblems of 
political authority  with  little connection  to any  more specific purpose than representing 
the idea  of “good”  or  “right-thinking”  citizens (boni).  This emblematic catalogue of 
aristocratic  names offers a  convenient  means to represent  the conservative political 
position  without tying  it  to anything more specific than  the cultural authority  of old 
families.
In  contrast  to the negative meaning  Cicero assigns to Titius’s possession  of a  bust 
of Saturninus, Pliny  the Younger  claims that possessing statues of Brutus, Cassius and 
Cato demonstrates the virtuous character  of Titinius Capito (Ep. 1.17).  In  the case  of 
Capito,  the possession  of images of exemplary  men  initially  suggests little more than  a 
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352 Cum ad arma consules ex senatus consulto vocavissent, cum armatus M. Aemilius, 
princeps senatus, in comitio constitisset, qui cum ingredi vix posset, non ad 
insequendum sibi tarditatem pedum sed ad fugiendum impedimento fore putabat, cum 
denique Q. Scaevola confectus senectute, perditus morbo, mancus et membris omnibus 
captus ac debilis, hastili nixus et animi vim et infirmitatem corporis ostenderet, cum L. 
Metellus, Ser. Galba, C. Serranus, P. Rutilius, C. Fimbria, Q. Catulus omnesque qui tum 
erant consulares pro salute communi arma cepissent, cum omnes praetores, cuncta 
nobilitas ac iuventus accurreret, Cn. et L. Domitii, L. Crassus, Q. Mucius, C. Claudius, 
M. Drusus, cum omnes Octavii, Metelli, Iulii, Cassii, Catones, Pompeii, cum L. 
Philippus, L. Scipio, cum M. Lepidus, cum D. Brutus, cum hic ipse P. Servilius, quo tu 
imperatore, Labiene, meruisti, cum hic Q. Catulus, admodum tum adulescens, cum hic 
C. Curio, cum denique omnes clarissimi viri cum consulibus essent: quid tandem C. 
Rabirium facere convenit? (Rab. Perd. 21).
general  sense of goodness. As Pliny  reports it,  Capito’s relationship to these famous 
Romans is more suggestive of cultish  devotion  than  active emulation: “It  is wonderful 
with  what care,  with  what  enthusiasm  he keeps portraits of Brutus, Cassius,  Cato at 
home, where he is able to do so. This same man  celebrates the life of each  very  famous 
man with  outstanding  poems” (mirum  est qua religione quo studio  imagines  Brutorum 
Cassiorum Catonum domi ubi potest habeat. Idem clarissimi cuiusque vitam  egregiis 
carminibus exornat,  Ep. 1.17.3). Capito,  as other  letters make clear,  is primarily  a  literary 
figure (Ep. 5.8  and 8.12).  His poetry  and art collection  displays a  set of figures that  meet 
with  general  approval within  Pliny’s social circle, but  this grouping of exempla suggests 
little more than adherence to a  set  of commonly  approved opinions. 353 These figures, of 
course, were not always safe  objects for  veneration  under  the principate as 
demonstrated,  for  instance, by  the enforced absence of the images of Brutus and Cassius 
at  Junia  Tertulla’s funeral (Tac., Ann. 3.76),  by  the burning  of Cremutius Cordus’s 
history  praising Brutus and Cassius (Tac.,  Ann.  4.34-35)  or  by  the concerns Tacitus 
represents Maternus’s visitors as voicing  about  their  host’s recitation  of a  tragedy  Cato 
(Tac. Dial. 2-3).  A  comment  in  Juvenal depicts Brutus and Cassius as emblems of the 
Stoic opposition to Nero and Domitian when  the satirist describes a  bottle  of wine as  “…
the sort of thing Thrasea  and Helvidius used to drink while wearing wreathes on the 
birthdays of Brutus and Cassius”  (…quale coronati Thrasea Helvidiusque bibebant | 
Brutorum  et Cassi natalibus, 5.36-37).  As central figures among  those executed or  exiled 
under Nero,  Domitian and the other Julio-Claudian  and Flavian  emperors, Thrasea  and 
Helvidius themselves become emblems of opposition to the previous regime and support 
for  the new  order  of Nerva  and Trajan. 354 This final element  suggests an important  factor 
173
353 The image of Cassius is perhaps more unusual than the others. Litchfield (1914) 45, 
noting the general absence of Cassius as an exemplum in the literary sources, suggests 
that the suppression of Cremutius Cordus’ histories may help to explain his infrequent 
appearance.
354 Cf. Freudenberg (2001) 271 on the wine in Juv. 5.36-37 and the evocation of 
Republican freedom here.
in  Titinius Capito’s devotion  to these icons of the Republic: like many  who had prospered 
under Domitian (Capito held the trusted position  of secretary  ab epistulis  under 
Domitian, a  position  he later  held under both  Nerva  and Trajan), Capito may  use these 
figures to suggest  alignment  with  the opposition  to his erstwhile imperial patron.355 
Pliny  himself had also enjoyed political success under  Domitian, although  his later 
attempts to present  himself as part  of the opposition focus more on  aligning himself with 
the friends and surviving  relatives of the Domitianic martyrs Herennius Senecio, 
Helvidius Priscus and Arulenus Rusticus (e.g.  Ep.  1.5.3; 1.14; 3.11; 7.19; 9.13). 356 Capito’s 
devoted care for these emblematic images of Cassius,  Brutus and Cato provides one 
means to “prove”  his allegiance with  those who had openly  opposed Domitian.  (I discuss 
Capito’s cultural activities further in the following section.)
Pliny’s obituary  for  Silius Italicus reports a  similar cult  of objects and images, this 
one focused on  the poet  Vergil: “He not only  possessed many  books,  many  statues,  many 
images, but even  used to worship them, those of Vergil  above all. And he used to 
celebrate that man’s birthday  more religiously  than  his own, above all in  Naples,  where 
he was accustomed to approach  Vergil’s tomb as if it were a  temple”  (Multum  ubique 
librorum,  multum  statuarum, multum imaginum, quas non habebat modo, verum 
etiam  venerabatur,  Vergili ante omnes, cuius natalem  religiosius quam  suum 
celebrabat, Neapoli maxime, ubi monimentum eius  adire ut templum  solebat,  Ep. 
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355 See Syme (1958) 92-93 and Freudenberg (2001) 225-28 on Capito’s career and 
professed Republican sentiments. ILS 1448 provides the details of Capito’s career. I 
discuss Capito’s activities further in the following section (4.2).
356 See Bartsch (1994) 167-69; Ludolph (1997) 45-47, 142-44, 149-51, 155-56; Hoffer 
(1999) 5, 8-9, 72-75; Freudenberg (2001) 229-34; Dominik (2007) 329. I discuss these 
figures further in section 4.2 below.
3.7.8).357 Silius’s cultish  devotion allows him  to enact his poetic  emulation  of the earlier 
poet  in  the physical world as well. 358  Where Capito’s care for  images of famous 
Republican  heroes like Brutus, Cassius and Cato demonstrates for  Pliny  a  general  sense 
of virtuousness and implicitly  attempts to position  him  retroactively  in  the opposition  to 
the “bad”  emperor  Domitian,  Silius’s devotion to Vergil expresses a  more focused 
connection  between  the two men.  Unlike Capito, whose public  career  displays no 
personal connection  with  the subjects of his art collection,  the Flavian poet’s epic poem 
suggests that  his cult  of Vergil functions as a  secondary  means to establish  himself as 
poetic  heir  to the earlier  author.  By  collecting  and venerating the works of his model, 
Silius Italicus uses physical objects to reinforce the artistic filiation that he labors to 
establish  through  allusions in  his poetry.  Pliny,  of course, does not  equate Silius’s poetic 
production to that  of his idol,  as we shall see Martial do in  several encomiastic epigrams. 
Pliny’s verdict on  Silius’s poetry, in  contrast,  stresses the modesty  of his 
accomplishment: “He used to write  poems with greater  care than talent”  (Scribebat 
carmina maiore  cura quam  ingenio,  3.7.5). Although he describes the cult,  Pliny 
structures his account  to avoid linking his comments on  Silius’s poetry  and Silius’s 
veneration for his poetic model.
Accounts of Silius Italicus and his extensive purchases of villas in  Campania 
demonstrate the symbolic possibilities of real estate to construct  a  similar  connection 
between  two persons.  A  villa or  other  site that  once belonged to a  well known person  may 
evoke the memory  of that  figure just  as an  image does, albeit  in  a  less direct  manner.  As 
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357 Martial 11.50 also describes Silius’s devotion to Vergil’s tomb: iam prope desertos 
cineres et sancta Maronis | nomina qui coleret, pauper et unus erat. | Silius optatae 
succurere censuit umbrae, | Silius et vatem, non minor ipse, colit. See Henderson 
(2002) 116-17 for some discussion of Martial’s epigrams concerning Silius Italicus. 
Henderson (2002) 30-31 and 115 comments more specifically on Pliny Ep. 3.7.8, but 
focuses mostly on Pliny’s remark about Silius’s consumerism: Erat Z'/>1"/.- usque ad 
emacitatis reprehensionem. Ep. 3.7.8.
358 E.g. Hardie (1993) 64-65 briefly connects Silius’s devotion to Vergil’s tomb with the 
Vergilian resonances surrounding Hannibal taking the impetus for his vendetta against 
Rome from Dido’s shrine in Carthage.
with  artwork and books, possessing  a  house or  other piece of property  that once 
belonged to another  may  suggest a  personal  similarity  between  the current  and previous 
owners. Numerous scholars have explored the idea  that  “for  Romans of the educated and 
propertied classes a  man’s country  house,  like his manner  of speech, was a  reflection  of 
his character.” 359 These discussions tend to focus on  the connection  between  a  single 
owner  and a  house, devoting little attention  to the relationship between  successive 
owners through  the medium  of the villa.  The texts I examine here in  fact  mention  almost 
nothing about the house aside from  the identity  of the former  occupant.  In some cases, 
details about the villa may  be widely  known,  but what  I primarily  want  to focus on  is the 
equation between  the former  and current occupants. Of course,  this is not  to say  that  the 
two approaches to understanding  the character  of a  house’s owner  cannot  influence one 
another.  It  is precisely  the idea  that  a  house reveals indications of its owner’s character 
which  enables a  villa  to act  as an  emblem  linking  the current and previous owners: if the 
features of an  estate reflect  the character  and lifestyle of the occupant, then it is a  small 
step to the assumption  that subsequent occupants will display  the same character. 
Houses are generally  not  exemplary  in  themselves,  but rather  serve as tokens to evoke 
the memory  of an associated emblematic figure.  We have seen  an  instance of this 
phenomenon  in  the emblematic  or  “para-exemplary”  emphasis our  sources place on  the 
location  of the emperor Tiberius’s death  in the villa  that  once belonged to Lucullus (Tac. 
Ann. 6.50; Suet.  Tib.  73). 360 Neither  the account of Tacitus nor  that  of Suetonius draws 
any  direct  connection between  the men,  but  the care they  take to connect  the place to the 
Republican voluptuary suggests an implicit link between the two.
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359 Bodel (1997) 5. See also Baroin (1998) Treggiari (1999), Hales (2003) and Henderson 
(2004). Bodel 6 n. 4 provides earlier references. For some ancient views on houses as 
index’s of their owner’s character, see e.g. Cic. De off. 1.138-40 and Nepos, Att. 13.
360 I discuss the linkage between these two figures in section 1.2. See Gowing (2005) 
64-65 on the references to this villa in obituaries for Tiberius.
In  a more explicit  fashion,  an  epigram  of Martial connects Silius Italicus with 
both  Cicero and Vergil. Silius had purchased a  Campanian villa  that  once belonged to the 
former  and had restored and celebrated the latter’s tomb.361 Even  though no one alive at 
the time of Silius and Pliny  would have been  old enough  to have personally  known  Cicero 
as the owner  of the villa  in  question,  nonetheless the association  remains available to be 
called upon. 362 Martial connects Silius’s possession  of properties associated with  famous 
predecessors to a  claim  that  he is heir not  only  to their  property, but  also to their  work. 
Silius Italicus,  who has acquired possession  of both  Vergil’s tomb and a  Campanian  villa 
previously owned by Cicero is described as the preferred successor to both men:
Silius, who possesses the acres of eloquent Cicero,
 honors this monument of great Maro.
Neither Maro nor Cicero would prefer another
 as heir and master of his tomb or his house.
Silius haec magni celebrat monumenta Maronis,
 iugera facundi qui Ciceronis habet.
Heredem dominumque sui tumulive larisve
 non alium mallet nec Maro nec Cicero. 
    Mart. 11.48
As with  the perceived connection  between Tiberius and Lucullus,  the connection that 
Martial  draws between  Silius and his models substitutes property  ownership for 
evidence of similar  character  or  talent. 363 As it  appears,  Silius attempts to use his wealth 
to purchase the appearance of being  heir  to two of the most  accomplished cultural 
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361 As Pliny reports, Silius bought numerous villas in the area: Plures isdem in locis villas  
possidebat, adamatisque novis priores neglegebat, Ep. 3.7.8. Henderson (2002) 30-31 
and 115 comments on Silius’s “buyingitis.” See also Henderson (2004) 160-63 where he 
comments on the relationship between Scipio Africanus and Vetulenus Aegialus, the 
freedman owner and caretaker of his villa at the time of Nero. Bodel (1997) argues that 
Romans assumed a close link between villas and tombs; see 22 for a brief comment on 
Silius and Vergil’s tomb.
362 Likewise Tacitus’s readers could not have personally known either Lucullus or 
Tiberius.
363 See also Mart. 7.63 which again connects Silius to Vergil and Cicero, but focuses 
directly on his activities as an advocate and as a poet rather than his possession of 
properties connected with his two predecessors. Pliny’s obituary on the other hand is 
even more dismissive of Silius’s oratorical accomplishments than his poetic ones: 
Laeserat famam suam sub Nerone (credebatur sponte accusasse) and maculam veteris 
industriae, Ep. 3.7.3.
figures from the Roman past.
Other  geographical  connections provide parallel explanations for  literary 
succession.  Pliny, for example,  claims that a  poet  friend of his,  Passennus Paulus, derives 
his talents in  the field of elegy  from  his origin  in  the same town as Propertius,  in  addition 
to his family  relationship with  the Augustan  elegist.364 In  the letters that describe Paulus, 
Pliny  seems to emphasize the family  connection and the geographical connection  as two 
separate things.  In  the first  letter  that  mentions this friend,  he explains Paulus’s 
composition  of elegies with  the following statement: “This activity  is native to that  man: 
for  he is a  fellow-townsman of Propertius and even  numbers Propertius among  his 
ancestors”  (Gentilicium hoc illi: est enim  municeps Properti atque etiam inter maiores 
suos  Propertium  numerat,  Ep.  6.15.1).  In  this explanation the family  relationship 
intensifies a  connection  already  created by  their  shared municipal origin.  The second 
letter  does not  offer  quite as clear  a  division  between  shared citizenship and family 
origin,  but  it  does emphasize the importance of location  in  molding Paulus’s poetic 
output. Pliny  explicitly  connects the quality  and character  of Paulus’s elegies to their 
composition  in  Propertius’s house: “If you  take his elegies into your  hands,  you  will read 
a  pure,  delicate,  delightful work, and one clearly  written  in  the house of Propertius”  (Si 
elegos  eius  in manus  sumpseris, leges  opus  tersum  molle iucundum, et plane in Properti 
domo scriptum, Ep.  9.22.2).  Similarity  of style  thus springs from  the shared location  “in 
the house of Propertius”  (in Properti domo).  The poet  is the emblem, his house is the 
vehicle  for  activating  the association.  The house’s actual appearance may  thus be 
essentially  immaterial for  its function  in these letters.  It  is even  possible that  the house is 
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364 See Passennus Paulus, splendidus eques Romanus et in primis eruditus, scribit 
elegos. Gentilicium hoc illi: est enim municeps Properti atque etiam inter maiores suos 
Propertium numerat, Pliny Ep. 6.15.1, and praeterea in litteris veteres aemulatur 
exprimit reddit, Propertium in primis, a quo ducit, vera suboles eoque simillima illi in 
quo ille praecipuus. Ep. 9.22.1. Sherwin-White (1966) 370 cites a dedicatory inscription 
from Asisium (ILS 2925) to give Paulus’s full name as C. Passennus Paullus Propertius 
Blaesus.
purely  metaphorical. Pliny  assumes his reader  is familiar  with  Propertius’s poetry. 
Because a  house was thought  to reflect  the character  of its owner,  therefore the reader 
should assume that  the appearance of the house agrees with  what  he or  she knows about 
Propertius. By  the same assumption, the house should reflect the current occupant  as 
well.  As both  men  share the same relationship to the same house,  Paulus clearly  must 
produce poetry  like that of Propertius. As Martial  cites Silius Italicus’s acquisition of 
property  to reinforce his praise for  the ex-consul  as heir  to Cicero and Vergil, Pliny  uses 
Paulus’s residence in  the house of Propertius to reinforce his praise for  his friend’s 
imitation of the earlier elegist.365
To close this section, I would like to turn  now  to several instances in  which 
Roman  authors themselves recognize and argue against the artificial nature of such 
emblematic  connections. Some of our  sources attack  the use of statues or  images as a 
means of molding  one’s public persona. Authors sometimes accuse others of using  such 
figures to misappropriate their  cultural prestige.  Such  attacks demonstrate that  the 
Romans themselves recognize the somewhat  arbitrary  nature of the relationship between 
an  owner and the objects he puts on  display.  In  general,  however, speakers and writers 
only  deploy  this recognition  as an isolated tactic in order  to paint  particular  opponents as 
hypocrites.  As we have seen above, in  many  other situations authors willingly  assume 
that  exemplary  emblems represent the sincere intentions or  character  of their  owner, 
that  is they  treat  these emblems as if they  were accurate models for  who their  owners 
are, who they  intend to become,  or  what they  intend to do. In  the remainder  of this 
section,  I focus on two instances where writers attack opponents for  falsely  appropriating 
the cultural  authority  of images.  Cicero’s invective against Piso offers perhaps the more 
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365 Compare, however, the later part of Ep. 9.22 where Pliny mentions that Paulus has 
begun to imitate Horatian lyric as well: Nuper ad lyrica deflexit, in quibus ita Horatium 
ut in illis illum alterum effingit: putes si quid in studiis cognatio valet, et huius 
propinquum, Ep. 9.22.2. In mentioning this shift toward emulating Horace, Pliny 
narrows the focus to the criterion of family relationship alone, leaving aside the idea of 
geographical connection he has stressed with emulation of Propertius.
dramatic  illustration  in  which  the orator  claims that  Piso has used his own  family’s 
imagines — the wax  masks of his ancestors — to inflate his political standing.  In  the 
opening  tirade of Juvenal’s second satire, the speaker  likewise attacks a  group of 
hypocritical moralists for  attempting to purchase moral rectitude with  busts of Greek 
philosophers.366  Both  cases involve speakers who attempt to drive a  wedge into the 
assumed ethical connection between persons and the art they display.
In  his speech  against Piso, Cicero charges that  his target has falsely  claimed the 
cultural  authority  of his ancestors,  represented by  the masks (imagines) displayed in  the 
entry  to his house.  He argues that  Piso’s perceived resemblance to these masks creates a 
false impression of his character. He renders his target almost  as a sinister  beast  in  this 
misappropriation  of his ancestral reputation: “You  crept up to office by  a  mistake of the 
people, by  the recommendation  of your smoky  imagines,  to which  you  have no 
resemblance except in  color”  (Obrepsisti ad honores errore hominum, commendatione 
fumosarum  imaginum, quarum  simile  habes  nihil praeter colorem, Pis.  1).  This 
argument relies on  the possibility  for  misusing  exemplary  figures,  claiming  their  social 
authority  without reproducing  the moral content  of their  actions that  supposedly 
authorizes their  use.  Rather than emulating  their  character  and actions,  the orator 
claims, Piso merely  mimics their  appearance. 367  But even  his resemblance may  be 
distorted: Cicero emphasizes the effect that  age has had on  the imagines  when  he 
specifies their  “smoky”  appearance (fumosarum  imaginum) and then claims that Piso 
resembles these masks only  in  color  (quarum  simile habes  nihil praeter colorem).  At  the 
opening  of this paragraph  in  fact he labels his target’s complexion  as “that slavish  color 
of yours”  (color iste servilis,  Pis. 1)  and compared him  to a  Syrian  slave (Syrum nescio 
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366 Similar attacks on contemporary philosophers appear in other imperial writers, e.g. 
Quintilian IO 1.proem.15 and 12.3.12.
367 Likewise Cicero also compares Piso’s public career to his own, arguing that the 
Roman people elected Piso to office based solely on respect for his family name rather 
than any knowledge of or admiration for Piso himself as Cicero claims was the case with 
his own electoral success (Pis. 1).
quem  de grege noviciorum,  Pis. 1).  Thus he suggests that Piso’s resemblance is not  to the 
imagines themselves, but  only  to the smoke that  has discolored them  over time.  Arguing 
that  his target’s reputation  derives solely  from  the public  respect given  to his ancestors, 
Cicero depicts Piso’s reputation  as a  fiction  built  over a  void.368  Only  limited public 
activity  preserves his façade of nobility  unbroken. This attack does not,  however, 
discount  personal appearance as evidence for  inner character: only  Piso himself fails to 
embody  the expectations created by  his appearance.  Piso’s appearance is a  mere mask, 
paradoxically  unlike the literal masks of his ancestors (imagines).  This contrast  depicts 
wax  portraits as reliable witnesses to the character  of men  now  dead but  denies the 
validity  of appearance as a  witness for  a  living man. Cicero acknowledges the possibility 
for  purely  self-interested use of exempla, but  he carefully  limits this negative potential to 
an  individual  who appears as an  incomplete actor  in the social  and political world of 
Rome.
Cicero’s description  of Piso’s public inactivity  glances broadly  over  the traditional 
activities of Roman aristocrats: “Your  voice was never  heard in  the forum,  no trial  was 
ever  made of your  advice, not  only  did you  not  do any  outstanding  act either  in  military 
service or  at home, but  not  even  anything noticed at all”  (Numquam  erat audita vox in 
foro,  numquam  periculum  factum  consili, nullum  non modo inlustre sed ne notum 
quidem factum aut militiae aut domi, Pis.  1).  These activities emphasize public 
observation  as the central  means of evaluating  action: Piso’s voice is never  heard; his 
advice  is never  tried; his actions neither  call  attention  to themselves (nullum… inlustre) 
nor even  attract  casual notice (ne notum quidem).  Visible and audible activity  forms the 
basis for  accurate judgment  of character. Public  activity  is characterized as a  sincere 
communication  between  the speaker and his audience: it  is simply  Piso’s lack of public 
activity that preserves the fiction created by his perceived resemblance to his imagines.
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368 For other instances of people failing to live up to their family’s reputation, see Val. 
Max. 3.5 and Juv. 8.231-35.
The opening  tirade against  the false Stoics in  Juvenal’s second satire presents a 
number  of parallels to Cicero’s representation  of Piso using  his imagines  to present a 
false image of social authority.  These fake moralists differ  from  the Republican  aristocrat 
in  the choice of cultural markers used to create their  façade of respectability. 369 Where 
Piso’s social  and political standing  rests on  the portraits of his ancestors preserved 
through  his family’s imagines, these false Stoics attempt  to purchase respectability  with 
statues of Greek philosophers: “For  he is the most  complete representative of them, if 
someone buys a likeness of Aristotle or  Pittacos and bids his bookshelf to hold original 
statues of Cleanthes”  (nam perfectissimus  horum, | si quis  Aristotelen similem vel 
Pittacon emit | et iubet archetypos pluteum  servare Cleanthas.  2.5-7). Portraits and 
statues of Greek  philosophers and poets,  of course,  constitute a  common  element in  the 
decoration  of the homes of the Roman elite. Zanker states that their  purpose was “to 
conjure up an impression  of learning,”  claiming that “In  the overly  competitive climate  of 
the Late Republic  and Early  Imperial  period,  cultural  pretensions quickly  became a 
vehicle  for  winning distinction.”370 Thus Juvenal in  fact  targets a widespread element of 
elite home decor  in  his attack on these hypocritical moralists.  This tactic forces his 
audience into an uncomfortable position where they  may  be forced to recognize 
something  of themselves in  the satirist’s targets.  In  an  article on  the poem,  Jonathan 
Walters argues that  the speaker  attempts to create a  “community  of the righteous”  united 
through  common disapproval of the various behaviors put on view.371 But  by  suggesting 
that  his audience may  share certain  behaviors with  the targets of his invective, the 
satirical  speaker  goes beyond merely  recruiting his audience in  this community  and 
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369 Quintilian 1.proem.15 and 12.3.12 attacks those who attempt present themselves as 
moral by adopting the pose of philosophers, but his criticisms focus primarily on their 
style of clothing and personal grooming.
370 Zanker (1995) 206. Connected to this claim, Zanker offers an oddly reductive reading 
of Juv. 2.1-7, focusing solely on lack of education but ignoring the false claims of 
morality: “Soon Juvenal would complain that you could not go to the home of the most 
uneducated man without seeing plaster casts of the great philosophers and wise men.”
371 Walters (1998) 149-50.
instead forces them  either  to search  actively  for  an  external  target for  the attack or  to risk 
identifying  themselves with  the position  of the hypocritical philosophers.372 The speaker 
attempts to compel each auditor or  reader to accept  the ethical framework of his attack 
by  placing  the audience in  a  position where they  must choose either  to join  the speaker  in 
condemning  this hypocrisy  or  to discover  themselves to be a  fellow  hypocrite  among  the 
condemned.  The satire seizes on  a  common  practice  — but  one that in  many  cases may 
have received little serious attention  from  its practitioners373  — in  order  to trap such 
unreflective art  collectors into endorsing  the speaker’s attacks and thus deflecting the 
invective away  from  their  own  potentially  embarrassing  emblematic baggage.  Presenting 
these hypocrites as examples, Juvenal demonstrates the potential for  deception  inherent 
in  the display  of emblematic images.  His argument,  however,  does not  attack the use of 
emblems as a  practice,  but rather directs his invective at these particular  users of 
emblems. The satire thus combines both  varieties of exemplum: Juvenal here  presents 
the false Stoics as examples depicting the deceptive use of emblems.
4.2: You Are What You Publish.
While  owning  a statue of an  exemplary  person  merely  suggests a  connection  between  the 
owner  and the subject,  by  publishing  a biography, reciting  a  eulogy  or  dedicating  a 
monument  to an  emblematic figure, a  speaker  or  writer  could publicly  declare his 
admiration  for  the subject  and thus assert  his connection to that person.  A  number  of 
sources link the moral worth  of authors of exemplary  accounts to that  of their  subjects. 
Pliny,  for  example, ascribes moral worth  to authors, such  as C. Fannius and Titinius 
Capito,  who wrote biographies of Domitianic  and Neronian  martyrs.  Capito in  particular 
appears to follow  the same pattern of activity  as T.  Pomponius Atticus,  both  as a  recorder 
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372 The shift to the second person at Juv. 2.9-10 in this passage produces a similar effect. 
Concerning this tactic, see Gunderson (2000) 70 discussing Quintilian IO 5.10.23-25 on 
the ability of a rhetorically adept speaker to find vices even within positive traits.
373 See Zanker (1995) 207.
of accomplished men and as a patron  of literary  activity.  In this view  of writing  history 
and biography, the writer  imitates in  some sense the acts he narrates and may  also 
himself take on  the status of a  model for  imitation. Publishing a  laudatory  narrative of 
the actions of a  previous figure or  setting  up an honorific  statue to that  person  acts as a 
public declaration  and suggests an  intent  to imitate. The simple act of narration, in fact, 
sometimes seems to substitute for  literal imitation.  It  is in this way  that Atticus can 
become “the greatest imitator  of the character  of our ancestors”  (maiorum… moris 
summus  imitator, Nepos,  Att. 18) through  his antiquarian  and genealogical research, 
while Titinius Capito and C.  Fannius imitate the  Neronian  and Domitianic martyrs 
through  the recitation and publication  of death  (exitus)  narratives (Pliny,  Ep.  1.17; 5.5; 
8.12).
In  one letter,  Pliny  clearly  combines giving  praise with a  desire to be like  the 
object  of praise.  The opening epistle in  his third book of letters announces the author’s 
intent to imitate its subject,  the elder  senator  Vestricius Spurinna: “I don’t know  whether 
I have spent  any  more delightful  time than  when I was with  Spurinna  recently.  It  was so 
delightful  in  fact  that I would prefer  to emulate no one else in  old  age, if only  it  is granted 
to me to grow  old”  (Nescio an ullum  iucundius  tempus  exegerim,  quam quo nuper apud 
Spurinnam fui,  adeo  quidem ut neminem  magis in senectute,  si modo senescere datum 
est,  aemulari velim,  Ep. 3.1.1). Henderson  describes Pliny  in  this letter as adopting 
Spurinna’s career  and retirement as a  blueprint  for  his own life.374  At  the close of the 
epistle,  Pliny  repeats his desire  to model  his own  retirement on Spurinna’s current 
lifestyle,  and further  he expands the comparison  between  himself and the older  senator 
to encompass their  parallel  attitudes toward political service: “Meanwhile I am  worn 
down by  a thousand labors, for  which  the same man,  Spurinna,  is both  a  solace and a 
model to me; for he also,  for  as long  as it brought  him  honor,  discharged duties, 
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374 I also discuss this letter in section 3.3 of the previous chapter. See also Henderson 
(2002) 59, 62-66 on Pliny’s prospective modeling himself on Spurinna.
performed public offices,  ruled provinces, and by  much labor  deserved this 
leisure”  (Interim  mille laboribus  conteror,  quorum  mihi et solacium  et exemplum est 
idem  Spurinna; nam ille quoque,  quoad honestum fuit,  obiit officia,  gessit magistratus, 
provincias  rexit, multoque  labore hoc  otium  meruit,  Ep.  3.1.11-12).  Pliny’s letter 
describing  the retired senator’s lifestyle both  presents Spurinna  as an emblem  and 
expresses a desire to adopt him as a model.
Such authorial self-projection  could take on  much  more politically  aggressive 
forms. A  number  of figures during  the first  century  CE became political  martyrs by 
publishing  eulogies of earlier opposition  figures.  In  most  of the following  cases, the 
biographies these men  published have not survived, but  this loss has the perhaps 
unexpected benefit of allowing  us to consider  the emblematic function of the book as a 
discrete object without the distraction of its textual content. When  considering a  eulogy 
as an emblematic gesture rather  than  as a  narrative, it  is instructive to consider  that  in 
some sense the book as an  object  is always less than  the sum  of its contents.  Thus,  it  may 
be enough  to know  that  a  particular  book  contains, for  example,  a  ‘praise of Thrasea’ to 
understand the core of its function as an emblem.
Just  as Cicero claimed that  displaying a  bust  of Saturninus indicates an  intent to 
imitate his acts (Rab. Perd.  24),375 narrating  the acts of another  person  suggests a  desire 
to imitate that person, and in  a  number of cases results in  the author’s martyrdom  as 
well.  Where it  is a  hostile prosecutor  who uses the bust as an emblem  to attack Titius, 
however, these eulogists actively  invite the comparisons that  eventually  leads to their 
deaths. For  instance, among  those executed by  Domitian in  93  CE, two men  were 
charged,  at  least  in  part, because they  praised earlier  icons of opposition  to the 
principate.  One, Arulenus Rusticus, wrote eulogies (laudes) of both Thrasea  Paetus and 
Helvidius Priscus (Tac.,  Agr.  2.1; Suet.,  Dom. 10.3). The other, Herennius Senecio, also 
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375 I discuss Cicero’s comments on Sex. Titius’s statue of Saturninus in the previous 
section 4.1.
wrote a  biography  of Helvidius at  the request  of Helvidius’s widow  Fannia  (Tac., Agr. 
2.1; Pliny, Ep.  7.19.5). In  the introduction to the Agricola,  Tacitus states that  not only 
were these two authors executed but  Domitian  had their  books burned as well.376 A.  J. 
Turner suggests that Tacitus exploits a potential ambiguity  between the subjective and 
objective genitive within  the description of these books as “the monuments of the most 
famous talents”  (monumenta clarissimorum  ingeniorum,  Agr. 2)  in  order  to tie the 
original  actors together with  the authors of their  biographies.377 Dylan Sailor  develops 
this point,  focusing  on  the fame shared by  writer  and subject: “through  the text,  the 
authors themselves share in  the claritudo  (monumenta clarissimorum  ingeniorum) that 
is the  quality  of persons worthy  of memory  (clarorum virorum  facta moresque …); and 
what  were imagined before as simple acts of ‘handing on’ the lives of illustrious men 
have become monumenta, physical  testaments of the ingenia  that composed them, 
preserving  their  auctores  as well as their  subjects.” 378  This idea is representative of a 
widespread assumption, particularly  in  evidence during  the first  century  of the 
principate,  that  objects of praise serve as emblems for  the authors of their  praise. 
Publishing a  laudatory  account  of some person  often  is treated as evidence that  the 
author takes his subject as an exemplary model.
Herennius Senecio and Arulenus Rusticus come at  the end of a  chain  of authors 
killed for  publishing  laudatory  accounts of earlier  opposition  figures. Freudenburg 
remarks that: “the making  of martyrs in stories,  according  to Tacitus, in the first century 
CE became a  sure and regular  means for  the making  of new  martyrs in fact.” 379 
Cremutius Cordus, who committed suicide in  25  CE,  was among  the earliest  of these 
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376 Legimus, cum Aruleno Rustico Paetus Thrasea, Herennio Senecioni Priscus 
Helvidius laudati essent, capitale fuisse, neque in ipsos modo auctores, sed in libros 
quoque eorum saevitum, delegato triumviris ministerio ut monumenta clarissimorum 
ingeniorum in comitio ac foro urerentur. Tac. Agr. 2.1.
377 Turner (1997) 590-91.
378 Sailor (2004) 148.
379 Freudenburg (2001) 220, emphasis in the original.
authors: he published annals praising Brutus and calling Cassius the “last of the 
Romans.” 380  After  he was accused for  publishing  these opinions,  Cremutius starved 
himself to death,  and the Senate ordered his books burned.  In  the closing  lines of his 
defense speech  to the Senate as written for  him  by  Tacitus, Cremutius claim  that his 
conviction  will  solidify  his connection with  Caesar’s killers: “Posterity  repays their  own 
honor  to each  person; if condemnation  falls on me,  those who will remember  not only 
Cassius and Brutus but  me as well  will not be lacking”  (suum  cuique decus  posteritas 
rependit; nec deerunt,  si damnatio  ingruit,  qui non modo Cassii et Bruti set etiam  mei 
meminerint,  Tac.  Ann.  4.35).  Thrasea Paetus,  whom  Rusticus later  eulogized, himself 
wrote a  biography  of the younger Cato (Plut. Cat. Min. 25, 37).  Thrasea’s treatise may 
have been only  one among a  series of gestures linking himself emblematically  to Cato. 
For  instance, Juvenal describes Thrasea,  along  with  his son-in-law  Helvidius, celebrating 
the birthdays of Cato and Brutus (Juv.  5.36-37).381 Martial treats the two men  as a  pair  in 
an  epigram  where he advises a  friend to imitate the lives of Cato and Thrasea,  but not 
their  deaths. 382 Tacitus describes a  parallel connection  of this sort  in  the Dialogus  when 
Maternus’s friends express concern for  his safety  on the day  after  he has recited a 
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380 Cremutius Cordus postulatur novo ac tunc primum audito crimine, quod editis 
annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dixisset. Tac., Ann. 
35. See also Dio 57.24.2-4; Suet. Tib. 61.3, Cal. 16.1. Modern critics frequently cite the 
accusation against Cremutius and his suicide: see e.g. Bartsch (1994) 84-86, 106; 
Freudenburg (2001) 219-20; Gowing (2005) 26-27, 32-33, 131. Bartsch (1994) 105-6 
points out that Cremutius’s comments were not the only accusation made against the 
historian and suggests that Tacitus exaggerates the role of such writings in this 
condemnation.
381 Such birthday celebrations could sometimes even become the basis for accusations: 
according to Suetonius, Domitian had Salvius Cocceianus executed for celebrating the 
birthday of his uncle, the emperor Otho (Dom. 10). Silius Italicus’s celebration of Vergil’s 
birthday provides less politically fraught example (Pliny, Ep. 3.7.8; I discuss this passage 
in section 4.1 above).
382 Quod magni Thraseae consummatique Catonis | dogmata sic sequeris salvos ut esse 
velis, | pectore nec nudo strictos incurris in ensis, quod fecisse velim te, Deciane, facis. 
Martial 1.8.1-4.
tragedy  Cato  (Dial.  2-3). 383 In  all of these cases, publishing  or reciting  a  biographical 
account of an  iconic  figure—Cato, Brutus, Cassius, Thrasea, or  the like—serves as a 
gesture claiming moral and political filiation from that model.
Titinius Capito provides another  example of this type of emblematic act.  The 
letter  in  which  Pliny  praises Capito’s character  by  means of his statue collection  takes 
another,  more public  gesture as its frame. In  the opening  of the letter,  Pliny  announces 
that  Capito obtained permission  from  the emperor  to erect  a  statue of Lucius Silanus in 
the Roman forum  (Ep.  1.17.1).  In  the closing  sentences, he equates the dedicator  and the 
subject  of the honorific statue as recipients of the fame ensured by  the monument: “The 
honor  that  was owed has been repaid to Silanus; Capito has provided for  that  man’s 
immortal fame at the same time as for  his own.  Indeed it  is no more fine and 
distinguished to have a  statue in the forum  of the Roman people than to erect 
one”  (Redditus est Silano debitus  honor, cuius  immortalitati Capito  prospexit pariter et 
suae.  Neque enim magis  decorum  et insigne est statuam in foro  populi Romani habere 
quam  ponere,  Pliny,  Ep.  1.17.4). By  dedicating a  statue in  the forum, Capito engages in  a 
form  of self-advertisement  that  both  asserts his own  status and establishes Silanus as an 
emblem  of his relationship to the principate.384 In  honoring  Silanus, Capito takes part  in 
a  widespread pattern  following  Domitian’s assassination of honoring  the persons killed 
or  exiled by  the ‘bad’ emperors such  as Nero and Domitian.  Situating  Capito’s gesture 
within  this trend, Freudenburg  writes: “Like the made-to-order  hero-stories of Pliny, 
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383 Maternus’s intention to write a tragedy on Thyestes carries a similar danger as a 
statement against the principate, but does not suggest the same exemplary identification 
between author and subject that the Cato does (Tac., Dial. 3). For a parallel to 
Maternus’s proposed Thyestes, see Tac., Ann. 6.29 and Dio 58.24 (on an accusation 
against Aemilius Scaurus supposedly motivated by verses directed against the emperor 
Tiberius in his play Atreus), and Suet. Dom. 10.3 and Dio 67.13 (on the younger 
Helvidius Priscus, executed for writing a play on Paris and Oenone that was interpreted 
as criticism of Domitian’s divorce).
384 Compare Caesar’s erection of a statue of Marius on the Capitol in 65 BCE as a 
declaration of a political position (Plut., Caes. 6). See Gregory (1994) 90 on Caesar’s 
statue of Marius and 92 on Capito’s statue of Silanus.
Tacitus, and so many  others, Capito’s statue-work  is instrumental  not only  in  defining 
Lucius Silanus,  whom  the statue portrays, as a  hero who dared to stand up to Nero. More 
importantly,  it  says something about who Capito is,  what he values and, most 
importantly,  how  he relates to the events of Rome’s recent, traumatic past.” 385 Pliny 
precisely  calibrates the meaning  of this statue dedication by  positioning  it  as 
categorically  equivalent  to Capito’s possession  of busts of Brutus,  Cassius and Cato (Ep. 
1.17.3).386  The implied parallel between  Silanus and the revered heroes of the fading 
Republic colors the significance of Capito’s request  in  this letter  by  suggesting that 
Silanus himself may  belong  to this group. Freudenburg argues that  the emblematic  link 
between  Capito and the Neronian  nobleman  allows the former  to assume some portion 
of his political force: “By  erecting the statue, and putting  his name on  it,  he claims some 
small share in Silanus’s defiance.” 387
There is,  however, one problem  with  this claim: Silanus never stood up to Nero. 
Although  Pliny’s letter  implies a  connection between Silanus and Caesar’s killers, this 
connection  is tenuous at  best.  In  Tacitus’s account of his death, Silanus emerges as more 
victim  than hero (Ann.  16.7-9). Although  modern  critics consistently  identify  him  as the 
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385 Freudenburg (2001) 226; see 215-34 for Freudenburg’s full discussion of these martyr 
tales.
386 The inclusion of Cassius in this list of Republican heroes may refer to the Neronian 
jurisconsult Gaius Cassius, who was married to Silanus’s aunt Iunia Lepida and who was 
accused and exiled along with Silanus (Tac., Ann. 16.7-9). The charge against Cassius 
was keeping an image of Caesar’s killer Cassius among his family’s death masks: 
obiectavitque Cassio quod inter imagines maiorum etiam C. Cassii effigiem coluisset, 
ita inscriptam ‘duci partium’, Tac., Ann. 16.7; see also Suet., Nero 37.
387 Freudenburg (2001) 226; Freudenburg continues on to claim that Pliny’s letter writes 
him into the chain of ethical links as well. In publishing a letter about this particular 
statue, Pliny may even indirectly hint at his own family connections to this victim: 
Tacitus Ann. 16.8 mentions that Pliny’s grandfather-in-law Calpurnius Fabatus was 
among those accused as conscii in Silanus’s purported incest with his aunt, but he 
ultimately escaped condemnation because he was too unimportant to pursue. Compare 
this to Pliny’s ‘innocent’ references to his close relationship with the family of Helvidius: 
see e.g. Hoffer (1999) 4, 8, 177-; Ludolph (1997) 147-51; Freudenburg (2001) 219 with n. 
15; Henderson (2002) 138. This connection would not have been active at the time the 
original letter would have been sent because Pliny would not have yet married Calpurnia 
(Pliny’s previous wife died in 97), but it would come into play when Pliny revised and 
published this letter.
L.  Iunius Silanus who was exiled and later  murdered on  Nero’s orders in  65  CE, they  do 
not discuss the details of his death  beyond the simple fact  that  he was a  victim  of Nero.388 
Treating  him  as a  cypher, some critics suggest that  Silanus was part  of the opposition  to 
Nero. As we have just  seen,  for  example,  Freudenburg  claims that Capito’s statue 
“[defines]  Lucius Silanus… as a  hero who dared to stand up to Nero.” 389 Pliny’s letter, 
which  never  mentions any  details about  Silanus aside from  his name, encourages such 
speculation by  equating this dedication  and Capito’s private devotion  to the memory  of 
Brutus,  Cassius and Cato.  According to Tacitus,  however,  Nero attacks Silanus without 
provocation  because of the “fame of his family  and his modest youth” (claritudine 
generis  generis  et modesta iuventa,  Ann.  16.7). 390 Tacitus labels the charges against the 
young man  as “both  empty  and false” (inania simul et falsa),  explaining that  “Silanus 
was very  threatened by  fear  and driven  by  terror  at the death of his uncle to be on his 
guard”  (Silanus intentior metu et exitio patrui ad praecavendum  exterritus erat, 
16.8). 391 Only  at the moment  of death  does this victim  become anything  like the heroic 
figure Freudenburg suggests,  but  this act of resistance is not directed against  either Nero 
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388 See e.g. Freudenburg (2001) 225, who describes Silanus simply as “one of Nero’s 
victims in 65 CE”, footnoting the paragraph in Tacitus describing his death (Ann. 16.9), 
but omitting the previous two that introduce the young man and the false charges 
against him. In a possibly revealing omission one sentence later on the same page, 
Freudenburg (2001) 225 n. 31 also omits to include in a list of men condemned for 
possessing statues of martyrs or tyrannicides that Silanus’s fellow defendant C. Cassius 
was charged for possessing an image of the killer of Caesar among his imagines (Tac., 
Ann. 16.7). Syme (1958) 92 mentions the statue of Silanus but identifies the subject only 
as “a nobleman who had been put to death by Nero.”
389 Freudenburg (2001) 226.
390 Silanus is not even the first target in this prosecution; that honor goes to the well-
known jurisconsult Gaius Cassius who was married to Silanus’s aunt Iunia Lepida (Tac., 
Ann. 16.7-8). Silanus’s political passivity is in fact typical of the rather numerous family 
of the Iunii Silani under the Julio-Claudians: Syme (1986) 188 comments, “Few Silani 
ever made an impact through personality or talent, or from any action.”
391 In response to his boasting of his descent from Augustus, Silanus’s uncle Torquatus 
had been compelled to commit suicide the year before Silanus was charged (Tac. Ann. 
15.35).
or  the principate in  general. Silanus merely  struggles against the centurion  sent  to kill 
him as best he can before he is cut down. 392
Interpreting  Silanus’s attitude toward Nero as “resistance”  thus confuses the 
categories of opposition  figure and victim.  This confusion collapses the possible range of 
meanings that  these various executed and exiled persons may  represent  through  their 
individual narratives.  So, why  would Silanus be a  useful  exemplum  for  Capito to 
monumentalize? Capito may  have chosen  Silanus precisely  because he has no other 
public significance than  as a  victim: his exile and murder  represents tyrannical  violence 
in  its purest  form  because it is essentially  arbitrary. 393  The innocuous character of 
Silanus also insulates Capito against  appearing to endorse resistance to the principate 
itself as an institution rather than  merely  against  particular  ‘bad’ emperors. While 
establishing  a  symbolic  connection  to Silanus does not offer Capito a  direct path  to 
claiming to resist Domitian, it does carry  the suggestion  that  Capito might have imitated 
Nero’s victim by becoming himself a victim of Domitian. 394
Capito’s engagement  with  honoring such ‘martyrs’ extends beyond the public 
monument  to Silanus and his private statue collection. As Pliny  informs us,  Capito also 
wrote laudatory  poems and exitus  narratives (Ep.  1.17.3; 8.12.4-5). Pliny’s personal 
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392 Silanus tamquam Naxum deveheretur Ostiam amotus, post municipio Apuliae, cui 
nomen Barium est, clauditur. illic indignissimum casum sapienter tolerans a 
centurione ad caedem misso corripitur; suadentique venas abrumpere animum quidem  
morti destinatum ait, sed non remittere percussori gloriam ministerii. at centurio 
quamvis inermem, praevalidum tamen et irae quam timori propriorem cernens premi 
a militibus iubet. nec omisit Silanus obniti et intendere ictus, quantum manibus nudis 
valebat, donec a centurione vulneribus adversis tamquam in pugna caderet. Tac. Ann. 
16.9.
393 Except, of course, that Silanus was a descendant of Augustus and thus a potential 
dynastic threat to Nero. His father and both his uncles had been murdered or forced to 
suicide, most recently his uncle Torquatus who committed suicide in 64 (Tac., Ann. 15.35  
and 16.8). Syme (1986) 188 describes Silanus’s immediate family as “foredoomed to 
splendour and tribulation” by their descent from Augustus.
394 Pliny repeatedly describes himself as a potential victim of Domitian in asserting his 
connections with the families of Arria, Fannia and Iunius Mauricus (e.g. Ep. 3.11.3, 7.19); 
Tacitus suggests a similar potential in the biography of his father-in-law Agricola (Agr. 
39, 41-43). See also Freudenburg (2001) 223-24.
affinity  for  the subjects of these works underlies his enthusiastic description  of these 
activities: “He writes of the deaths of famous men, among these of certain  ones very  dear 
to me”  (scribit exitus  inlustrium  virorum, in his  quorundam mihi carissimorum,  Ep. 
8.12.4). 395  For  Pliny,  Capito’s recitations act  like  funeral rites in  honoring  and 
commemorating  the dead: “Therefore I seem  to perform  a  dutiful  service: and for  those 
men  whose rites it  was not  possible to celebrate,  I seem  to be present as if for  their 
funeral  praises – late, it is true,  but  so much  the more true”  (Videor ergo fungi pio 
munere,  quorumque exsequias  celebrare non licuit,  horum quasi funebribus 
laudationibus  seris  quidem  sed tanto magis veris  interesse,  Ep.  8.12.5).  Like Pliny 
himself and many  other  writers of the time, Capito studiously  affirms his allegiance to 
Trajan’s new  order through  the posthumous praise of these victims.  His enthusiasm 
attempts to suppress his earlier  advancement by  Domitian,  under  whom  he had served 
as secretary  ab epistulis. 396 Syme suggests that funeral  orations provide the original  basis 
for  this type of biography,  although  he disparages the expansion  of the practice beyond 
the family  and close friends of the deceased: “If the practice took  its origin  from  the 
funeral  oration, it  was soon exploited by  persons extraneous to the deceased, avowedly 
as a genre intermediate between  oratory  and history.” 397  Syme interprets Capito’s 
publicly  displayed enthusiasm  for  the Republican  past as a  blatant  exercise in  fakery, 
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395 Pliny also provides an obituary for another writer of exitus narratives whose work he 
describes as pulcherrimum opus: Gaius Fannius “used to write about the ends of those 
killed or exiled by Nero and he had completed three fine, careful books in good Latin, 
halfway between conversation and history” (scribebat tamen exitus occisorum aut 
relegatorum a Nerone et iam tres libros absoluerat subtiles et diligentes et Latinos 
atque inter sermonem historiamque medios, Pliny, Ep. 5.5.3).
396 Freudenberg (2001) 228 discusses Capito’s ability to accommodate himself to the 
changes in government from Domitian to Trajan. Cf. also Syme (1958) vol. 1, 93 on the 
incongruity between Capito’s public life and his literary activities. Our evidence for 
Capito’s public career derives from ILS 1448: Cn. Octavius Titinius Capito | praef. 
cohortis, trib. milit., donat. | hasta pura corona vallari, proc. ab | epistulis et a 
patrimonio, iterum ab | epistulis divi Nervae, eodem auctore | ex s. c. praetoriis 
ornamentis, ab epistul. | tertio imp. Nervae Caesar. Traiani Aug. Ger., | praef. vigilum, 
Volcano d. d.
397 Syme (1958) 91-92.
labeling  him  “a  document of social mimicry.”  In making this judgment, he places great 
importance on family  connections and social class to justify  a preference for using 
representations of aristocratic  figures for  their  symbolic  capital: “No suspicion of 
Republican  sentiments incriminates the life and career  of Titinius Capito, nor does any 
link  of propinquity  with  the aristocratic houses explain or  extenuate his behavior. … 
Undue subservience to the prestige of rank and station transforms imitation into parody, 
involuntarily exposing the inner falsity of conventional beliefs and pious observances.” 398
This dismissal of Capito’s activities as a  literary  variety  of social climbing, 
however, ignores an important model for  both  the production  of such  historical  works 
and the encouragement  of other  writers:  the late Republican  banker  and antiquarian 
scholar  T.  Pomponius Atticus.  Like Capito,  Atticus was an  equestrian  who proved himself 
adept at  surviving the political upheavals of his lifetime.399 Cicero heralds his friend’s 
scholarly  works as a  rich  source for  historical instances.400 According to Nepos, in  at 
least  some of his works Atticus achieved epigrammatic brevity  in  his accounts of the 
deeds and offices of his subjects.401  Nepos,  himself a  probable recipient  of Atticus’s 
encouragement, describes his historical interests in  terms that anticipate Capito’s 
adopted cultural role: “He was also the greatest  imitator  of the character  of our  ancestors 
(mos  maiorum)  and a lover  of antiquity, which  he knew  so thoroughly  that  he explained 
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398 Syme (1958) vol. 1, 92. Freudenberg (2001) 227-28 discusses Capito and Syme’s 
interpretation of his social, literary and intellectual role as “the Maecenas of Trajan’s 
Rome” [Syme (1958) vol. 1, 93].
399 V. Nep. Vit. Att. 6-12, 16. I discuss Atticus as an exemplary model for personal 
survival in section 3.3 of the previous chapter.
400 Nunc vero, quoniam haec nos etiam tractare coepimus, suppeditabit nobis Atticus 
noster e thesauris suis quos et quantos viros! (de Fin. 2.67). The phrase e thesauris suis 
may pun on Atticus’s notable wealth. Nepos likewise comments on Atticus’s histories of 
various noble families: quibus libris nihil potest esse dulcius iis, qui aliquam 
cupiditatem habent notitiae clarorum virorum (Vit. Att. 18). Cf. David (1998a) 15 on 
Atticus’s historical works.
401 namque versibus, qui honore rerumque gestarum amplitudine ceteros populi 
Romani praestiterunt, exposuit ita, ut sub singulorum imaginibus facta 
magistratusque eorum non amplius quaternis quinisve versibus descripserit: quod vix 
credendum sit tantas res tam breviter potuisse declarari (Nep. Vit. Att. 18).
it  in  its entirety  in  that volume, in  which he enumerated the magistracies”  (moris  etiam 
maiorum  summus imitator fuit antiquitatisque amator,  quam  adeo diligenter habuit 
cognitam,  ut eam  totam in eo  volumine exposuerit, quo  magistratus ordinavit,  Vit.  Att. 
18.1-2). Atticus as a  collector  and publisher  of such  historical  and cultural material,  as 
well  as a  supporter  of others’ scholarly  activity, may  provide a  model for later  scholars 
and patrons: the recorder of the deeds of famous men  himself becomes an exemplum,  as 
does Capito in turn.
By  recording famous acts,  both  Atticus and Capito assume something  of the 
cultural  authority   belonging to the persons whose lives they  record. 402 In  his biography 
of Atticus, Nepos suggests that  recording  an act in  writing becomes almost  a  means of re-
enacting  it  as if imitating  an  exemplum.  Atticus’s antiquarian  publications form  much  of 
the basis for  his appearance as imitator: the passage in  the biography  passes in  a  smooth 
progression  from  Atticus as “imitator  of the character  of our ancestors” (moris  etiam 
maiorum  summus imitator),  to his love for  and complete knowledge of antiquity,  and 
finally  to his composition  of a  book on  Roman  magistracies (Att.  18.1-2).  Reading this 
sequence in  reverse order  reveals the underlying logic  of this progression: Atticus’s book 
demonstrates his antiquarian knowledge, and this in  turn demonstrates his love for  and 
thus his perceived imitation  of the ancestral practices of Rome. Nepos links the 
antiquarian symbolically  with  the content  of his work: publishing  his knowledge of the 
past  demonstrates his love for  ancestral practices.  Atticus shows that the connection 
between  an  author  and his work  can  encompass a  much  broader  range than  the relatively 
focused connections between  the exitus  writers and the various Imperial  victims. As I 
discussed near  the beginning  of this section,  the introduction  to Tacitus’s Agricola  also 
suggests this connection  between  historical  actors and the recorders of their  acts through 
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402 Compare Wallace-Hadrill (1997) 13-14 who suggests that antiquarianism replaced the 
idea of the inherited tradition of the nobility as a basis of authority in the late Republic 
and Augustan era.
the echo between  the opening words—“The deeds and practices of famous 
men”  (Clarorum  virorum  facta moresque,  Agr.  1)—and the description  of the books 
written  by  Arulenus Rusticus and Herennius Senecio as “monuments of the most  famous 
talents”  (monumenta clarissimorum ingeniorum, Agr.  2). 403  In  this echo, Tacitus 
establishes fame as a  transferable property  between  political actors and their  literary 
narrators.  Pliny’s summary  praise for  Capito’s statue collection  and laudatory  poems 
evinces the same pattern: “You  may  know  that  the man  who loves others’ virtues in  this 
way  abounds in  many  of his own”  (Scias ipsum plurimis  virtutibus abundare,  qui 
alienas  sic amat,  Pliny,  Ep.  1.17.4).  Within  this conception  of biographical writing,  a 
public declaration  of praise by  means of recitation or  publication establishes the subject 
of the eulogy  as an  emblem  for  the author’s own  character. Such  a  public  declaration 
implies that the attitude expressed about the emblematic  figure also demonstrates 
something  about the character of the author, whether  or  not  the latter’s life  or  actions 
support  the connection.  The Roman  assumption  that people should imitate actions they 
approve thus enables individuals to claim  that  those whom  they  adopt  as emblems for 
their moral or political views serve as proofs of their own character.
4.3: Collecting the Mos Maiorum.
In  the final section  of this chapter, I shift  my  focus to the emblematic  function of 
collections of exempla rather than  the one-to-one correspondences between an  emblem 
and its owner  or  author  that occupied the previous sections. Groups of exemplary 
representations in  textual or  sculptural  form  could evoke an  impressionistic vision of 
Roman  accomplishments,  traditional morality  as a  system  (mos maiorum)  or  some 
particular  moral  quality. Some collections impress their  audiences simply  by  the 
multitude of figures collected in  them. In  more compressed form, bare lists or  catalogues 
195
403 See Sailor (2004) 148.
of names within  a  passage from  a larger  work  also act as allusive  representations of 
character  or  morality.404 Such  collections of exempla represent something  at once more 
limited and more abstract  than any  individual instance.  Of course,  just  as authors may 
mold individual  exempla to fit  a  particular  argument or  circumstance, the selection  and 
arrangement  of individual  components guides the potential  meaning  of such  lists of 
names and sculptural programs. 405  Just  as with  the transformation  of individual 
exemplary  figures into cultural emblems,  the constituent  figures of these collections lose 
much  of their  specificity  as they  are subsumed by  the collection  as a  whole.  The reader  of 
a  compilation  like that  of Valerius Maximus cannot  simultaneously  apprehend both  the 
collective force of the whole and the particular  details of its constituent  elements.  Even 
within  a  single chapter  of the work, a  reader  must choose between  viewing  the whole or 
its parts at  any  one time. Likewise sculptural  programs—whether  gradually  assembled 
over  time like  the monuments scattered through  the Roman  Forum,  or  consciously 
planned like those in  the Forum  of Augustus or  the Portico and Theater  of Pompey—can 
only  be experienced by  an  observer either  as a collection or  as individual works at  any 
one time. The audiences for  such  collections must  choose to view  them  on either the 
particular  or the composite level,  and likely  will switch  back  and forth  between  the two 
viewpoints over  time. Unless they  consciously  refuse to view  a  collection  as whole, 
instead isolating each  component as a  discrete unit, they  will experience the totality  of 
the list or  monument  as a  representation  of an  abstract that cannot fully  assimilate  the 
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404 E.g. Cicero, pro Caelio 39, Par. Stoic. 11-12; Vergil Aeneid 6.756-886; Horace, C. 
1.12.33-48; Manilius 1.777-804; Quintilian 12.2.29-30; Pliny, Ep. 1.17. Ovid Fasti 
1.590-608 provides a similar list primarily using indirect references rather than names. 
Cf. Martial 11.5. Cf. Hölkeskamp (1996) 316 “Zugleich sind alle Figuren dieses 
‘Schatzhauses der Erinnerung’ auch Mitglieder und Repräsentanten einer besonderen 
Art von Kolletiv, nämlich der Gesamtheit aller maiores.” Hölkeskamp, however, 
concentrates on the Republican exemplars as forming a sort of library of both moral and 
practical patterns for action.
405 E.g. Gowing (2005) 144-45 discusses the potential criteria for inclusion or omission 
among the summi viri of Augustus’s forum. See Bloomer (1992) 17-54 and Skidmore 
(1996) 83-92 on Valerius Maximus’s choice and arrangement of exempla.
particular  details of each  component  exemplum.  Authors and monument builders deploy 
collections of images or  lists of names to represent the city  of Rome,  the body  of its 
citizens or  some aspect  of their  character  in  broad strokes, creating  an impressionistic 
sense of the object of representation that  downplays the messy  particular  details of its 
components in favor of the broader emotional or cultural vision.
Perhaps the most  clearly  emblematic textual form  such collections may  take is 
that  of a  bare list  of names cited to evoke some ethical or  cultural claim. Quintilian,  for 
example,  uses this type of list to proclaim  the efficacy  of Roman  exemplarity  itself as a 
method of moral instruction: “Will  others teach  Bravery, Justice,  Trust,  Self-Control, 
Frugality, Contempt for  Pain  and Death  better  than  the Fabricii, the Curii,  the Reguli,  the 
Decii,  the Mucii and countless others? As strong  as the Greeks are in  precepts to the 
same extent  the Romans are strong  in  examples,  which  is a  greater  thing”  (An 
fortitudinem,  iustitiam,  fidem, continentiam, frugalitatem,  contemptum  doloris ac 
mortis  melius  alii docebunt quam Fabricii,  Curii, Reguli,  Decii,  Mucii aliique 
innumerabiles? Quantum enim Graeci praeceptis  valent, tantum Romani,  quod est 
maius, exemplis, IO  12.2.30). Through  the list  at the center of this passage, Quintilian 
valorizes a  system  that teaches abstract  qualities through  circumstantially  limited 
instantiations of those qualities,  but  what  is notable here is the identification  of these 
qualities purely  with  family  names, eliding  references even  to particular  deeds.  Just  on 
the level  of the individual  names, this oblique form  of reference shifts the emphasis in 
evaluating  morals from  actions to actors,  from  examples to cultural  emblems.  In 
addition,  it  emphasizes the traditional  authority  of aristocratic families as a  group 
through  the use of names in  a  generic  plural.406 But  in  the wider  view,  by  collecting  these 
names as a  list,  Quintilian  creates a sort  of collective emblem  for  traditional  Roman 
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406 While in some cases the plural name describes a group of clearly linked men of the 
same name—the two famous Decii form a clear pair that would occasion the use of plural
—in other cases the plural name describes a well-known individual as a generic type—
Regulus would be a model of this type.
morality. Note that  the list  of virtues that  opens the passage—“Bravery,  Justice,  Trust, 
Self-Control, Frugality,  Contempt  for  Pain  and Death”—do not  correspond in  any  direct 
fashion to the list  of names that follows—“the Fabricii,  the Curii, the Reguli,  the Decii, 
the Mucii and countless others.”  The phrase “countless others” that  closes the list in fact 
enables this group to extend indefinitely: the preceding  five names act  as emblems for  an 
assumed vast  collection  of other Roman  examples.  Quintilian  lists these particular 
names not  so much  because they  themselves are active parts of every  Roman’s moral 
decision  process, but  because their citation  as exempla symbolizes the concept of 
exemplarity.
Numerous lists of this type appear in Roman  texts. 407 Monuments such as the 
Forum  of Augustus and imitations of its sculptural program  at  Arretium, Lavinium  and 
Pompeii function  as architectural equivalents of these written  collections.408 The Forum 
of Augustus both presented a  collective representation  of exemplars with  its sculptural 
program  of summi viri and also allowed for  the inclusion  of more recent  figures 
alongside its gallery  of Republican  Roman  heroes. 409  Within  this public  space the 
sculptural representation of leadership designed by  Augustus could continually 
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407 E.g. see Cic., Cael. 39, Par. Stoic. 11-12, Tusc. Disp. 1.89; Vergil Aeneid 6.756-886; 
Horace, C. 1.12.33-48; Manilius 1.777-804; Pliny, Ep. 1.17. Juvenal 8.1-23 weaves a 
similar list through a condemnation of contemporary mores.
408 For scholarly treatments of the Forum of Augustus, see Zanker (1968), Spannagel 
(1999). Flower (1996) 224-36 discusses the Forum as a monumental development of the 
display of imagines intended to supersede the family displays of the traditional 
senatorial families; Chaplin (2000) 174-87 discusses the Forum in relation to Augustus’s 
attitude toward and use of exempla; Gowing (2005) 138-45 discusses the shaping of 
memory through the construction of the Forum.
409 Cassius Dio reports that the ornamenta triumphalia were expanded after the 
construction of this Forum to include the erection of a statue there beside the summi viri 
(55.10.3). Chaplin (2000) 188-92 discusses the substitution of the ornamenta for the 
triumph itself under Augustus and the role of the statues in establishing this changed 
form as a desirable honor.
incorporate new  figures into the collective portrait. 410 Gowing links Vergil’s parade of 
Roman  heroes (Aen.  6.756-886) and Ovid’s passage on Republican  figures worthy  of the 
title ‘Augustus’ (Fasti 1.590-608) with  Augustus’s own  Forum  to claim  that: “The period 
gives rise,  in  other  words,  to a  canonical list of acceptable Republican  exempla,  a  list  that 
would set  the standards by  which  the emperor  himself wished to be judged.” 411 Although 
he does not  cite the passage, Gowing  here reproduces Augustus’s own  edict about the 
purpose of his forum: “he declared by  proclamation  that  he had devised this in  order  that 
the citizens would judge him,  while he lived, and the princes of the following  generations 
by  the standard of those men’s lives as if according to a  model”  (professus  edicto 
commentum id se, ut ad illorum  <vitam> velut ad exemplar et ipse, dum viveret,  et 
insequentium aetatium principes exigerentur a civibus,  Suet.  Aug.  31.5).412  Thus, 
Gowing  seems to read the explicit  purpose of a  single collective emblem  as representing a 
binding, culture-wide development.  T. J. Luce,  however,  identifies numerous 
disagreements between  the extant inscriptions from  Augustus’s forum  and the parallel 
accounts in  Livy’s history. He argues that Augustus and Livy  present  two very  different 
views of exempla: “for Livy  the emphasis was on imitation  or  avoidance in  the conduct  of 
one’s personal  life and public  career,  whereas for  Augustus it was on  the achievements 
against which  he and succeeding  principes  should be measured in the judgment of 
posterity.  But  in  all else there is little common  ground.”413  In  Luce’s reading,  then, 
Augustus’s forum  presents a  vision  of Augustus’s place in  Roman  history  that 
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410 Professus edicto commentum id se, ut ad illorum <vitam> velut ad exemplar et ipse, 
dum viveret, et insequentium aetatium principes exigerentur a civibus (Suet. Aug. 31.5).  
Chaplin (2000) discusses the role of the Forum as a collection of exempla. See e.g. Tac. 
Agr. 40 on the triumphal honors for Agricola’s victory in Britain; Pliny Ep. 2.7 for a 
triumphal statue erected to commemorate Vestricius Spurinna’s victory over the 
Bructeri; and AE 1972, 174 recording triumphal statues erected in Augustus’s forum for 
L. Volusius L. f. Saturninus, cos. 3 CE.
411 Gowing (2005) 144. For similar interpretations, see also Litchfield (1914) 53-61; David 
(1998) 10, 15-17; and Chaplin (2000) 171-72.
412 Gowing (2005) 144 n. 33 on this passage does, however, cite Chaplin (2000) 173-96 
who discusses the passage from Suetonius. See also Flower (1996) 232.
413 Luce (1990) 137.
emphasizes magnitude of accomplishment  as much as a  canon of acceptable conduct. 
Although  Augustus’s forum  was undoubtedly  an  influential  monument, treating  it  as 
establishing  “a  canonical list  of acceptable Republican  exempla”  is unlikely  to be 
accurate for anything beyond a narrow span of time.
Other  emblem  lists demonstrate that  the content  of such  compilations in  fact 
displays a  significant flexibility.  In  a  passage written  toward the end of Augustus’s 
principate,  for  instance, Manilius describes a  gallery  of heroes inhabiting  the Milky 
Way. 414 Even  more than  Augustus’s forum,  this list emphasizes magnitude, both  in  the 
number  of heroes and the scale of the accomplishments the poet  references.  The Roman 
heroes in  this list  appear  in  loosely  chronological  order  proceeding  from  the kings, to the 
early  Republic,  then  the Punic  wars, followed by  a  scattering  of figures from  the late 
Republic and finally  ending with  praise of Augustus, although  there are frequent local 
reversals within this larger  frame.415 Toward the end of the passage,  the poet cites three 
important aristocratic families collectively,  instead of identifying  individual members of 
each  clan: “the great descendants of Claudius, and the chiefs of the Aemilian  house, and 
the famous Metelli”  (et Claudi magna propago,  Aemiliaeque domus proceres,  clarique 
Metelli,  1.795-96).  The inclusion  of these familial references reinforces the emphasis that 
Manilius places on the unparalleled quantity  of Roman  heroes: “Roman  men, the 
number  of whom  is now  the largest”  (Romanique viri, quorum iam maxima turba est, 
1.777). Most relevantly  for  comparison  with  the Forum  of Augustus,  this catalogue of the 
Milky  Way’s inhabitants includes several figures from  the civil  wars, at  least  two of whom 
— Cicero and Cato the younger  — are unlikely  to have appeared in  the Forum.  First, 
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414 Manilius 1.777-804 comprises the list of Roman heroes. The preceding lines 760-76 
include a range of mythological and historical Greek heroes.
415 E.g. 1.784-86 which names Camillus and Brutus in reverse order (et Iove qui meruit 
caelum Romamque Camillus | servando posuit, Brutusque a rege receptae | conditor) 
and 1.787-88 which names Marcellus and Cossus, the third and second dedicators of the 
spolia opima, in reverse chronological order (et tertia palma | Marcellus Cossusque 
prior de rege necato).
Pompey  and Cicero follow  immediately  after  the two Scipiones Africani in  the list: 
“Pompey  the conqueror  of the world and through  three triumphs the first  citizen before 
its day,  and Tullius [Cicero] who attained the fasces by  the wealth  of his 
mouth”  (Pompeiusque orbis  domitor per trisque triumphos | ante diem princeps, et 
censu Tullius  oris | emeritus  fasces, 1.793-95). Even  more interesting is the trio of 
figures who immediately  precede the appearance of Augustus: “Cato the conqueror  of 
fortune,  and Agrippa the creator  of his own  fortune as a  soldier  under  arms, and the 
Julian  offspring  from  the lineage of Venus”  (et Cato fortunae victor,  fictorque sub armis 
| miles  Agrippa suae, Venerisque ab origine proles  | Iulia,  1.797-99). Of these five 
figures, Cicero and the younger Cato are unlikely  candidates for  inclusion  in the 
sculptural  program. 416  Within  the odd progression  from  Cato to Agrippa  and then 
Caesar,  the linkage between  Cato and Agrippa as respectively  “conqueror  of fortune 
(fortunae victor) and “creator  of his own  [fortune]”  (fictor… suae)  reveals that  Manilius 
here adopts a  sort  of the ‘great man’ approach  to history  that  focuses on individual  ability 
and force of will rather than  selecting  particular  figures for  ideological consistency. 
Likewise the  earlier  references to Pompey’s triumphs and Cicero’s oratory  accentuate the 
fact  of success in  and of itself, untethered from  any  particular  political  purpose. What 
this approach  produces,  however, is not a  de-politicized view  of emblematic  figures, but 
rather  one that  affirms Augustus’s position  by  the sheer  magnitude of his 
accomplishment.
Martial  provides a  strikingly  different example in  an  epigram  praising the 
emperor  Nerva.  The poet assembles a  number  of famous Republican  figures who would, 
he claims, reverse their  best known  acts to welcome Nerva  as supreme ruler  (11.5).417 
This epigram  works precisely  on  the assumption  that  most  readers would not expect 
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416 Gowing (2005) 145. See Luce (1990) 129-30 on the likely inclusion of Pompey in the 
sculptural program as “a nonpartisan gesture of which Livy doubtless would have 
approved.”
417 See also Gowing (2005) 105 on this poem.
these figures to support such a  ruler.  For example,  Martial claims that  “Brutus will 
rejoice with  you  as leader”  (te duce gaudebit Brutus,  11.5.9) and that,  setting aside their 
competition  for  supremacy, “[Pompey] the Great  along with  Caesar  as a  private citizen 
will love you”  (et te privato cum Caesare Magnus amabit,  11.5.11).  The epigrammatist 
caps this recitation  with  the paradoxical claim  that: “Also if Cato himself should return, 
called back from  the infernal shadows of Dis,  he will be a  Caesarian” (Ipse  quoque 
infernis revocatus  Ditis  ab umbris  | si Cato  reddatur, Caesarianus  erit,  11.5.13-14).  This 
compilation  of flattering hyperbole thus parades a  series of ideologically  troublesome 
figures whom  it  playfully  converts into supporters of Nerva’s principate.  It  is precisely 
because these statements are not  really  credible that  the poet’s praise for  Nerva  works. 
That  Martial’s claims cannot  be literally  true does not undermine his purpose; rather 
their  incredibility  is necessary  for  his paradoxical assertions to function as paradox.  This 
epigram, then,  stresses the incompatibility  of these authoritative figures with  the 
contemporary  principate.  Rather  than reconciling  these emblematic figures to the 
current political regime,  in  this poem  Martial  chooses to recognize their  essential 
alienation  from  that system, instead deploying  them  to illuminate Nerva  with  their 
reflected glory.  This paradox  in  fact  is a  central element in  contemporary 
characterizations of the ‘restoration of freedom’ following  the assassination of Domitian; 
Tacitus, for  example,  claims: “immediately  from  the very  birth  of this most  blessed era 
Nerva  Caesar  has combined once incompatible things, the principate and liberty”  (et 
quamquam primo  statim  beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerva Caesar res  olim dissociabiles 
miscuerit, principatum  ac libertatem,  Agr.  3).418 The epigrammatist’s playful hyperbole 
and the inversions of these emblematic figures establish  a frame of reference in  which  to 
consider  Nerva  that, despite parading  its own absurdity,  nevertheless works as praise for 
the emperor.
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418 See also Rimell (2008) 162-64 on Martial 11 and the new principate of Nerva.
Like the more succinct  lists of names, compilations of exemplary  figures such  as 
Atticus’s genealogical  volumes,  Valerius Maximus’s Facta et Dicta Memorabilia and 
Fannius’s collection  of martyr  biographies may  function as unified structures rather than 
simply  compilations of fragmented sub-units.  These collections that  begin  to appear  in 
the late Republic and the Augustan  era  from  authors including Varro, Atticus, and Nepos 
continue in  various forms through  the first  century  C.E. 419 Valerius Maximus provides 
the primary  extant example of this genre in  literature, but  Pliny’s reports of Capito’s and 
Fannius’s works demonstrate similar,  albeit  more focused activity  continuing  under the 
principate.  Pliny’s own  collection of letters with  its frequent  obituaries and other 
discussions of recent and contemporary  persons resembles in  part collections of this 
sort.420 In  contrast  to the claim  that the canon  of available exempla  and their  potential 
meanings became fixed during the early  principate following  the publication  of various 
exempla collections during  the Triumviral  and Augustan  periods,  the emphasis on 
Neronian and Domitianic  martyrs that  dominates much  of literary  production  from  the 
time of Trajan demonstrates continuing interest in more recent exemplary figures. 421
Some emblem  collections represent  sub-groups within Roman  society.  For 
example,  aristocratic  families,  especially  under  the Republic, used several types of 
emblematic  display,  often  involving  collections of figures,  to affirm  their  inherited 
authority.  The family  genealogies (stemmata)  and masks (imagines) of famous ancestors 
displayed in  the atria  of aristocratic homes impressed the family’s social  importance on 
those entering  the house.422  At  the most  basic  level, these objects served as ‘status 
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419 David (1998) provides an overview of the exempla collections preceding that of 
Valerius Maximus. He divides these into two broad types: (1) collections of exempla 
proper and (2) books de viris illustribus.
420 Freudenberg (2001) 215-17, who uses Pliny Ep. 4.11 on the exile of Valerius Licinianus 
as a primary example of this activity.
421 Litchfield (1914) 63-64. Hölkeskamp (1996) 327-28 sets the shift in the function of 
exemplarity earlier, toward the end of the Second Century BCE, with what he sees as the 
expansion of the primary audience beyond the nobiles to the entire people.
422 See Flower (1996) for the most recent full-scale examination of the imagines.
symbols’ for  those who had held a  magistracy  and their  descendants.423 In  discussing  the 
exemplary  function  of these displays earlier  critics have typically  focused on  the idea  that 
these masks act  as spurs to imitation  for  their  descendants.424 However,  the influence of 
these emblems on the behavior of later  generations was likely  more often an  unrealized 
ideal than  a frequent  source of guidance.  An  anecdote about  T. Manlius Torquatus (cos. 
165  BCE) in  Valerius Maximus provides a revealing  illustration (Val. Max.  5.8.3). In  140 
BCE,  Torquatus condemned his son D. Iunius Silanus for  abuse of office in 
Macedonia. 425 In  response the younger man committed suicide. The father  refused to 
attend the funeral,  instead offering  legal consultation  to his clients during the ceremony. 
While  he was doing  this,  Torquatus “saw  that  he had taken his seat  in  that atrium  where 
the image, conspicuous by  its severity,  of that well known Torquatus Imperiosus was 
placed,  and it  occurred to that  very  prudent  man  that  the portraits of ancestors with  their 
labels were accustomed to be placed in  the front  part of the house for  the purpose that 
their  descendants would not only  read of their  virtues,  but  would also imitate 
them” (videbat enim se in eo  atrio  consedisse,  in quo  Imperiosi illius  Torquati severitate 
conspicua imago posita erat,  prudentissimoque viro  succurrebat effigies  maiorum 
[suorum] cum titulis  suis idcirco in prima parte  aedium  poni solere, ut eorum  virtutes 
posteri non solum legerent,  sed etiam  imitarentur,  Val.  Max. 5.8.3). Citing this passage, 
Flower  describes this anecdote as indicating that  the example of Torquatus’s imagines 
“had encouraged him  in the severe stance he had adopted.” 426 A  close attention to the 
narrative, however, reveals that those steps occur  in  reverse order: Torquatus only 
notices the imago  after  he has demonstrated his own  severity.  Although Valerius defines 
imitation of ancestral  imagines  through  the voice of Torquatus as the way  things should 
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423 Flower (1996) 10.
424 See e.g. Hölkeskamp (1996) 308, 316-323.
425 Torquatus had emancipated the son for adoption into the Iunii Silani; see Cic. De fin. 
1.24.
426 Flower (1996) 218; compare, however, her translation of the passage on p. 323-24 
which indicates that the observation about imitating the ancestors comes after the fact.
work, it  is notable that  this anecdote does not  enact this expectation.  As the narrative 
appears in Valerius, the father’s reflection  about his ancestor’s severity  providing an 
exemplum  for  his own  appears only  after  the fact,  more as a  confirmation of his 
judgment  than  a  model for  it.427 Although  one might  argue for the ongoing  influence of 
the imagines  in  inculcating  Torquatus with  an  attitude of severity,  Valerius’s account of 
the event leaves little room for conscious imitation of his ancestor’s precedent.
The aristocratic funeral  projected the family  image of the participants more 
directly  into the center  of public  life, both  through  the public  parade of imagines  and 
through  the speech  from  the rostra praising  both the deceased and his or  her  ancestors. 
Individuals or  families sometimes published written  versions of these eulogies,  often 
when  a  public funeral could not  be held due to the circumstances, as in  cases when the 
person  had died abroad or  the body  were otherwise unavailable for  the funeral.428 
Romans viewed these speeches in  praise of the ancestors as an ancient,  indigenous 
practice.  Dugan  labels the funeral oration  (laudatio funebris) a  “mainstay  of aristocratic 
image-production.” 429 Cicero describes speeches of this sort  as one of the earliest extant 
forms of Roman  oratory: “for  the families themselves used to preserve them  like marks 
of their  own  honor  and monuments to be used, if anyone of the same family  had died, to 
recall  praise for  the household and to illustrate their  own  noble birth,  although  by  these 
eulogies the history  of our  affairs has become more filled with errors”  (ipsae enim 
familae sua quasi ornamenta ac monumenta servabant et ad usum,  si quis  eiusdem 
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427 Cic. Fin. 1.23-24 could be taken to imply a causal connection by recounting the deeds 
of the two Torquati in succession, but Cicero does not link the second episode to the first 
as a conscious imitation and the statement cum illam severitatem in eo filio adhibuit 
could apply equally either to direct imitation or an inherited family characteristic. The 
only direct reference to the maiores in this passage is in fact Torquatus’s judgment about 
the dissimilarity between his son and their ancestors: pronuntiaret eum non talem 
videri fuisse in imperio, quales eius maiores fuissent (Fin. 1.24). See also Livy, Per. 54, 
but the epitome retains no reference to the exemplum of the previous Torquatus, if such 
appeared in Livy’s text.
428 See Flower (1996) 91-150, especially 146-47 on published laudationes.
429 Dugan (2005) 28. See e.g. Dion. Hal. Rom. Ant. 5.17.3.
generis  occidisset,  et ad memoriam  laudum domesticarum  et ad illustrandam 
nobilitatem suam. quamquam  his  laudationibus  historia rerum  nostrarum  est facta 
mendosior,  Brut. 62). In  particular,  the third purpose Cicero suggests — illustrating  the 
family’s nobility  — explicitly  characterizes such  speeches as a means of projecting 
authority through images.
Cicero’s explanation  for  how  these speeches distort  history  suggests that their 
preservation  has less to do with  factual accuracy  than  projecting  the family’s importance 
through  the accumulated citation  of honors and offices: “For many  things are written  in 
them  which  did not happen: fake triumphs,  extra  consulships,  even  fake family 
relationships and transitions to the plebeians, since people of lower  birth  are mixed into 
an  unrelated family  of the same name; as if I were to say  that  I am  descended from 
Manius Tullius,  who was a  patrician  consul along with  Servius Sulpicius in  the tenth  year 
after  the kings had been driven out”  (multa enim  scripta sunt in eis  quae facta non sunt: 
falsi triumphi,  plures consulatus, genera etiam  falsa et ad plebem transitiones, cum 
homines  humiliores in alienum  eiusdem nominis  infunderentur genus; ut si ego me a 
M’. Tullio  esse dicerem,  qui patricius  cum  Ser. Sulpicio  consul anno  X post exactos  reges 
fuit,  Cic.,  Brut.  62).430  Notice that  the types of additions that  are specified do not 
generally  involve narratives of actions but instead prioritize the multiplication  of honors 
— triumphs, consulships,  family  relationships. Flower  states that, “The impressiveness of 
a  funeral speech  depended partly  on  the length  of the lists of offices and honors.”431 As 
with  some interpretations of the Forum  of Augustus and Manilius’s gallery  of heroes who 
inhabit  the Milky  Way,  the sheer  size of the list  becomes an  argument for  its importance. 
We have also seen  this tactic in  Cicero’s speech  pro Rabirio perduellionis  where the 
orator  recites a  barrage of authoritative names of those who were aligned against 
Saturninus to demonstrate the authority  of the conservative faction (in  section  4.1 
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430 On fabrications introduced through funeral orations, see also Livy 8.40.3-5.
431 Flower (1996) 149.
above).  In  the competition  between  aristocratic families, the length  of their  funeral 
laudations becomes a marker of their success.
Varro’s Hebdomades  and Atticus’s similar  collection  of imagines  demonstrate a 
development on  these familial displays of images. Although  neither  of these works is now 
extant,  ancient  descriptions state that both  authors published works pairing  images of 
numerous well known  figures with  capsule accounts of their  individual 
accomplishments.432 David links Atticus’s works on  individual  families to the laudatio 
funebris  and the imagines.433  This ‘picture book’ or  catalogue approach to history 
presents a  compilation of emblematic  figures rather  than  an  extended narrative of 
events. In  such  works,  concise description  is likely  a necessity. Nepos’s description  of 
Atticus’s works emphasizes the extreme brevity  of the texts: “… under  the images of 
individuals he described the acts and offices of those men in  no more than  four  or  five 
verses: and this is scarcely  to be believed,  that  such great  things can be declared in  so 
brief a  fashion” (… sub singulorum  imaginibus  facta magistratusque  eorum  non 
amplius  quaternis  quinisque versibus  descripserit: quod vix credendum  sit, tantas  res 
tam breviter potuisse declarari,  Att.  18).  Such  collections thus unite visual images with 
extremely  abbreviated narratives.  By  compressing  deeds and offices into such  a  limited 
space,  Atticus directs his audience toward experiencing  the history  of Rome as an 
illustrated parade of emblematic  figures whose individual  roles appear  only  in brief 
outline. As with  funeral laudations,  the interest in  large collections asserts itself here as 
well: Varro’s collection  included images and descriptions of seven  hundred persons 
(Pliny, NH 35.11).  As with  other  lists of emblems, then, the quantity  of figures may 
become an  end in  itself. Such  collections of images allow  their  readers to choose between 
contemplating  one or  more selected persons or  marveling  at  the collective prestige of the 
multitude.
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432 See Pliny, NH 35.11 on both works; See also Nepos, Att. 18 on that written by Atticus.
433 David (1998) 15.
4.4: Conclusion.
As I have argued in  this chapter,  Romans sometimes deploy  exempla  simply  as tokens of 
cultural  authority; that  is,  they  introduce exemplary  figures not for  practical or  ethical 
guidance or  illustration,  but simply  for  the prestige or  notoriety  connected to those 
figures. Figures whose acts were frequently  cited as exempla  could themselves become 
emblems that  represent  an abstract  value or simply  convey  broad cultural authority. 
When they  symbolize abstract  qualities,  the narrative details behind exemplary  figures 
tends to fade into obscurity. In  some cases the composite  form  may  present  a  broad 
sense of a  particular  abstract  quality,  as the Forum  of Augustus was designed to 
represent  leadership. 434 In  other  cases these collections could suggest a  impressionistic 
vision  of Roman  identity  or  the mos  maiorum.  Sometimes lists impress simply  by  the 
multitude of figures they  include.  These collective forms serve as cultural shorthand to 
evoke an  image of Roman  society  either  in part or as a  whole.  Obviously  viewers and 
readers are free to approach  any  such  compilation  at  different  times either  as the totality 
or its particular individual elements.
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Conclusion
As I argued in  the introduction,  exemplarity  provides a  useful window  onto the structure 
of the Roman moral universe.  By  locating  the basis for  judgment  in  examples of 
particular  acts or  events rather  than  in  a collection  of abstract  rules or  an  expressed 
moral  code, the use of exempla  encourages a  compartmentalization of ethical  thought. 
Where earlier  scholarship has tended to treat  these instances as fairly  direct 
representatives of externally  defined moral categories,  this dissertation  argues that, aside 
from  their  instantiation  in  contingent narratives, these categories maintained only  a 
nebulous abstract  existence in  Roman  thought.  Traditional Roman  moralism  classified 
instances within  moral categories not  by  adherence to a  set  rule,  but  by  a  sort  of family 
resemblance within  these groups.  The casuistic character  of traditional moralism 
insulates those who engage in this discourse from  perceiving  the contradictions between 
assessments made under differing  circumstances. Moralism  rooted in  the particular 
details of narratives rather  than  abstract  definitions is well adapted to conceal or  absorb 
potential conflicts and paradoxes that  may  arise from  the circumstantial application  of 
moral judgment. 
The traditional complaints in  ancient  texts about  the degeneration  of morals 
actually  demonstrate the resilience of this form  of moralism.435 As a consequence of the 
compartmentalization of ethical material  into circumstantial  narratives, questioning  the 
current efficacy  of exemplary  imitation does not  compromise the underlying  system, nor 
does it  produce any  real alteration  in  behavior.  People simply  agree with  the complaints, 
and then  go on  as they  had before. Most  people assume that  they  themselves have chosen 
‘good’ models (hence why  they  agree with  the criticism); in  contrast  to this optimistic 
self-assessment, it  is only  the people with  whom  they  disagree who have failed to 
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435 See e.g. Cic. De rep. 5.1-2; Livy 1.pr.12; Sallust, Cat. 11-13. See Edwards (1993) 1-33 
for an overview of Roman moralism, including the trope of decline.
emulate the tradition  of the ancestors (mos  maiorum).  Without a  stable abstract  code to 
which  judgments can  be referred,  the  ability  to recast ‘tradition’ to match  current  needs 
and ideological preferences allows individuals of various views all  to present  themselves 
as the exponents of traditional morality.  (I discussed this ability  to manipulate the 
understanding of tradition in chapter 1.)
The permeable boundary  between  factual  and fictional narratives enables what 
seems credible — and therefore what appears to be credibly  traditional — to serve as 
historical fact.  As I argued in  the second chapter,  the ability  to treat  observed actions as 
the acts of stock  figures and the converse  ability  to transform  stock  characters and 
narratives into specific exempla allows the process of exemplary  comparison  itself to 
provide a  mythical  or ideological  basis for  justifying  the expediency  of moralistic 
judgments.  The practice of exemplarity  locates the true ground for  its stability  in the 
method of making  ethical  decisions rather  than  in  the content  of those decisions. Moral 
ideas must  consequently  remain  rooted in  circumstantially  bound enactments,  not  in 
reified abstractions.  For  this purpose, anonymous exempla  are particularly  useful for 
transforming  anecdotes into abstract representations of acts, without  thereby 
transforming  them  fully  into figures for  abstract  concepts. Thus,  rather  than enabling an 
idealist  understanding,  narrative-based moralism  retains the focus of ethical  assessment 
entirely in the world of  contingent circumstances.
Given  this focus on  a  practical ethics located firmly  in the realm  of human  action, 
it  is necessary  to understand not  only  how  exemplarity  structures arguments for  which 
behaviors to imitate and which  to avoid, but  also how  it  generates illustrations of the 
general  condition  of the world against  which  those behaviors are to be judged.  As I 
argued in  the third chapter of this dissertation,  writers and speakers may  in  fact  adopt 
this approach  to using  exempla to argue against making  judgments,  or  against  making 
excessively  harsh judgments. Illustrations treat  examples not  as material  for  morally 
charged comparisons but  rather  as purportedly  typical representatives of a  type. Instead 
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of positioning  exempla as objects for  direct  imitation, such  arguments employ  them  as 
rhetorical premises for a related idea.
Finally,  it  is important  to realize that Romans could frequently  make rather 
superficial  use of the mechanisms of exemplarity.  They  may  suggest that a  pattern  of 
comparison  or  imitation  is applicable to a particular  situation  without  any  definite 
logical or  evidentiary  basis.  Prominent  among  such  superficial  deployments of exempla 
is the use of emblems to claim  the social  or  moral authority  of an  important  figure by 
means of a  tangential connection.  Such  emblematic assertions pare down  the 
relationship between  the exemplary  figure and the object  of comparison  to a  simple 
assertion  of their  connection.  Despite the shallow  character  of these associations, 
however, they could serve as powerful declarations of intellectual or political allegiance.
Looking  forward, I see three primary  vectors for  continuing  work  on  this project: 
(1) more broadly  and much  more thoroughly  incorporating  evidence from  material 
culture and the work  that has been  done on  such  sources; (2) integrating  theoretical 
material  derived from  recent studies of human  moral psychology; and (3) further 
elaborating  the view  of exemplary  thought as a  method of mythologizing the activities 
observed in  everyday  life to become the basis for  this variety  of moral  and practical 
discussion.  In combination,  these paths may  provide first illustrations for  the extension 
of this practice of moral  reasoning  to the lower  echelons of society  both  within  and 
beyond the elite who dominate the literary  sources that have provided the basis for  my 
work  in  this dissertation,  and second a  more comprehensive theoretical basis for 
interpreting  how  lower  status persons might  understand themselves as participants in  a 
system shared between themselves and the elite.
A  wider  incorporation  of various evidence from  material  culture — artistic 
representations, graffiti, etc.  — provides a  means to expand my  work to cover  a  broader 
swath  of Roman  society.  Although  my  discussion  has incorporated some small concerns 
with  visual representations,  primarily  in  my  chapter on  emblems, I have largely  focused 
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on  reinterpreting  literary  evidence to demonstrate the centrality  of a  more ad hoc mode 
of creating  and recreating  exemplary  material  to meet  current  needs than what the 
earlier  discussions focused on  well-known enduring exemplars have described. The work 
that  others have done on  exemplarity  expressed through  visual  media has typically  built 
on  the consensus that  I have argued against.  Often  working from  the assumption  that 
exempla were necessarily  drawn  from  widely  recognized elite figures,  a  number  of 
scholars have attempted to extend our  understanding of Roman  exemplarity  to the lower 
ranks of society  using various sorts of material evidence to demonstrate how  members of 
the lower  classes might  understand themselves in  relation  to those aristocratic  figures,  or 
how  they  might model  themselves after  those figures. 436 This body  of scholarship, thus, 
offers an  opportunity  to begin  supplementing  and extending  my  work with  a  broader 
range of evidence by  building  on and reorienting  those discussions to align  more closely 
with  my  focus on  the users rather  than  the creators of exempla.  In  particular,  the work 
that  some scholars have done on  the use of type scenes and type figures as a  form  of 
engagement with  the traditions of exemplarity 437 indicate a  potentially  fruitful path  for 
further  extending  my  discussion in  Chapter  2  of the cross-pollination of narrative 
outlines derived from  both fictional and factual sources.  The use of stereotyped figures 
and scenes in  artistic  representations suggests a  parallel to the repetition  of narrative 
patterns between  exempla, declamations and fables. A  wider attention to non-literary 
evidence provides the best possibility  for  illustrating  the extension  of the pattern  of 
observation  and recollection  that  I have described into the lower  classes of Roman 
society.
Modern studies into the psychological bases for moral  thought provide another 
path  to expand my  work  to encompass a  broader  understanding  of the place of 
exemplary  thought in  the operation  of Roman  moralism. My  description  of the use of 
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436 See especially the essays collected in Bell and Hansen (2008).
437 e.g. Davies (2008), Hölscher (2008), and von Hesberg (2008)
exempla has revealed various practices that  seem  to enact  largely  unmediated 
expressions of a  number of the innate tendencies of moralism  that  have been  identified 
by  recent  psychological  studies. For example,  social  psychologists have demonstrated a 
typical human  tendency  toward hypocritical application  of moral standards,  including 
the strong predilection  for “motivated reasoning”  to reach  conclusions dictated by 
personal advantage; the tendency  to judge ourselves by  more lenient standards than  we 
use to judge others, even  to the extent  of using potentially  negative information as a 
standard only  for  making  judgments about  others,  not  ourselves; “naive  realism”, the 
tendency  to assume that we see things as they  truly  are  while others do not; and the 
tendency  to interpret  conflicts in  such  a  way  as to produce clear-cut, black-and-white 
oppositions between  the opposing sides.438  These predilections appear  to suggest an 
innate psychological  basis for  many  of the patterns in which Roman speakers and writers 
adapt  exemplary  materials to serve their  best  advantage in  their  contemporary 
circumstances. By  identifying  the activities I have described in  the use of exempla for 
moral  argument  as consistent  with  a  human predisposition  toward certain  patterns of 
moral  judgment,  I would seek to provide an  underlying  theoretical explanation  for  the 
potential diffusion  of the exemplary  mode of moral argument and decision making 
beyond the Roman  elite.  Although  this work  cannot  directly  prove the extension  of the 
practice of exemplary  moral argument as I have described it  to a  broader  portion  of 
Roman  society,  it  does suggest  a  potent  means for  understanding how  members of the 
lower  classes might buy  into the system  that we find in  elite literature, whether  they 
adopted these forms of reasoning for themselves directly or in some adapted form.
Finally,  a  broader  and more thorough  integration of the concept  that exemplarity 
acts as a sort of constantly  recreated mythology  based in  the observation of everyday  life 
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438 The chapter on “The Faults of Others” p. 59-80 in J. Haidt (2006) The Happiness Hypothesis. 
New York, provides an overview, in a relatively popularizing format, of several of the conclusions 
about the psychological bases for moralism derived from recent studies in moral psychology.
in  each  individual’s local  communities provides another  vector  for  enriching  the 
theoretical  foundations of my  model for the use of exempla. Through  this concept,  based 
in  Beard’s adaption  of Barthes’ model of “Mythology  Today”  to discuss the mythological 
role  of declamation  in  ancient Rome, 439  I suggest  that the process of identifying  by 
personal observation  models for emulation or avoidance encouraged a  practice through 
which  individuals would transform  the acts and events they  had observed into the 
substance of a  form  of mythology, that is, they  would engage in  a  process by  which they 
mythologized the behaviors and attitudes that  they  had identified as significant  during 
the course of their  everyday  life. Thus,  in  the practice of exemplarity,  the material  of 
living  memory  served not  simply  as a  mental  record of actions, but  also as a  vibrant 
source for  the creation of moral meaning, the core in fact  of what  served as the Roman 
moral  code.  While integrating this theoretical argument  more thoroughly  into my 
description of exemplarity, I hope to enrich my  model of the interaction  between 
individuals and the various local communities with which  they  interacted, through  which 
they  passed during  the course of their  activities, and from  which  they  assembled their 
personal libraries of remembered exempla. A  vital element of this practice  of observation 
was the mental recording  not  only  of observed actions,  but  of the various reactions to 
those actions which  could provide patterns to predict the potential responses to 
repetitions of particular  exempla.  A  more thorough  integration of this understanding of 
exemplarity  as a  means to mythologize everyday  life may  enable us to reveal  more clearly 
the means by  which Roman society  maintained the perception of a  stable ideology 
through  the medium  of an  ever-shifting  body  of exemplary  material that  was perpetually 
liable to be recast or replaced in accord with current demands.
These three  vectors for  further  study  — the incorporation  of evidence from 
material  remains, the observations derived from  recent studies of moral  psychology,  and 
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439 Beard (1993) and Barthes (1972).
the interpretation  of exemplarity  as a  form  of mythological discourse — offer  an 
opportunity  to create a socially  broader and theoretically  richer picture of the Roman use 
of exempla than  the primarily  literary  focus in  this dissertation  has so far  achieved.  My 
work  here has attempted to reorient our  view  of exemplarity  to understand the essential 
importance of the use of exempla rather  than the creation of exempla. I have 
demonstrated the ancient  authors deployed a  wider  variety  of examples in  more varied 
ways than  has generally  been recognized.  In  particular  I emphasize the malleability  of 
both  the material and the forms of argument through  which  individuals could deploy  it. 
The concepts of the anonymous exemplum  and the exemplary  emblem  represent 
probably  the two most significant  expansions to our  previous picture of exemplarity. 
Each  of these two forms is essentially  the inverse of the other: nameless exempla 
emphasize the narrative of the action  to the exclusion  of the identity  of the actor, 
exemplary  emblems the actor’s identity  and social authority  to exclusion  of the narrative 
details. These opposing  concepts provide a  cogent illustration  of the wider  range of 
exemplarity that I have sought to demonstrate through my discussion.
By  focusing  on  the use of exempla  in  building moral and practical arguments,  I 
have attempted to reorient  our  understanding  of Roman  exemplarity. Rather  than  being 
primarily  limited to an  established canon  of important  historical figures, exempla 
emerged on  an  ad hoc  basis within  a  vibrant  tradition  centered around the identification 
of useful models within  one’s local community.  With  its emphasis on  supporting  moral 
judgments through  particularist  argument, exemplarity  is well  attuned to mold itself to 
the opportunism  of traditional, non-rigorous moralism. The Roman  use of exempla 
provides a supple  and powerful  means to combine the ability  to evolve and adapt  in 
response to emergent circumstances with a firm sense of adherence to tradition.
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